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Summary 
Wireless communications are experiencing an unprecedented expansion. The 
increasing mobility of the communication society and the pace of 
technological change are growing pressure for more spectrum to support 
more users, more uses and more capacity. Thus, spectrum management has 
become an extremely important part of wireless communications. A few 
regulators are changing their traditional ‘command and control’ approach. 
Nevertheless, many features of optimal spectrum management are still 
widely discussed. This work is aimed at contributing to that discussion. 
The key insight is that spectrum management can benefit from more 
liberal spectrum sharing. This work set out to answer three main research 
questions: (i) whether there is a theoretical framework which can be used to 
analyze and guide spectrum policy reform, when moving from a traditional 
‘command and control’ regime to a market-inspired one; (ii) whether it is 
possible to design a plausible mechanism which can promote efficient 
allocation and assignment of spectrum commons; (iii) whether (and how) 
technological developments could enable band sharing methods outside the 
traditional management framework and without harmful interference.  
The literature on transition economics and policy was used to help 
answer the first research question. Evidence from liberalizing countries was 
positively analyzed to discuss reforms of spectrum allocation and 
assignment methods. Most countries have adopted strategies that gradually 
change their spectrum policies and started by using more liberal methods to 
assign spectrum. It is also argued that future spectrum reforms might benefit 
from insights presented in the transition economics literature. 
 A translation of a model on cartel quotas under majority rule is 
proposed to answer the second research question. The work verifies, firstly, 
that an analogous set of properties is satisfied under our assumptions and 
that the median-index theorem applies, mutatis mutandis, to our setting. 
Thus firms bidding to acquire spectrum commons contribute a minimum 
amount of their wealth; the sum of contributions offered is then compared to 
other bids for the same spectrum, which is allocated to the highest bidder. 
 The last research question considers novel ways of spectrum sharing 
that might be enabled by technological developments. The work explores 
contributions, from various research areas, regarding management of scarce 
resources. Those contributions are discussed with respect to shared spectrum 
access. It is suggested that spectrum management might benefit from 
methods which enable the management of pooled (intermittent) demands for 
access, especially methods in line with fair sojourn protocols. 
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Chapter 1. Spectrum management: an introduction 
 
1.1.- Radio spectrum for wireless communications: debate and issues 
Radio spectrum1
                                                 
1 Radio spectrum depicts that part of the electromagnetic spectrum used to transmit voice, 
video and data; it uses frequencies from 3 kHz to 300 GHz and is segmented into bands of 
infinitely re-usable frequencies (see, e.g., ITU 2000; Hatfield 2003: 1-2; Ofcom 2004: 8). 
 (henceforth, spectrum) is a vital input into an ever widening 
range of uses (see, e.g., Richards et Al. 2006; Cave et Al. 2007a; Hazlett 2008; 
Ofcom 2010a). Technological developments in electronic communications 
systems, coupled with individuals’ desires to communicate with each other 
and have timely access to information, wherever they are, have brought an 
increase in demand for wireless communications and, consequently, in 
derived demand for spectrum (see, e.g., Benkler 2002; Cave 2002; Hazlett 
2003; Webb 2007). However, spectrum can accommodate only a limited 
number of simultaneous users (see, e.g., Hatfield 2003; ITU 2006a). Therefore, 
it is crucial to develop appropriate technical, economic and regulatory 
 9 
solutions to avoid artificial spectrum scarcity,2
Optimal spectrum management depends on mechanisms and 
incentives in place to promote efficiency in its allocation to different uses. 
Spectrum regulators have played a pervasive role for decades, especially by 
deciding the allocation of scarce spectrum resources to a variety of 
commercial and public services, such as radio and television broadcasting, 
private and commercial radio services, defence and public safety. In fact, 
until the late 1990s, the dominant approach to spectrum regulation has been 
based on ‘command and control’, with spectrum use determined almost 
entirely by regulatory fiat and enshrined in administrative licences.
 while keeping safeguards 
against harmful interference (ITU 2001a, 2005a).  
3
The debate on the limitations of this framework has a relatively long 
history indeed.
 This has 
resulted in a rigid spectrum management framework (see, e.g., FCC 2002a; 
Ofcom 2004; Chaduc and Pogorel 2008).  
4
                                                 
2 See, e.g., Akyildiz et Al. (2008), Benjamin (2003), Benkler (1998), Cave et Al. (2007a), Coase 
(1959), Hazlett (2001), Levin (1966), Noam (1995) among academic contributions; FCC 
(2002a), ITU (2001a) and Ofcom (2004) among papers delivered by regulators; and Vodafone 
(2006) for perspectives from a wireless industry operator. 
3 Licences confer the right to transmit at a specific frequency to a licence holder exclusive of 
others, with the expectation that license holders will be able to transmit their signals without 
any harmful interference, as licences also set power limits, temporal and spatial boundaries, 
etc. (see the literature cited above, esp. ITU recommendations). 
4 For instance, the Journal of Law and Economics devoted a special issue to spectrum 
management problems in 1998 (vol. 41, no. 2). 
 As early as 1959, Ronald Coase proposed, in his critique of 
the administrative approach, a market allocation of radio spectrum rights 
 10 
(Coase 1959). Then the US regulators asked if that was “a big joke” (Hazlett 
2001). The thesis that spectrum management needs more flexibility (to 
accommodate technological developments and new demands) has gained 
widespread currency recently and has been at the heart of the so called 
“property rights vs commons” debate (see, e.g., Faulhaber and Farber 2003; 
Baumol and Robyn 2006; Hazlett 2006, 2008a). This has led to some strong 
calls from industry experts and leading academics for a radical overhaul of 
traditional methods of spectrum management, through the use of market-
based (or market-inspired) solutions.5
(i) is there a theoretical framework which can be used to analyze and 
guide spectrum policy reform when moving spectrum management from a 
traditional ‘command and control’ regime to a market-inspired one? 
National and international regulators very often seem to have managed 
spectrum in response to contingent pressures and this has resulted in a 
  
Some regulators (e.g., Ofcom in the UK, FCC in the US and ACMA in 
Australia) have taken bold steps towards a more liberal spectrum 
management regime. Nevertheless, many features of future spectrum 
management are still greatly discussed.  
This work is aimed at contributing to that discussion; in particular, it 
set out to answer three main research questions: 
                                                 
5 See the literature cited above, esp. Faulhaber and Farber 2003; Baumol and Robyn 2006; 
Hazlett 2006, 2008a; see also Vodafone 2006 and Wik Consult 2005, 2008. 
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piecemeal approach to spectrum management (sometimes even in 
liberalizing countries); optimal spectrum management could be promoted by 
a more clear-cut strategy to its liberalization; 
(ii) is it possible to design a plausible mechanism which can promote 
efficient allocation and assignment of (shared) spectrum commons? Some 
spectrum bandwidth for (shared) unlicensed use has been traditionally 
offered by regulators, but usually without safeguards against harmful 
interference, and without use of market-based mechanisms to determine the 
value of allocated frequencies. New technologies and demands are bringing 
about increasing interest for collective use of bandwidth (with no harmful 
interference); optimal spectrum management includes consideration for the 
problem of efficient expansion of spectrum commons; 
(iii) what methods can be used to share spectrum with no harmful 
interference (or even `spectrum tragedies`; Hazlett 2005) by new spectrum-
using technologies, which are challenging the traditional ‘command and 
control’ framework? In general, the traditional approach has divided 
spectrum along three fundamental dimensions, i.e. frequency, time and 
space; however, new technologies promise to enable spectrum use in various 
ways, which differ widely from traditional ones in some cases. Recognition 
that spectrum is a shared input, which can be used collectively, suggests 
 12 
need to explore management methods (perhaps already implemented in 
similar circumstances) that could improve spectrum use.  
 
1.1.1.- Outline of this work 
The key insight is that spectrum management can benefit from more liberal 
spectrum sharing. After the short introduction to the current discussion 
about optimal spectrum management and main research questions 
addressed here, this chapter looks, firstly, at the role of spectrum in the value 
chain and shows that spectrum can be used as an input for a wide range of 
services and applications. Next, this chapter reviews the key tools for 
spectrum management - i.e. spectrum allocation, assignment and 
interference management – and discusses changes, suggested by market-
inspired approaches, to the traditional spectrum management regime. 
Finally, it presents a brief overview of new technologies, including those in 
their early stages of development, and discusses some of the implications for 
spectrum management. 
Chapter 2 carries on the review and the discussion begun in the 
introduction, with a closer look at specific themes of market-inspired 
spectrum regimes. It considers in more detail a number of ingredients of 
optimal spectrum management promoted by regulators who are changing 
their spectrum framework from ‘command and control’ to a more liberal one. 
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The chapter reviews the literature on spectrum auctions, secondary trading 
and liberalization of spectrum uses. It then discusses the issue of 
“unlicensed” spectrum6
                                                 
6 This is also known as licence-exempt spectrum (esp. in the UK), or class licensed spectrum 
(esp. in Australia). Some commentators refer to such arrangement as spectrum commons. 
Here unlicensed spectrum is used to refer to spectrum whose users do not hold an 
administrative licence for exclusive access. 
 and public sector use of spectrum. The chapter sets 
out to provide key information on recent developments towards a more 
market-inspired spectrum management regime and a map to locate the 
analyses that will be developed in the three core chapters, which follow the 
methodological presentation for this research (Chapter 3). 
 Chapter 4 analyzes strategies and tactics of spectrum management 
reform. It proposes the use of models from the literature on the economics of 
transition from planned economies to market economies (see Dewatripont 
and Roland 1995) as a theoretical framework for the case of spectrum 
liberalization. The chapter presents spectrum reforms in a number of 
countries and uses them as case studies. The chapter discusses the empirical 
finding that reforms have proceeded along paths which differ from those 
suggested by arguably relevant theory; it also discusses hurdles to the 
implementation of a few market-inspired mechanisms for spectrum 
management (with technological innovation playing a relevant role) and 
how spectrum reforms might best be managed. 
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 Chapter 5 then addresses a more specific topic, namely the problem of 
collecting funds by a few commercial spectrum operators who are willing to 
negotiate access and use together some bandwidth in a shared manner. A 
number of innovative technologies offer new opportunities to exploit 
spectrum resources collectively, with limited (and often tractable) 
interference problems. Starting from a study on cartel quotas (see Cave and 
Salant 1995), a majority vote solution is proposed to allocate spectrum for 
collective use and to assign it via auctions. 
 Chapter 6 investigates those instances where some bandwidth is 
shared among a few operators, including the public sector, using various 
(novel) technologies and network architectures. In those circumstances, it is 
crucial to have mechanisms which can deal with possibly large and 
heterogeneous demands of spectrum access, in order to avoid congestion and 
interference. A number of management arrangements and their implications 
are proposed and discussed. 
 Chapter 7 concludes and proposes some possible avenues for further 
research. 
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1.2.- Spectrum in the value chain 
Spectrum is an input for the provision of an increasing number of radio 
frequency services. Before the advent of radio broadcasting at the beginning 
of the 20th century, spectrum was used mainly by point-to-point applications 
(such as fixed services) that enjoyed open access to the ether. Today 
spectrum is used to provide a wide range of wireless services; a look at any 
national table of frequency allocations can illustrate how regulation of 
spectrum access has accommodated a great number of spectrum uses, 
especially in frequency bands between 300 MHz and 3.5 GHz.7
                                                 
7 For European countries, cf. data available at 
 
 In the early days of broadcasters’ services – radio services first and, 
then, also TV broadcast services - access to spectral resources was heavily 
disciplined by regulatory authorities (Hazlett 1998). The goal of spectrum 
regulation should be the same as that of other economic regulation, namely 
to advance the long-term interests of end-users. Most observers agree that 
this is best achieved by competition, but the nature of competition in the 
value chain can be very varied, and there may be uses for which competition 
is not feasible or desirable, such as military use, radio-astronomy and 
emergency services use (Cave 2006; Wik Consult 2008; EC 2009).   
www.ero.dk . 
 16 
Figure 1 shows a typical vertical structure of production of wireless 
broadcasting and communications (to the extent that a distinction between 
them can be maintained).  
Figure 1 - Spectrum in the wireless service value chain 
              
 Value Chain            
 
Source: Cave (2006:  221). 
 
Different degrees of vertical integration or separation can 
accommodate many (spectrum) sharing opportunities, for example: 
Examples 
- the same physical assets and transmission capabilities allow a range of 
programming to be sold or shared. Equally, content can reach end-users via 
Wholesale 
Spectrum   
                     Retail      
Content 
Physical assets 
Transmission 
Reselling 
Retail (end-users) 
Programmes, file-sharing 
Licensees, intermediaries, commons 
Towers and masts 
MVNOs, broadcasting transmission 
Air time 
Mobile telephony, broadcasting services 
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many platforms; for instance, television content can be delivered to viewers 
in the retail market by employing three main broadcasting technologies, i.e. 
terrestrial, satellite or cable television (see, e.g., Adda and Ottaviani 2005); 
- access to spectrum can be achieved in numerous ways via commons, direct 
licensing, underlays or overlays,8
1.3.- Traditional key tools for spectrum management 
 or using intermediaries such as band 
managers or operators of real time access regimes (Bazelon 2003; Bykowsky 
2003; Cave and Webb 2003c); 
- physical assets, spectrum and other resources can be used to provide entry 
or access points nearer the end-user (for example MVNOs and other resellers 
typically use existing wireless network infrastructures and capacity to offer 
their services). 
 
Traditional spectrum management involves a layering of mechanisms, 
starting at the international level with the ITU planning process through 
national planning processes and down to licensing and interference 
management (ITU 1998, 2001b, 2001c, 2005a). In these processes, regulators 
                                                 
8 Spectrum underlay techniques seek coexistence between two or more users of the same 
channel (or spectrum swath) by enabling transmissions with very low power by secondary 
users that will not interfere with systems with higher power densities deployed by a 
primary user. Spectrum overlay techniques are based on an intrude-and-avoid principle 
such that a secondary user transmits signals only when the channel is not occupied by the 
primary user. See also Section 1.4 below. 
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use three fundamental tools to manage spectrum: (i) interference 
management; (ii) spectrum allocation; (iii) spectrum assignment. 
Those tools are likely to continue to play a key role for spectrum 
management; however, regulatory decisions have become increasingly 
unsatisfactory and arbitrary in recent years (Cave 2006). There is widespread 
agreement that more flexibility has to be introduced in their deployment and 
one option to achieve this is to substitute market-inspired mechanisms for 
administrative management wherever possible (Coase 1959; Levin 1966; 
Melody 1980; Rosston and Steinberg 1997; Spiller and Cardilli 1999; Hazlett 
2001; Cave 2002; Kwerel and Williams 2002; Benjamin 2003; Faulhaber 2005).  
 This will be addressed in the following sections, by describing the role 
of those three key spectrum management tools, the limitations arising from 
the command-and-control approach and the potential advantages of a more 
flexible framework. 
 
1.3.1.- Interference management 
Interference management under ‘command and control’ has been carried out 
by a rigid definition of technical conditions to be met9
                                                 
9 See, for instance, Eurostrategies-LS Telecom (2007).  
 and licences have 
provided a major tool for interference management. In addition, regulators 
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have also introduced guard bands between spectrum allocations to different 
services and have established a hierarchy of users, whereby primary users’ 
operations enjoy the right to be free from interference caused by secondary 
users (Falch and Tadayoni 2004; Peha 2009). 
The limitations of this approach to interference management have 
become a major regulatory issue, especially in those countries that are 
reforming their spectrum management regimes (see Wik Consult 2005; 
McLean Foster & Co. 2007 for surveys). However, the more flexibility 
allowed, the higher the risk of harmful interference and, consequently, the 
more crucial the definition of spectrum rights, which is intertwined with the 
development of market-mechanisms (cf. Ofcom 2006a).  
Interference management under a market-based approach is likely to 
be aimed at fully protecting spectrum users; this protection would be the 
outcome of a negotiation process among those entitled to spectrum rights 
(Cave and Webb 2003b). In a less radical way, parameter-based interference 
management, that outlines the objectives to be achieved (for example in 
relation to permissible out-of-band emissions), and yet still leaves the 
licensee with flexibility as to how best to meet these parameters, is preferable 
to the traditional approach of tightly prescribing technical conditions.  
In reducing the relevance of the ‘command and control’ framework, 
spectrum policy is also moving towards an expansion of licence-exempt 
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spectrum (Benkler 1998; Noam 1995; Buck 2002; Werbach 2004; Lehr 2005; 
Best 2006; Brito 2007; Horvitz 2007). License-exempt spectrum was originally 
designed to accommodate experimental uses. However, the success of many 
of these experimental applications (for instance, WiFi) have seen them 
extended to commercial use without shifting to other parts of the spectrum.  
Interference management for unlicensed spectrum usually involves 
only power limits and perhaps also the protocols to be deployed (Weiser and 
Hatfield 2006). Therefore, unlicensed users are not protected from 
interference (or the administrative level of protection is minimal) and 
avoidance of interference needs to be arranged in a decentralized way 
(Santivanez et Al. 2006). This has raised major concerns on the viability of 
open access to spectrum (Buchanan and Yoon 2002; Cave and Webb 2003c; 
Hazlett 2005; Baumol and Robyn 2006). Technology developments such as 
beaconing systems and cognitive radios can reduce harmful interference and 
therefore they should help make (decentralized) interference management 
easier (FCC 2002b). 
 
1.3.2.- Spectrum allocation 
Spectrum allocation refers to the process of deciding what type(s) of 
service(s) can use a particular spectrum band. At the highest level, spectrum 
is allocated by ITU through the Table of allocations, which is contained in the 
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Radio Regulations. Those allocations are regularly updated at World Radio 
Conferences held every three to four years. In general, national spectrum 
regulators derive national spectrum plans from the ITU Table of allocations, 
albeit local variations are possible. More detailed planning arrangements 
contribute to the allocation process below the national plan of frequency 
allocations (ITU 2001c, 2001d; Cave 2002; Chaduc and Pogorel 2008). 
 Implementation of proposed changes of spectrum allocations might 
take several years using this negotiated approach to spectrum management, 
which has been criticized for being very slow, unduly restrictive and unable 
to keep pace with technology and demand developments in wireless 
communications. Allocation of spectrum should as far as possible be 
responsive to market conditions rather than imposed by central fiat (De Vany 
et Al. 1969; Falch and Tadayoni 2004; Entman 2004; Cave et Al. 2007b). In this 
way allocation policy would support efficient use of spectrum in the 
economy (Hazlett and Muñoz 2004). That is, it would enable and support 
spectrum being employed in the most highly valued uses.10
But the advantages of more flexible spectrum allocations have to be 
balanced against the advantages of harmonisation (ECC 2006; UMTS Forum 
2006). In the past, centrally prescribed usage of spectrum has been crucial in 
a number of occasions, notably in Europe for the development and rapid 
 
                                                 
10 To some extent, this is a matter that can be handled by assignment tools—if licensees have 
the flexibility to change the use to which their spectrum is put (see below). 
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uptake of 2G mobile phone services, using the Global System for Mobile 
communication (GSM) standard. However, it would be preferable for these 
advantages to be realised by market mechanisms wherever possible, as there 
are also cases of regulatory failures—for example, in Europe, there has been 
little take-up for TETRA mobile services in the 870-876 / 915-921 MHz band 
since the decision was ratified in 1996; in Australia, Local Multipoint 
Distribution Services (LMDS) never proved to be commercially viable in the 
allocated spectrum at 27 and 28/31 GHz. Moreover, the trajectory of wireless 
technology is making harmonisation less necessary than in the past, as 
modular designs and software defined radios make it increasingly feasible to 
realise the fundamental advantages of harmonising spectrum, namely scale 
economies and interoperability (ECC 2006). 
 
1.3.3.- Spectrum assignment 
Spectrum assignment refers to the process used to decide who gets access to 
spectrum. To control access to spectrum and prevent harmful interference, 
the ‘command and control’ approach was generally accompanied by a 
licensing regime. Under ‘command and control’, this has been implemented 
by administrative mechanisms, some of which involve regulatory discretion 
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(e.g. beauty contests).11
1.4.- New technologies and their implications for spectrum management 
 If demand for spectrum access is considered unlikely 
to exceed spectrum supply, spectrum has historically been assigned on a 
first-come first-served basis. In the US, spectrum lotteries had formerly been 
used in assigning spectrum for which there was excess demand, in lieu of 
administrative discretion. However, those lotteries have proven inefficient 
and were abandoned. High demand for particular frequency bands has 
suggested, in recent years, the introduction of market-based mechanisms—
notably auctions—to assign spectrum (McMillan 1998; Klemperer and 
Binmore 2002; Kwerel and Williams 2002; Illing and Klüh 2003; Maasland 
and Moldovanu 2004; Salmon 2004; Cramton et Al. 2010). 
 
New technologies show great promise in how to make more effective 
use of spectrum.12
                                                 
11 Beauty contests are based on comparative selection and may involve hearings or the 
submission of detailed applications which are then scored according to rules devised by the 
radio administrator. The winner of a beauty contest is the applicant achieving the highest 
score. 
 Developments in spread spectrum technologies (including 
UWB), software-defined/ cognitive radios (SDR/CR) and smart antennas 
12 The literature on those themes is vast; see, e.g., IEEE Communications Magazine, vol. 46(4) of 
April 2008 for a collection of studies on cognitive radios, mobile ad hoc networks and sensor 
networks; Webb (2007) for discussions and predictions on future wireless communications 
technologies; see also the deliverables available at http://www.sportviews.org/, the website 
of the Sportviews (Spectrum POlicy and Radio Technologies Viable In Emerging Wireless 
Society) project. 
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have raised particular interest (ITU 2005b, 2006b). These technologies have a 
potential to increase spectrum efficiency in many ways, including a higher 
level of frequency reuse and sharing by means of both underlay and overlay 
techniques. Furthermore, mesh networks have the prospects of diminishing 
the power required of transmissions, by virtue of their use of multiple short 
hops at low power levels rather than one long hop at a higher power (Plextek 
et Al. 2006). 
 New spectrum-using technologies may have a relevant impact across 
the value chain of spectrum-based services, by enabling a more efficient use 
of spectrum either directly or indirectly. For instance, spread spectrum 
technologies are likely to bring about great benefits in increasing spectrum 
efficiency directly, by using frequencies more intensely; smart antennas 
promise better performance at both transmitter and receiver levels, and 
generate opportunities for enhanced spectrum efficiency by building on the 
techniques to receive and send signals over frequencies without suffering 
harmful interference; mesh networks enhance the scope for commons, 
provided that increases in equipment costs do not outweigh savings in 
spectrum use; SDR/CR technologies are expected to change significantly the 
way spectrum is used today, particularly as high-level cognitive radios 
promise to enable more frequency reuse and more flexible uses of the same 
hardware and infrastructure (Qinetiq 2006), thus contributing to spectrum 
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efficiency in a variety of ways (see, e.g., Minervini 2007; Fette 2009). 
Moreover, those technologies might be implemented together (e.g. in mesh 
network architectures such as ad hoc networks) to offer a wide range of new 
opportunities for spectrum-based services. 
The traditional regime for spectrum management is that of one 
frequency to one user (bound to provide a particular service using 
individually licensed apparatus). Technological innovations promise to 
enable access to spectrum resources using techniques that either do not fit 
the traditional regime, or would be highly constrained by such regime. Thus 
a crucial issue is how to achieve the benefits of flexibility in the context of the 
more sophisticated technologies. 
A technology such as CR relies upon using agility to make greater use 
of given frequencies by pooling intermittent demands to achieve a greater 
utilisation rate. Other things being equal, this process occurs more efficiently 
on a larger scale, subject to the increasing cost and technical complexity of 
ranging over more spectrum. Therefore, CRs are likely to aggregate demand; 
this will capture the benefits of scale, possibly involving intermediation, such 
as a band manager selling access to a range of frequencies (Cave and Webb 
2003a; Cave 2006). 
Two remaining issues concern underlays and overlays (see, e.g., 
Baumol and Robyn 2006). Underlays are exemplified by UWB, which 
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operates under the noise floor13 of other services. In principle, UWB could be 
utilised in at least three ways. First, one or more separate geographical 
licences could be carved out beneath any existing noise floor and assigned on 
an exclusive basis; or, the same space could be carved out, and made licence-
exempt; or, an obligation could be imposed on any prospective user of UWB 
to negotiate an arrangement with all licensees under whose noise floor it 
proposed to operate. The last option would almost certainly fail because of 
the transaction cost incurred in negotiating with countless licensees (Cave 
2006). Finally, there is the question of overlays, or access by users to 
spectrum licensed to others. In principle, this could be made generally 
available. Indeed, the European Commission’s proposals on spectrum 
reform14
                                                 
13 The noise floor is the measure of the signal created from the sum of all the 
 seem to contemplate such a general right of access, when they state 
that “a new system for spectrum management is needed that permits 
different models of spectrum licensing (the traditional administrative, 
unlicensed and new marked-based approaches) to coexist so as to promote 
economic and technical efficiency in the use of this valuable resource. Based 
on common EU rules, greater flexibility in spectrum management could be 
introduced by strengthening the use of general authorisations whenever 
possible” (EC 2006: 7). 
noise sources 
and unwanted signals within a measurement system. 
14 Revisions to the Framework were agreed in November 2009 (see Directive 2009/140/EC). 
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 The rest of this work is intended to contribute to the development of 
that new system for spectrum management. 
 28 
 
Chapter 2. Review of the literature on market-inspired methods 
 
2.1.- Spectrum policy trends in liberalizing countries and market-
inspired methods of spectrum management 
Traditionally, spectrum regulators have established, to a large extent, how 
radio frequencies can be used for wireless communications (cf. Chapter 1). 
The ‘command and control’ framework has been, and in many countries 
remains, the predominant method of spectrum management. However, there 
is a general consensus on the need to move spectrum management towards a 
more flexible regime, in particular in order to avoid inefficiencies brought 
about by decades of administrative allocation of radio frequencies (cf., e.g., 
ITU 2001a; Cave 2002; EC 2007; Pogorel 2007).  
 ‘Command and control’ is no longer the sole approach to spectrum 
regulation. Three models - exclusive use, commons,15
                                                 
15 Unlicensed spectrum and commons have been used as synonymous in the spectrum-
allocation debate. However, on one hand, unlicensed spectrum describes an access regime 
(for spectrum that is owned by the state and allocated administratively); on the other hand, a 
commons refers to a property regime where a resource is owned by a group of individuals 
(cf. Hazlett 2006). Moreover, the use of the term ‘common property’ - to refer to property 
owned by a community, the government or no one - has led to wider confusion in the 
analysis of legal regimes, particularly for natural resources (Ostrom and Schlager 1992). 
 and administrative 
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‘command and control’ - have become the usual taxonomy to describe 
different spectrum management options, especially following the FCC’s 
Spectrum Policy Task Force report (FCC 2002a), which has influenced 
spectrum regulation in the US.  
 While the traditional approach was aimed at controlling interference, 
recent policy trends have focused on the issue of establishing a framework 
where spectrum can be put in the hands of those who value it the most. 
Indeed, consideration that spectrum is a valuable resource has become 
crucial.16 Therefore, spectrum auctions and (secondary) trading have been 
introduced in the regulatory toolkit in many countries, together with some 
(cautious) measures to deregulate change of spectrum use – although 
liberalization of use has been pursued in a lower number of countries.17
In this section, the case for a major extension of market forces in 
spectrum management is briefly considered (for extensive reviews of 
markets vs. administrative methods, see, e.g., Cave 2002; FCC 2002a; Ofcom 
2004; EC 2005a; Cave et Al. 2007b). The context of the discussion is a 
management regime in which licences are issued for the exclusive use of one 
firm or organisation. Under a market system, this is subject to change of 
 
                                                 
16 Issues encountered in estimating both licensed and unlicensed spectrum values in the 
absence of markets are discussed in Minervini (2008). 
17 See Chapter 4 for an analysis of liberalization of spectrum assignment and allocation in a 
few countries.  
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ownership and/or change of use – whereas ‘command and control’ sets 
constraints on spectrum assignment (i.e. who is entitled to use radio 
frequencies) and, more crucially, tight restrictions on spectrum allocation (i.e. 
how radio frequencies can be used).  
In some countries (e.g. the US, the UK and Australia, but also 
developing countries such as Guatemala and El Salvador) spectrum policy is 
shifting away from the traditional methods of spectrum management and is 
increasingly relying on market-inspired methods (McLean Foster & Co. 
2007). These methods have been adopted to assign spectrum, both at the 
primary level (auctions) and at the secondary level (spectrum trading); in 
addition, relaxation of constraints on uses and technologies (liberalization) is 
being pursued in countries which have been leading recent policy trends. 
Moreover, the case for an expansion of spectrum bandwidth for collective 
use has also attracted more attention than in the past. However, spectrum 
liberalization measures have had little impact on public sector spectrum so 
far, compared to progress with the use of market-inspired methods for 
commercial spectrum. These spectrum liberalization issues are reviewed in 
this chapter. 
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2.1.1.- Spectrum auctions 
Spectrum auctions have been the most prominent of the market-based 
mechanisms to be deployed in many countries. In those auctions, a 
government sells the right to use specific segments of spectrum in some 
geographic areas (see, e.g., Illing and Klüh 2003). Until the late 1980s, 
spectrum rights (i.e. licences) had been assigned applying many different 
ways, but only beauty contests (comparative selection procedures) explicitly 
accommodate a competitive element (OECD 1993). Nevertheless, beauty 
contests sometimes open the door to favouritism and corruption (Cave and 
Valletti 2000).18
                                                 
18 For instance, in the UK, in preparing for the auction of 3G licences, the regulator stated: 
“Government should not be trying to judge who will be innovative and successful”, thereby 
suggesting that market-based mechanisms should be preferred to administrative methods 
(
  Auctions by themselves do not make a fundamental change 
in spectrum management, because they usually operate in a framework of 
‘command and control’ over the use of the licence which is being auctioned. 
Thus they introduce a competitive element into the assignment process, but 
do not necessarily introduce flexibility into spectrum use (Valletti 2001). 
However, a combination of auctions with secondary trading and 
liberalisation (see below) does amount to a genuine market-inspired reform.  
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/static/archive/spectrumauctions/documents/faq2.htm); with 
regard to the pricing of 3G spectrum, the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) 
stated that “the auction route is superior to the beauty contests and the fixed fee 
approaches” (TRAI 2006: 54) 
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There are a number of different auction formats that can be used to 
assign spectrum licences, ranging from simple first-price sealed-bid auctions 
through to complex combinatorial package bid auctions (Klemperer 2004). 
Since the first spectrum auctions, in New Zealand in 1989 which used a 
Vickery (or second-price) auction (Mueller 1993), the international trend in 
spectrum auctions has been to apply more sophisticated auction formats, 
such as combinatorial (clock) auctions,19
                                                 
19 The combinatorial clock auction is a two stage auction. The first stage is a multiple round, 
open clock auction where bidders have the opportunity to bid on their most preferred 
package of lots in each round. The second stage is a combinatorial sealed bid auction where 
bidders have an opportunity to express their preferences for packages of lots by bidding best 
and final offers. Bidders have the opportunity to bid best and final offers on all combinations 
of lots for which they were eligible to bid during the clock stage. This allows bidders to 
express their willingness to pay for combinations of lots which they would be happy to win 
even though they did not bid on them during the clock stage of the auction. A combination 
of these bids may allow the auctioneer to assign more of the available spectrum than was 
achieved at the end of the clock stage of the auction, and hence achieve a more efficient 
assignment (see, e.g., Ofcom 2007a, with regard to a combinatorial clock auction for the L-
band spectrum). 
 so that licence assignment processes 
are more likely to achieve the objective of economic efficiency.   
While auctions typically focus on the price for spectrum rights, 
competitive assignments are sometimes designed with a focus on revenue 
shares or royalty payments. In 2001 such an approach was adopted in the 
Hong Kong 3G auction, which was predicated on a need to guarantee a 
return on the use of spectrum to the community and to avoid possibly large 
upfront costs (Yan 2001). 
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Spectrum assignment via auctions has raised a few concerns. In 
particular, it has been argued that bid prices necessarily result in consumers 
paying more for services reliant upon radio spectrum, and that auctions, 
particularly those where bids ascend over time, encourage bidders to over-
value spectrum, resulting in spectrum prices being too high (cf. Binmore and 
Klemperer 2002). However, the first argument is fallacious. In well designed 
auctions, bidders are required to pay for spectrum up front and, for 
successful bidders, the cost of spectrum bandwidth will be a sunk cost, 
which does not influence market prices. For instance, in a paper by Kwerel 
(2000) the author shows, firstly, that prices for mobile services did not vary 
as widely as prices for radio spectrum and, secondly, that there was no 
statistically significant correlation between auction fees and the prices paid 
by consumers for mobile services (see also Cable et Al. 2002; Hazlett 2004 ). 
Nevertheless, auction prices are a cost and do matter for those businesses 
buying spectrum: they can make all the difference between a successful 
business model and a failure.  
The second argument—that is, auctions, particularly those where bids 
ascend over time, would encourage bidders to over-value spectrum—is also 
built on shaky grounds. This scenario is exceptional and it is unclear whether 
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bidders in spectrum auctions would over-value frequencies simply because 
of auction design (Cramton and Schwartz 2000).20
                                                 
20 In Europe, a lot of research has been carried out investigating the big differences in the 
outcomes of the numerous 3G European auctions of years 2000-2001 (EC 2002a; Klemperer 
2002). 
  
At least in some auctions, the cause of high prices may also be due to 
artificial scarcity arising out of the out-dated ‘command and control’ 
approach to spectrum management (Cave 2002): the limited spectrum often 
available via administrative decisions, for high value applications (such as 
mobile telephony), inevitably leads to high prices at auction. 
Therefore, a number of studies have discussed the relative advantages 
of auctions compared to other methods to assign spectrum, and have 
analyzed the features and implications of different auctions formats. 
However, the competitive assignment and allocation of spectrum for 
collective use by a group of players (against exclusive use by one service 
provider, i.e. the auction winner) has not yet been addressed. Research has so 
far considered collective spectrum use (e.g. Mott MacDonald et Al. 2006), or 
administrative allocation of licence-exempt spectrum (e.g. Indepen et Al. 
2006), or competitive allocation to individual auction winners (e.g. Illing and 
Klüh 2003). 
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2.1.2.- Secondary trading in spectrum 
Historically, spectrum trades have not been possible between users 
entitled to rights on spectrum. Hence, in order to assign frequency bands to a 
different user, spectrum had to be returned to the spectrum manager and 
then re-assigned—a much more rigid mechanism than secondary trading, 
with very high transaction costs (Hazlett 2003; Analysys et Al. 2004). 
Spectrum trading should contribute to a more efficient use21
                                                 
21 Economists describe efficiency more precisely and three related concepts are often used: (i) 
Pareto efficiency (which has three components: allocative, productive and dynamic 
efficiency) is where resources are allocated across consumers and firms so that no firm or 
consumer can be made better off without making some other body worse off; (ii) 
informational efficiency (where prices accurately reflect underlying value – usually of 
concern in financial markets); and (iii) operational efficiency (where markets work efficiently 
from an institutional perspective). A market can be said to be ‘fully efficient’ when all three 
efficiency criteria are satisfied. 
 of 
frequencies (Coase 1959; Melody 1980; Hazlett 2001; Cave 2002; Faulhaber 
and Farber 2003). It complements the introduction of market-based 
mechanisms for primary assignments of spectrum, i.e. auctions (Valletti 
2001). Auctions can be usefully applied to ensure that spectrum is purchased 
by those who value it the most (Illing and Klüh 2003; Janssen 2004). 
However, secondary trading of spectrum ensures that, if the valuation of 
spectrum change over time, resulting in the present spectrum holder’s 
valuation being lower than that of someone else, spectrum can flow from one 
use to another.  
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Efficiency is usually achieved when the users of spectrum tend to be 
those with the highest valuations for the spectrum. A trade will only take 
place if the spectrum is worth more to the new user than it was to the old 
user, reflecting the greater economic benefit the new user expects to derive 
from the acquired spectrum. To facilitate transfers, it is crucial to establish a 
swift and inexpensive mechanism with transaction costs as low as possible—
otherwise if transaction costs are too high compared to the potential 
efficiency gains, these efficiency gains will not be realised (Cave and Webb 
2003b). However, the vast quantity of important details, which have to be 
agreed, means that legislation cannot be far-reaching in the specification of 
actual arrangements.22
To promote spectrum markets, it is useful to provide some 
information about spectrum use. The availability of databases of licences for 
spectrum use may play a great role: databases could provide operators with 
sufficient information to understand who their neighbours will be, for what 
purpose they are currently deploying their spectrum, and the interference 
limits to which they are subject.
 
23
                                                 
22 There are a variety of market mechanisms that can be used to trade spectrum, including, 
e.g., bilateral negotiations, brokerage and exchange; it is also possible to combine more than 
one of these approaches (Analysys et al. 2004).  
 
23 In Europe, the Commission has recently published a decision to harmonise the availability 
of information on the use of radio spectrum through a common information point and by the 
harmonisation of format and content of such information; see Commission Decision 
2007/344/EC of 16 May 2007 on harmonised availability of information regarding spectrum 
use within the Community. 
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Finally, departure from ‘command and control’ towards a 
(decentralized) market-based approach to spectrum management has to be 
matched with the development of an effective dispute resolution process 
(public or private). Such a resolution process would arbitrate on problems 
arising from transgressions of interference rights and responsibilities by one 
party or another. It would also deal with the inevitable but rarer cases where, 
despite both parties adhering to their licence conditions, there is nonetheless 
unacceptable interference to their activities (Goodman 2004; Faulhaber 2005; 
Baumol and Robyn 2006; Weiser and Hatfield 2008; Hazlett 2008b).  
Spectrum trading is arguably a more potent market-based mechanism 
than auctions, as it makes the gravitation of spectrum to its most efficient use 
a permanent feature of the allocation system. Yet in practice its impact has 
been modest so far. Several possible reasons have been suggested, with each 
likely to have had some influence (Weiss 2006; Xavier and Ypsilanti 2006).24
                                                 
24 Some of those reasons are closely related to features of spectrum markets (e.g., insufficient 
information, inadequate development of private band managers, etc.); a second set of 
reasons is more closely related to the regulatory framework (e.g. uncertainties due to phased 
liberalisation of spectrum use, lack of alignment of licence terms and conditions, etc.). 
 
Nevertheless, an analysis of spectrum trading in conjunction with other 
market-inspired methods which feature in spectrum reform strategies may 
provide further insights.  
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2.1.3.- Liberalization and flexibility of spectrum use 
Liberalising moves (such as removing or lowering restrictions on use, and 
encouraging spectrum sharing) will improve the flexibility of spectrum use. 
This, in turn, should increase efficiency and confer greater economic benefits 
on society (Valletti 2001; Hazlett 2003; Lie 2004; Hazlett and Muñoz 2004). 
However, the costs of interference, or of preventing interference, may also 
rise. As returns to a market tend to increase with its scale (because in a larger 
market there is more scope for mutually beneficial transactions), the total 
return to expanding flexibility—measured, for example, by the number of 
bands over which secondary trades with flexibility of use can be effected—
will grow. Assuming that interference costs can be restrained, spectrum 
policy should promote maximum flexibility (and very limited ‘command and 
control’). At some point, it is possible that the marginal costs of flexibility 
exceed their benefits. In this situation, the optimal degree of flexibility lies 
somewhere between zero and maximum possible flexibility. The challenge 
facing spectrum policy makers is to determine how quickly to introduce 
flexibility and by how much. However, there are no signs yet from the 
experience of countries using market methods, that interference costs might, 
at the margin, outweigh the benefits of flexibility. 
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2.2.- Marketed licences and the commons 
Traditionally, a small number of frequencies sat alongside spectrum licences 
assigned by administrative methods to provide unlicensed access to users of 
particular apparatus, or for experimental uses.  These frequencies include 
those used for television remote controls, Bluetooth short range 
communications etc., as well as spectrum utilised for short-range broadband 
access using standards such as IEEE 802.11 or WiFi.  In the UK, for example, 
such licence-exempt spectrum amounts to 4-6% of the total. 
While several commentators have proposed a major expansion of the 
commons (e.g. , Benkler 2002; Werbach 2004), others regard it as best suited 
to short range applications where rivalries between operators for spectrum 
are more limited (e.g., Hazlett 2001; Faulhaber and Farber 2003; Cave and 
Webb 2003c; Baumol and Robyn 2006).  However, drawing the line over time 
between the universal licensed and unlicensed spectrum is highly 
problematic, and historically has been done using administrative fiat in two 
dimensions - in the basic decision to assign a frequency for unlicensed use, 
and in the choice of restrictions imposed on its use (Hazlett 2006).   
In the past, spectrum regulators have made decisions on unlicensed 
spectrum on administrative grounds,25
                                                 
25 They have carved the radio frequency spectrum into a number of bands and allocated 
most of them to licensed uses.  Thus, on the one hand, regulators have divided licensed 
 but this is arbitrary and 
(Continued on next page) 
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unsatisfactory. In a market environment, it would be better to introduce 
some form of market competition between the two modes of frequency 
management (Cave 2006).  Figure 2 illustrates the allocation decision 
between licensed spectrum, some of which may be utilised for ‘private 
commons’ and licence-exempt spectrum.  
Figure 2 - Licensed vs. unlicensed spectrum 
 
Spectrum 
                    Licensed         Licence-exempt 
           
 
Specify obligation and rights Private Commons      Public Commons 
- geographic 
- temporal    Rules   Regulation 
- interference parameters            - protocols 
- noise floor (underlay)            - power limits, etc 
- overlays                              
                              
Source: Cave (2006: 224). 
                                                                                                                                          
spectrum in a few fundamental dimensions (geographic area, frequency, time), and have set 
interference parameters (e.g. power limits) to protect licensees against harmful interference 
from other spectrum users.  On the other hand, access to unlicensed spectrum has been 
governed primarily by setting power limits, imposing standards (such as listen-before-talk) 
and using protocols (either polite, as they check for frequency occupancy by other 
transmissions before acting, e.g. IEEE 802.11 - or impolite, e.g. IEEE 802.16).  In addition, 
technological developments and increased demand for wireless spectrum recently have led 
regulators to consider new ways to share spectrum by means of underlay and overlay 
techniques. 
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Administrative decisions suppress market mechanisms, but regulators 
lack the information or incentives to judge on the (marginal) value of 
spectrum allocated to different kind of uses.  Therefore this task should be 
left to competitive market forces - unless market failures can be 
demonstrated – and should not be performed by adopting the popularity of 
some wireless services as a proxy.  For instance, rapid diffusion of WiFi 
hotspots that use unlicensed spectrum should not suggest per se to open 
more unlicensed spectrum; notably, WLANs providers, who use such 
unlicensed spectrum, usually exclude nonsubscribers (Kwerel and Williams 
2002; Hazlett 2006). 
 
2.3.- Public sector use of spectrum 
Historically public sector users have been gifted substantial amounts of radio 
spectrum to provide services in the public interest, such as defence, public 
safety and emergency services. Therefore, in many jurisdictions, the public 
sector holds a vast bulk of valuable frequencies. In the UK, for example, 
public sector spectrum use accounts for just under half of all spectrum use 
below 15 GHz. Military use of spectrum, particularly for radar and 
communications, accounts for most of public sector use. The strategic nature 
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of defence applications means that sometimes little is known in detail outside 
the immediate agencies concerned about how the spectrum is deployed. 
 Under the ‘command and control’ regime, public sector organisations, 
especially national defence departments, were accorded high priority in 
spectrum use and they were allocated spectrum for an indefinite period. But 
as demand for commercial spectrum grew, attention became increasingly 
focussed on the issue of whether public sector bodies crowded out 
commercially valuable private sector spectrum users (Cave et Al. 2007a).26
Eliminating the boundary between private sector and public sector 
spectrum markets is a bold, if logical, step, and one that many spectrum 
regulators are as yet generally unwilling to take (see, e.g. EC 2006). However, 
a few countries have taken bold steps to promote efficient use of spectrum by 
public sector bodies. In the US, the National Telecommunications and 
Information Administration and other federal departments were required to 
improve efficiency of the use of spectrum in 2003.
 
27 In the same year, the UK 
Government commissioned an independent audit of public sector spectrum 
holdings to inquire whether there is scope for re-allocation from public to 
private sector or within the public sector.28
                                                 
26 Significant returns of spectrum to the regulator were made in recent years by the French 
and UK Ministries of defence. 
 Furthermore, the British regulator 
27 See http://www.ntia.doc.gov/osmhome/spectrumreform/index.html. 
28 See http://www.spectrumaudit.org.uk/. Recently, the Australian spectrum regulator has 
commissioned a similar investigation into the use of spectrum by the public sector. 
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has applied administrative incentive pricing to sector users, including 
defence, to expose the public sector to market influences (Indepen et Al. 
2004). 
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Chapter 3. Methodology 
 
3.1.- General methodological considerations 
The introduction has presented the topic and the main research questions of 
this work. The questions that are asked influence what needs to be done to 
answer them (cf., e.g., Punch 1998: 245). Moreover, it is sometimes suggested 
that if research questions are well enough focused or refined, they will 
effectively determine the methods used to answer them; however, in 
practice, there will be alternative techniques which can be used and 
researchers need to think about which methods are practicable given the 
time and other resources available (Blaxter et Al. 2001, esp. 80 ff.). 
Several methods were used in this work on a few problems of 
spectrum management. The task of this chapter is to illustrate and justify the 
particular research methods used to answer the various questions presented 
in the introduction (cf., e.g., Blaxter et Al. 2001; Clough and Nutbrown 2007).  
A pragmatic stance was generally adopted. This is briefly discussed in 
this chapter, as philosophical ideas influence the practice of research and 
need to be identified, although they remain largely hidden (Creswell 2003: 4). 
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Thus, methodological choices, which guided and shaped this research and its 
outcomes, might be judged in the light of pragmatism.  
Pragmatists believe that, instead of methods being important, the 
problem is most important; therefore, researchers use all approaches to 
understand the problem (Tashakkori and Teddlie 2009).29
                                                 
29 “Research design is governed by the notion of ‘fitness for purpose’. The purposes of the 
research determine the methodology and design of the research” (Cohen et Al. 2000: 73, 
quoted in Clough and Nutbrown 2007: 33). See also Newman et Al. (2003: 169-70), who argue 
that “[o]ne’s purpose provides a way to determine the optimal path to studying the research 
question”. 
 According to Peter 
Clough and Cathy Nutbrown (2007), there is not a great deal to say about 
methods as such; methods only arise in the service of quite particular needs 
and purposes: “if the work ultimately has significance for us, it is because its 
quite particular purpose has been achieved; and to do this, it will have called 
on the construction of quite particular tools [..]. It is actually this particularity 
which it becomes the task of methodology to explain” (ibidem: 29). 
 The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. After an overview of 
pragmatism and use of mixed methods in research, the following sections 
discuss in more detail the research methods chosen to answer the research 
questions and the mixing of different ingredients, including methods, models 
and data collected for analyses. 
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3.1.1.- Pragmatism and the use of more than one research method 
Burke R. Johnson and Anthony J. Onwuegbuzie (2004: 18) argue that “the 
project of pragmatism has been to find a middle ground between 
philosophical dogmatisms and scepticism and to find a workable solution [..] 
to many longstanding philosophical dualisms about which agreement has 
not been historically forthcoming”.30 Thus all research projects may be 
considered mixed, at least to some degree. This is also supported by the 
difficulty (or impossibility) of placing all components of a research project 
(e.g., type of questions, nature of data, role of values) on one absolute end of 
a continuum of philosophical orientations (Creswell 2003: 94; Newman et Al. 
2003: 169-70; Tashakkori and Creswell 2007).31
Mixed methodologists do not think that research paradigms are 
associated with research methods in a kind of one-to-one correspondence. In 
mixed methods research “the investigator collects and analyzes data, 
integrates the findings, and draws inferences using both qualitative and 
quantitative approaches or methods in a single study or programme of 
  
                                                 
30 The paradigm contrast tables evolved during the past 20 years. The initial two-columns 
paradigm table (constructivism, positivism) became a four-column table in Guba and 
Lincoln (1994) and then a five-columns table in Lincoln and Guba (2000). Tashakkori and 
Teddlie (1998) compared four paradigms (positivism, postpositivism, pragmatism and 
constructivism), whereas Tashakkori and Teddlie (2009) add the transformative perspective 
as a fifth paradigm. 
31 See also Hantrais (2009, esp. ch. 5), where the focus is on combining methods in 
international comparative research.  
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inquiry” (Tashakkori and Creswell 2007: 4).32
From this stance, mixed methods/ methodologists
 Researchers who work from a 
mixed-methodology approach acknowledge the importance of both “striving 
for objectivity and taking steps to counter our subjectivity, and of the reality 
that not all stories are equally supported by the observable facts” (Clemons 
and McBeth 2009: 174). Indeed, the compatibility thesis supports the view 
that combining quantitative and qualitative methods is a good thing and 
denies that such a wedding is epistemologically incoherent (Howe 1988: 10). 
Moreover, it is contended that the mixed methods approach fits researchers 
who enjoy both the structure of quantitative research and the flexibility of 
qualitative inquiry (Creswell 2003: 23).  
33
                                                 
32 The authors discuss several ways to mix methods from the two traditions, thus presenting 
a spectrum of combinations of the two (see Tashakkori and Teddlie 2009). 
33 Tashakkori and Teddlie (2009) maintain that “until we get a greater consensus within the 
mixed methods community concerning what constitutes mixed methodology in broad terms [..], 
then the term mixed methods is more appropriately used” (p. 21, italics in original). 
 present an 
alternative to the quantitative and qualitative traditions. However, the 
quantitative and qualitative traditions appear more settled and their methods 
better established than the mixed tradition (cf. Clemons and McBeth 2009, 
esp. ch. 6). Recently, 19 different definitions of mixed methods research from 
experts in the fields have been presented in Johnson et Al. (2007); five 
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common themes emerged, including what is mixed, when the mixing is 
carried out, the breadth of the mixing and why the mixing is carried out.34
3.2.- Data collection and analysis 
The following sections present a more detailed account of the analyses 
carried out. They discuss the different methods used to answer different 
research questions. A broad definition of data is used in this work to embrace 
regulatory documents, legislation, reports, academic literature and formal 
models selected for their relevance with regard to research purposes. 
 
 
 
3.2.1.- Uses of formal models 
This work makes extensive use of formal models, which are used in various 
ways (including the mixing with more qualitative data) for different 
purposes and research questions. Moreover, most of those models appear in 
the economics literature. The following discussion looks at the (fundamental) 
models used in this work and briefly describes how those models where 
                                                 
34 The authors arrived at a broad definition of mixed methods research as “the type of 
research in which a researcher or team of researchers combine elements of qualitative and 
quantitative research approaches [..] for the purpose of breadth of understanding and 
corroboration” (Johnson et Al. 2007: 123). 
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used in the analyses. A short review of advantages and disadvantages of 
formal modelling is presented at the end of this section. 
The chapter answering the first research question contains an analysis 
which is based on a paper by Dewatripont and Roland published in the 
American Economic Review in 1995. That paper uses formal economic 
modelling in order to study alternative policies for transition economies. 
Parts of Dewatripont and Roland’s work are used to set up a thematic 
framework within which the data can be sifted and sorted. Researchers who 
adopt a more deductive approach use theory to guide the design of a study 
and the interpretation of results (Neuman 2003: 65). Devising and refining a 
thematic framework is not an automatic or mechanical process; it involves 
both logical and intuitive thinking; it also involves making judgements about 
meaning, about the relevance and importance of issues, about implicit 
connections between ideas (Ritchie and Spencer 1994: 180). All these 
activities rely crucially on the researcher’s role. 
The scope of the paper by Dewatripont and Roland is wider than our 
work in two respects at least: their analysis is referred to a whole economy 
gradually moving (or shifting, in the case of a big bang strategy) from central 
planning to a market based economy; their analysis also takes into account 
aspects of political economy, as they study, for instance, the relationship 
between majority voting systems and reversal of policies adopted in the past. 
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Our work looks at spectrum management reforms and does not investigate 
issues of political economy. 
An alternative could be to develop from first principles a formal 
model to provide a positive or normative analysis of spectrum management 
reform. However, our aim is to look at policies carried out by liberalising 
countries and study them within a plausible thematic framework. The formal 
models proposed by Matthias Dewatripont and Gérard Roland seemed to 
offer a ready-made framework to analyse reforming strategies and tactics 
with regard to spectrum management.35
The chapter answering the second research question is based on a 
translation of a model proposed by Jonathan Cave and Stephen W. Salant 
and published on the American Economic Review in 1995. Use of formal 
 Thus mixed methods in this part of 
research involved a two-stage design: stage one is the identification of a 
formal model to be used in the analysis of spectrum policy reform; and stage 
two is the study of a series of international cases from international practices. 
The two parts of the study were not designed to validate each other; they 
bring about different elements of analysis, so the relationship between them 
is not one of confirmation or contradiction, although they contain similar 
themes (cf. Mason 1994: 109; Gerring 2007: 39-43; Yin 2009: 130-1). 
                                                 
35 In addition, in order to conduct a valid ex-post cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness study, a 
programme must have been in operation long enough to have had an impact, and the 
programme must be able to be measured in quantitative terms (cf., e.g., Patton and Sawicki 
1993: 385). 
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modelling, to suggest a plausible mechanism to allocate and assign a 
spectrum commons via an auction, is the core research activity carried out 
here, after having identified Cave and Salant’s work as a useful point for 
departure. This followed some previous study (as part of this research) of 
other formal models, putting forth the idea of matching behaviour, originally 
proposed by Joel Guttman (1978, 1987), and a discussion about Guttman’s 
work with Jonathan Cave. There are relevant differences between Cave and 
Salant’s model and the model proposed here: their model was the outcome of 
a positive analysis, carried out to understand and explain situations of likely 
collusion in a number of industries, where output seemed to be subject to 
restrictions imposed by producers. In our model, we start from Cave and 
Salant’s work to find out whether, at least in theory, we can conceive of a 
mechanism to enable purchase of spectrum commons by a group of private 
players, who are likely to be competing against other (groups of) players in 
an auction to get bandwidth for their business. The mechanism proposed 
aims at obtaining from group participants a minimum amount of money to 
be used for a collective bid (instead of a maximum amount of output as in 
the collusive setting studied by Cave and Salant). In those circumstances, 
involving economic public goods, the difficulty is that of estimating, and 
making effective, unlicensed spectrum users’ derived demand for spectrum, 
in the same way that, say, mobile operators can express their derived 
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demand. The root cause of the problem is that of establishing the willingness 
to pay of a (large) number of non-rivalrous spectrum users. This is subject to 
the well-known difficulty that respondents have an incentive to falsify their 
estimates. A number of formal mechanisms have been developed to deal 
with such problems (e.g. the Clarke-Groves mechanism, reviewed in 
Campbell (1995: 283-94)).36
Chapter 6, answering the third research question, draws deliberately 
on a number of models from various research areas, as one of the purposes of 
that chapter is to establish, among available mechanisms designed to share 
scarce resources, those mechanisms which can be useful when pieces of 
spectrum (e.g. spectrum commons) are used to deliver a number of services 
 These mechanisms do, however, encounter 
problems associated with the fact that they do not yield a balanced budget. 
Other techniques, less sophisticated in terms of incentive properties, such as 
conjoint analysis, may be required to establish the aggregate valuation of 
unlicensed spectrum from willingness to pay for the services it can offer. 
Since a spectrum commons is typically regulated to produce a range of 
mutually exclusive or co-existing services, a range of options may have to be 
established, in circumstances where consumer understanding of them may 
not be strong (Cave 2006). 
                                                 
36 They have the feature that any respondent whose reported valuation tips the decision to 
buy into the positive has herself to pay a surcharge equal to the difference between the price 
and all other participants’ preferences for the alternative option.  This removes any incentive 
to report distorted valuations. 
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to many users. Patton and Sawicki (1993: 239) argue that “we often fail to 
find a solution to a problem because we do not recognize that our seemingly 
new problem is really an old problem [..]. The idea is that we can relate what 
we know about one problem and its solution to other problems and their 
solutions”.37
 Formal models consist of “a clear analytic statement of a theory with 
mathematical equations or logical propositions that are independent of 
evidence or observation, the derivation of observable implications of the 
theory and the testing of these implications in some appropriate manner” 
(Wible 1994: 147, quoted in Mayer 1996: 191). Thomas Mayer (1996) presents 
a discussion of the benefits and limitations of formal models. He argues that 
 There are at least three research themes which seem are relevant 
for analyses of shared spectrum management and allocation: (i) the recent 
literature on the so called price of anarchy; (ii) some work on the features of a 
few protocols (for online and offline data processing); (iii) the more 
traditional literature on (economic) public goods. Even when they do not 
offer a ready-made solution for spectrum sharing problems, they still may 
present useful results and insights for (future) spectrum specific refinements 
and quantitative analyses.  
                                                 
37 The so called synectics process, which is intended to provide new perspectives on a 
problem and to suggest possible solutions, is briefly discussed (see Patton and Sawicki, 1993: 
240-1). Synectics uses four types of analogy, including direct analogy (which involves 
searching for solutions among solutions to other problems), and symbolic analogy (which 
involves thinking of solutions that are aesthetically satisfying rather than technologically 
accurate). 
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one great benefit of formal modelling is that one can check the logic of ones’ 
deductive chain better if this chain is set out explicitly; in addition, modelling 
facilitates dipping into the “great storehouse of ready-made logical chains” 
offered by mathematics and makes it easier for the reader to grasp what is 
being said; if readers disagree with the author, they can see why they differ 
and what assumptions it is that causes them to reject the argument (Mayer 
1996: 192-3). One disadvantage of formal modelling is that often, though not 
always, it increases the time and effort required to read the paper. With 
regard to errors, it is argued that formal modelling can prevent errors that 
might result from less careful informal modelling, but formal modelling can 
also generate errors, both errors made by the author and the error made by 
readers when they accept erroneous conclusions (ibidem: 193).38
                                                 
38 The author’s full arguments about benefits and limitations of formal modelling are in 
Mayer (1996); see also the literature cited therein, Schotter (1996) and Hausman (1989). 
 Therefore 
formal models should be used with circumspection and “both the authors 
and readers should be on guard against the dangers of linear thinking by 
stepping back from time to time and looking at the problem under discussion 
in a more rounded way” (ibidem: 201).  
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3.2.2.- Collection and analysis of regulatory documents, legislation and literature 
Research was carried out almost entirely as desk work. Besides research and 
work on formal models available in the literature, a fundamental role was 
played, firstly, by national and international regulators’ documents and 
norms; secondly, by contributions in the (academic) literature. Information 
and evidence for this research was collected almost entirely using secondary 
data available in public documentation and, especially for evidence about 
non-English speaking countries, academic literature.39
A great amount of secondary data was thus used in the analyses. This 
is particularly evident in the more qualitative parts of the work, i.e. those 
parts where formal modelling is not the main research strategy/ method (as it 
is in the chapter proposing and analyzing a mechanism to purchase 
 Some of the literature 
used is authored by experts in the field of spectrum management and 
consultants for spectrum regulatory bodies and governments. In addition, 
this work benefitted from attendance and participation in meetings of 
experts and workshops on spectrum issues. These events offered the 
opportunity to get up-to-date information about policy, technology and 
research developments regarding spectrum management, including access to 
papers unavailable in the published literature (e.g., because still circulating 
in the form of working papers).  
                                                 
39 See, e.g., Yin (2009) on strengths and weaknesses of those sources of evidence. 
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spectrum commons collectively), but a useful ingredient for subsequent 
analyses. There, the challenge – and, to some extent, the purpose – was to 
provide some coherence and structure to the cumbersome data set, while 
retaining a hold of the original materials from which it derived (cf. Ritchie 
and Spencer 1994: 176). In this process, writing memos and notes on the 
documents greatly helped tracing the work done (cf. Creswell 2003: 190). 
Moreover, in those parts of the work, data analysis was not a discrete 
element of the research process which could be neatly separated from the 
other phases of the project; instead it can be argued that data analysis was 
integral to the way in which questions were posed, sources of information 
selected and data collected (Burgess et Al. 2001: 143). Research design, data 
collection and analysis were largely simultaneous and continuous processes 
(Bryman and Burgess 1994: 217; cf. also Creswell 2003, esp. 190 ff.). This 
helps understand the decision to do the analysis without computer software, 
as the use of software would have separated data collection and analysis 
more sharply; moreover, content analysis in this work is not intended to 
provide quantitative information about the documents and the literature 
used. On the contrary, a neater distinction between data collection and 
analysis can be traced in the work taking its steps from Cave and Salant 
(1995): after having identified their research paper and judged its usefulness 
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for our research question, the transfer (with necessary changes) of that model 
to our setting and further analysis of the implications were carried out. 
 
3.2.3.- Use of case studies for spectrum policy analysis 
The following chapter presents an analysis of spectrum policies adopted in a 
few liberalizing countries.40 It mixes theoretical propositions from the theory 
of transition economics and multiple case studies (see, e.g., Gerring 2007 and 
Yin 2009) to discuss international experiences of spectrum management 
reform (Yin 1992).41
 Therefore, the study shares the crucial view that modernizing 
spectrum management has similarities with the abandonment of `Gosplan 
regulation` (Faulhaber and Farber 2003), and the assertion that “[r]eforming 
spectrum policy is like reforming planned economies” (Kwerel and Williams 
2002: 40) is taken as the starting point of this research. The literature on 
transition economics and policy offers theoretical analyses of the expected 
payoffs under big-bang and gradualist approaches. That literature is used to 
  
                                                 
40 There is no single, agreed upon way for conducting policy analysis (cf., e.g., Patton and 
Sawicki 1993: 46). Very few analysts would argue that their work is value free (ibidem: 32). 
41 See Yin (1992, 2009); this research attempts to take on board two suggestions, inter alia, 
offered by the author in his discussion of programme evaluation: i) “many evaluations must 
go beyond assessing outcomes and must test relationships between processes and 
outcomes”; ii) “evaluations benefit greatly from any exposition of a demonstration project’s 
‘theory’” (Yin 1992: 124). For a discussion of advantages and disadvantages of case studies 
see also Blaxter et Al. (2001). 
 58 
analyse recent spectrum management reforms, which incorporate greater 
reliance on market-inspired mechanisms and increased flexibility to promote 
efficient use of radio frequency bandwidth in a number of countries (see 
Trochim 1989). There is thus a fundamental assumption about the possible 
extension of the transition literature to spectrum policy reform: reforms of 
spectrum management and planned economies are conceived as reforms 
which share a crucial attribute (Sartori 1970; Collier and Mahon 1993), i.e. 
they both imply a transition from centralized administrative decisions on 
resource allocation to (more) decentralized market-based/ market-inspired 
methods to allocate resources.  
 The literature on transition economics used in the analysis is 
particularly concerned with the sequencing of reforms: it offers theoretical 
guidance about which parts of reform packages should be adopted in the 
early stages and which other parts should be adopted in later stages, 
according to specific circumstances.42
                                                 
42 There are also circumstances when sequencing is not optimal and a big-bang strategy 
should be adopted, i.e. the reform package should be implemented as a whole and without 
delay. In addition, the literature on transition economics is also concerned with the ‘political 
economy’ of reforms. 
 Thus, this research focuses on the 
timing of events which represent milestones of spectrum policy reform in 
liberalizing countries. Purposely selected case studies are used as a means to 
account for what is judged to be important information about spectrum 
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policy reforms in various countries.43
                                                 
43 Abbott also argues that “[t]here are different types of universal narratives, which can be 
ranked from strictly to loosely specified. At the highly specified end of the continuum are 
stage theories, where we believe in a common sequence of unique events 
 In a discussion about multicase 
narratives, Abbott (1992: 73) argues that “population/ analytic approaches 
seem to reject too much important information [..]. Among the important 
information rejected by population/ analytic approaches is the narrative 
sequence of events in the various cases”. The passage of time is integral to 
qualitative research. Qualitative researchers note what is occurring at 
different points in time and recognize that when something occurs is often 
important (Neuman 2003: 148). Moreover, Carl V. Patton and David S. 
Sawicki (1993: 24) argue that descriptive analysis is often incorporated into 
prospective policy analysis; in order to design and evaluate new policies, the 
rationale for and the impact of past policies should be understood; therefore 
implemented policies must be monitored and evaluated in order to decide 
whether to continue or modify them and to generate information that will be 
useful when similar policies are proposed. Case studies are helpful to 
provide a context within which policy can be discussed. “For outcome 
evaluation purposes, the most useful case studies are those which are set up 
to provide directly comparative studies of similar regulatory initiatives in 
different places” (Stern 2010: 236). 
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 As often acknowledged, “researchers have very different views on the 
case study method. Some researchers may see the case study method as an 
alternative to ‘mainstream’ or positivist research methods and may be critical 
of an attempt to emulate the natural science model in data collection and 
analysis” (Gibbert et Al. 2008: 1473). In the positivist tradition, criteria of 
reliability and validity (which embraces internal, external and construct 
validity) are commonly used to assess the rigour of case study (Gibbert et Al. 
2008; Yin 2009). Those criteria are taken into account in developing the 
analysis. Qualitative researchers tend to use a “case-oriented approach [that] 
places cases, not variables, center stage” (Ragin 1992: 5): they examine a wide 
variety of aspects of one or a few cases, and their analyses emphasize 
contingencies in “messy” natural settings. This work aims to avoid, with 
regard to spectrum policy reform, being “left to swim in a sea of empirical 
and theoretical messiness” (Sartori 1970: 1053). The analysis also intends to 
judge the plausibility of that theory for spectrum policy reform (Hammersley 
1992).44
 The liberalizing (group of) countries considered are the United States 
(US), European countries members of the European Union (EU), the United 
Kingdom (UK), Australia, New Zealand, Guatemala and El Salvador. Their 
spectrum policies are the case studies for this research. There are other 
 
                                                 
44 “Judging a theory plausible is not a test of it, since there may be many competing plausible 
explanations” (Hammersley 1992: 177).  
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countries which have introduced some market-based mechanisms to manage 
their spectrum; however, the cases selected are spectrum policy reforms 
which present the greater differences from the traditional model of 
command-and-control regulation. Other countries (e.g. India, Canada, 
Nigeria and Japan) have taken actions to enhance spectrum efficiency, but 
those actions have been by and large limited to the introduction of spectrum 
auctions for its assignment, whereas crucial decisions of spectrum 
management are still left in the hands of national regulators. Conceptually, 
the selected cases are thus viewed, by and large, as objects (Ragin 1992): cases 
are based on existing definitions present in research literatures (i.e. they are 
general rather than specific); moreover, they are considered empirically real 
and bounded (i.e. a realist rather than a nominalist stance is preferred). 
 The analysis of spectrum policy reforms is carried out grouping the 
data collected (on the various reviews and actions taken by liberalising 
countries) in two major bundles of reforms.45
                                                 
45 A. Abbott argues that “[i]n the single-case narrative, each step need only be told; it need 
not be conceived as a version of a more generic type of event [..] [whereas] issues of 
conceptualization of events in multicase narrative research [..] concern aggregating 
occurrences into conceptual events” (Abbott 1992: 75-6). 
 The first bundle of liberalising 
measures includes changes in mechanisms of spectrum assignment, which 
may be further divided into primary and secondary assignment methods. 
The relevant changes are those moving spectrum regulation towards more 
market-based mechanisms; therefore primary assignment refers crucially to 
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the use of auctions (whereas beauty contests are conceived as a more 
traditional command-and-control method) and secondary assignment refers 
to the introduction of forms of spectrum trading (see Analysys et Al. 2004). 
The second bundle of liberalising measures includes changes in the degree of 
decentralization of decisions on spectrum allocation (i.e. decisions on the 
services provided using spectrum as an input) and other spectrum usage 
rights.46
                                                 
46 I.e. the issue of technology and service neutrality. Liberalisation of spectrum usage rights 
may be extended to include liberalisation of spectrum assignment; however spectrum 
auctions and secondary trading are usually addressed separately from spectrum allocation, 
because the problems involved differ. Moreover, in the following analysis, licence-exempt 
spectrum and spectrum commons are considered as measures of spectrum allocation 
liberalisation, although specific technical issues of spectrum use in those cases usually 
suggest a separate discussion (by academics, consultants and regulators: see, e.g., Faulhaber 
2005; London Economics 2008; Ofcom 2004, 2005).  
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Chapter 4. Reforming spectrum management: re-thinking 
practice 
 
4.1.- Introduction 
Traditional administrative methods to regulate radio frequencies are 
currently unsatisfactory; in particular, those methods tend to create artificial 
gaps between spectrum supply and demand.47
A variety of liberalisation programmes and specific actions have been 
proposed.
 Some spectrum regulators 
have changed their policies to accommodate new technologies and 
increasing demand for wireless services; however, spectrum management 
reform has not proceeded along the same path everywhere.  
48
                                                 
47 Cf. Chapter 1, Section 1. 
48 For a survey of the literature see Cave et Al. (2007b). 
 Contributions to the debate on modernizing spectrum policy can 
be placed along a continuum, ranging from proposals of big-bang strategies, 
aiming at a radical and quick change of spectrum management methods, to 
slow and incremental adjustments, very close to the administrative 
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approach. For a rapid transition to market allocation of spectrum, in 2002 
two economists working at the US FCC proposed to reallocate restricted 
spectrum to flexible use and to conduct large-scale two-sided auctions of 
spectrum voluntarily offered by incumbents, together with any unassigned 
spectrum held by regulatory authorities (Kwerel and Williams 2002). Thus a 
rapid and efficient restructuring of spectrum rights and use could be 
facilitated by ensuring that most spectrum was up for sale at the same time.49
                                                 
49 The authors also proposed to provide incumbents with incentives to participate in such 
auctions, by immediately granting participants flexibility and allowing them to keep the 
proceeds for the sale of their spectrum. 
 
According to their proposal, 438 MHz of spectrum in the 300 to 3,000 MHz 
bandwidth could be restructured in as little as 2 years, significantly reducing 
spectrum shortages for high demand uses. However, this big-bang auction 
never happened. 
 At first glance, most reforming countries seem to have adopted 
gradual and incremental strategies; a number of market-inspired 
mechanisms, such as auctions and trading, have been introduced, or at least 
proposed, over time. Noteworthy exceptions seem to be Guatemala and El 
Salvador, as those two small countries in Latin America have conducted an 
extensive programme of spectrum rights auctions during a relatively short 
period of time (Hazlett et Al. 2006).  
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 The aim of this chapter is to analyze spectrum policy reforms which 
are taking place in liberalising countries, and to contribute to the discussion 
on determinants and circumstances of effective reforms intended to increase 
reliance on decentralized methods for spectrum assignment and allocation. 
This is done using theories developed through analyses of transition 
economics (from planned economies to more market-based economies), as 
this work shares the crucial view that modernizing spectrum management 
has similarities with the abandonment of ‘Gosplan’ regulation and elaborates 
on the assertion that “[r]eforming spectrum policy is like reforming planned 
economies” (Kwerel and Williams 2002: 40).50
                                                 
50 Cf. Chapter 3. This analysis moves from the economic literature investigating the 
transition of former communist countries from planned economies to market economies; it is 
based especially on Dewatripont and Roland (1995). 
 A few questions are of 
particular interest here: whether, and under what conditions, big-bang 
strategies have to be preferred to gradualist strategies in the move from 
‘command and control’ to market-based approaches for spectrum 
management; whether, and to what extent, theoretical findings elaborated in 
the area of transition economics provide a useful theoretical framework for 
spectrum policy reform; and whether, and to what extent, experience with 
spectrum management reform in liberalising countries matches theoretical 
models of successful reform. 
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 The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the 
existing literature on spectrum management which has dealt closely with the 
problem of identifying models of spectrum policy reform. Section 3 
introduces a selection of propositions elaborated in the literature on 
transition economics, which are then used as analytical tools for spectrum 
policy reforms. Section 4 reports the most relevant evidence from the case 
studies (namely, Europe and the UK, the US, Australia, New Zealand, 
Guatemala and El Salvador), focussing on two key dimensions of spectrum 
liberalization policy, i.e. allocation and assignment. Section 5 closes this 
chapter with a discussion, from both positive and normative perspectives, of 
spectrum policy reforms analyzed in the previous sections.  
 
4.2.- Previous contributions on spectrum policy reform frameworks 
There is a vast literature about general and specific themes of spectrum 
management reform, which involves many different issues of transition from 
a strictly administrative regime to a more liberal one (cf. Chapters 1, 2). 
Liberalization of radio frequency use may be implemented to various 
degrees; therefore, various strategies and tactics may be adopted by 
spectrum regulators. Because the aim of this chapter is to analyze strategies 
and tactics adopted by liberalising countries (and contribute to the 
discussion), the focus in the following literature review is on a few analyses 
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which discuss possible frameworks for the transition from ‘command and 
control’ to a market-based (or, at least, market-inspired) regime. The selected 
contributions - which are considered of greater relevance - are, in 
chronological order, the ones by Kwerel and Williams (2002), Wellenius and 
Neto (2007) and Hazlett and Muñoz (2009). The following discussion will 
highlight some major findings of those studies; it will also compare and 
contrast those findings.  
 The first analysis, which is briefly considered here, is in Kwerel and 
Williams’ paper of 2002, where a big-bang strategy is advocated (Kwerel and 
Williams 2002). The authors argue that liberalization of spectrum policy can 
be broken down into two component parts: i) the flexibility given a particular 
licensee to use the spectrum allocated to its licence, whereby more flexibility 
cedes additional property rights to wireless spectrum holders; ii) the process 
whereby spectrum is allocated or reallocated from one category (or service) 
to another, thus permitting spectrum to be bid out of a given deployment 
and used in another one without special regulatory action.51
 Those two component parts of spectrum policy liberalization match, to 
some extent, two of the three benchmark models of spectrum regimes 
suggested by Hazlett and Muñoz (2009). The first component, i.e. part (i), 
may be matched with Hazlett and Muñoz’s model of spectrum assigned to 
 
                                                 
51 Cf. Hazlett and Muñoz (2009: 265, fn 14). 
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firms (their ‘model II’), whereby “[t]he regulatory authority allocates 
spectrum to licenses, which are then distributed to firms (through auctions or 
beauty contests), and it does not constrain the services that firms may supply 
or the technologies employed in accessing this bandwidth” (Hazlett and 
Muñoz 2009: 265); the second component, i.e. part (ii), may be matched with 
their model of spectrum assigned by markets (‘model III’), whereby “private 
property rights are assigned to the spectrum resource, wireless firms 
enjoying full flexibility in the use of assigned airwave space ... [and] 
spectrum rights can flow between firms” (ibidem).52
 Furthermore, Hazlett and Muñoz (2009: 276) contend that “[p]olicy 
reform, which entails an expansion of administrative allocations or more 
general liberalization measures, can be pursued either by independent 
regulatory actions or via statute”. They discuss two alternative scenarios for 
reform policies and regulatory structures: first, a scenario where policies are 
instituted by fiat under the administrative allocation system already in place; 
alternatively, a scenario where statutory reforms may eliminate regulatory 
discretion and require structural changes. With statutory reforms (‘model 
 
                                                 
52 The remaining benchmark model (‘model I’) - i.e. spectrum assigned to services – is close 
to the traditional command-and-control regime of spectrum management, although with 
occasional (minor) reliance on market-based mechanisms for spectrum assignment: “[in this 
model] the regulatory authority assigns spectrum to each operator to provide a specific 
service, with licenses awarded by either beauty contest or competitive bidding” (Hazlett and 
Muñoz 2009: 265). 
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III’), markets would change both spectrum assignments and allocations,53 
and prices would be at levels reflecting efficient spectrum allocations. Thus 
spectrum would be treated as any other input.54
 Primary spectrum assignments via auctions and secondary spectrum 
trading are both liberalizing actions. However, Spiller and Cardilli (1999: 67) 
argue that “[a]lthough pundits and scholars alike have attached much 
importance to the shift towards auctions, it is unclear whether auctions by 
themselves are that important regulatory change”. Spectrum trades usually 
have only little impact on spectrum efficiency if trading is not accompanied 
by spectrum rights enabling change of use - i.e. change of allocation, before 
or after a trade (e.g. Valletti 2001; Analysys et Al. 2004). With regard to 
 
 Hazlett and Muñoz are particularly concerned with mobile 
communications services. They contend that “liberalizing both licences and 
spectrum allocations can be undertaken in tandem, and many reform efforts 
have taken this approach” (Hazlett and Muñoz 2009: 275). Moreover, they 
note that one proposal in this direction is the big-bang strategy advocated by 
Kwerel and Williams.  
                                                 
53 Liberalization of spectrum allocations in this sense may include allocation (and 
assignment) of spectrum in the hands of the regulator as well as refarming - both driven by 
regulatory action. The analysis in Kwerel and Williams can be extended to include 
allocations of unlicensed spectrum (and commons). Those inclusions would be within 
existing regulatory structures (cf. ‘model II’).  
54 Marginal cost is decreasing in capital and spectrum; these two inputs are substitutes (Reed 
1992). 
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trading, Hazlett and Muñoz note that use of spectrum secondary markets is 
“sometimes associated” to policy changes.  
 Finally, Wellenius and Neto (2007) outline three of the many options 
that may be considered for spectrum policy: (i) do nothing; (ii) move as fast 
as possible; and (iii) improve piecemeal at the margins. They argue that 
“whenever country conditions permit, it is preferable to move quickly. The 
benefits from spectrum management reform are likely to be larger when an 
aggressive agenda is pursued [..]. Radical solutions may be easiest to 
implement when spectrum management is least developed” (ibidem: 54).55
                                                 
55 The authors argue that “the rights approach will yield the greatest economic efficiency 
gains and least risk of anti-competitive behaviour if all spectrum is placed on the market at 
once and at the same time restrictions on use and technology are lifted” (Wellenius and Neto 
2007: 54; cf. Kwerel and Williams 2002). Nevertheless, they write “[t]he spectrum rights 
approach [..] is not equally well suited to manage all parts of the spectrum nor in all country 
conditions. The main limitations that may arise relate to insufficient liquidity, lack of 
individual spectrum rights, high transaction costs and inefficiencies, international 
constraints, market failures, and conflict with public policy” (Wellenius and Neto 2007: 18-
9). 
 
The authors also contend that “[n]ew solutions are likely to be tried first in 
situations on which there is experience elsewhere and the risks are low, or 
where risks are higher but payoff in terms of economic or social benefits is 
large [..]. This more gradual transition may be preferred in mature markets” 
(ibidem: 55). 
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4.3.- The transition from command-and-control to market-based 
mechanisms: theoretical models of transition economics 
Liberalizing countries are introducing market (-inspired) mechanisms in 
various areas of spectrum management, thus moving from ‘command and 
control’ to a more flexible regime. This section discusses possible strategies 
and tactics for such transition, using the literature on transition economics as 
a theoretical framework (esp. Dewatripont and Roland 1995; see also 
Wallsten 2002; Nsouli et Al. 2005); in particular, it contrasts big-bang reforms 
and gradual reforms and suggests that gradualism is likely to be a better 
approach to spectrum reform than big-bang strategies. 
 The defence of a big-bang strategy is often based on the 
complementary nature of reform packages (i.e., smaller parts which 
represent sub-divisions of a major reform) - e.g. spectrum auctions and 
liberalization of radio frequency uses. However, reform packages being 
strongly complementary does not necessarily strengthen the case for big-
bang transitions: it may, on the contrary, give gradualism an additional 
advantage, by building constituencies for further reforms (because an 
appropriate sequencing of reforms would provide demonstrated success to 
build upon). The case for gradualism thus crucially hinges on correct reform 
sequencing. Moreover, a big-bang strategy involves high reversal costs, 
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which are often an obstacle to start a reform programme (cf. Dewatripont 
and Roland 1995). 
 Spectrum reform involves a considerable amount of uncertainty; 
crucial information will only become available later (in liberalization 
programmes): for instance, what technologies will actually become available 
and marketable, what levels of harmful interference will be suffered, what 
services and applications will be in (high) demand and what will the wireless 
network be like. With such issues at large, gradualism makes reforms easier 
to start, because it gives an additional option of early reversal at a lower cost 
after partial uncertainty resolution. It is not a coincidence that gradual 
reform packages tend to start earlier (Dewatripont and Roland 1995). 
 A gradualist approach involves a sequential implementation of 
minimum bangs, i.e. a simultaneous implementation of a minimum set of 
reforms that can be implemented independent of other reforms without 
failure. Therefore, a gradualist approach assigns different parts of a reform 
programme into packages; within each package, there is usually strong 
interdependence and simultaneous implementation is likely to be better. This 
is in contrast to a piecemeal approach, which implements different parts of a 
reform package in many steps without regard to possible strong 
interdependences (Wei 1997). 
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 The literature on transition economics and policy offers formal 
analyses of the expected payoffs under a big-bang approach and a gradualist 
reform. A number of results, which are listed below, could assist in the 
design, implementation and analysis of spectrum reforms (cf. Dewatripont 
and Roland 1995; Roland 2002): 
a) gradualism has advantages and disadvantages compared to a big-bang 
strategy. A crucial advantage is to save on reversal costs, by giving an option 
of early reversal, when the prospects for further reform look disappointing. 
Disadvantages may derive, firstly, from a period of partial reform (which can 
be costly) and, secondly, from an unnecessary delay in the implementation of 
the whole reform package (when the expected payoff of a big bang approach 
is positive);56
b) ‘informativeness’ of sequential reforms is key to decide as to whether a 
gradualist approach is better than a big-bang one.
 
57
                                                 
56 Still gradualism dominates if the option value of early reversal is important enough; 
intuitively, this is true if learning is not too costly, or if it is fast enough. 
57 Informativeness is used “in the sense that learning about one reform tells whether to try 
another reform or not” (Dewatripont and Roland 1995: 1211). 
 If reforms can proceed 
quickly, gradualism is the best strategy when information is likely to become 
available at a later stage (for instance, information on actual operation of 
devices in licence-exempt spectrum, or service options to promote efficient 
use of some frequency bands); 
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c) if gradualism is optimal and reforms included in the package differ only 
in their riskiness, it is optimal to start with the riskier reform, because doing 
so increases the option value of reversibility (thereby increasing the expected 
outcome). Arguably, liberalizing spectrum use is riskier - especially in terms 
of a possible increase in harmful interference - than changing assignment 
methods (for instance from first-come-first-served to comparative bidding); 
d) if the only difference is in the expected outcomes, and reforms do not 
proceed quickly, it is better to start with the reform with the higher expected 
outcome. A number of studies have produced a strand of large-scale high-
level estimates of the (positive) effects of spectrum liberalization; in general, 
total benefits of liberalization and trading are expected to be substantially 
higher than those from trading only. This is largely due to higher innovation 
and competition from liberalization (cf., e.g., Analysys et Al. 2004, which uses 
a methodology followed in later studies on other liberalizing countries). 
However, there is still little empirical evidence directly addressing the effects 
of liberalization on interference (London Economics 2008). 
 
4.4.- International experiences of spectrum reform 
This section focuses on several countries which have been in the forefront of 
spectrum reforms. These countries provide evidence on the major initiatives 
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aimed at introducing market-based mechanisms for spectrum management. 
The (groups of) countries selected for this purpose are Australia, the 
European Union, Guatemala and El Salvador, New Zealand, the United 
Kingdom and the United States (they are predominantly but not exclusively 
high income countries). They are not the only liberalizing countries, but their 
experience with spectrum reform includes the aspects deliberately selected 
for this study, where the emphasis is on spectrum auctions and secondary 
trading (i.e. liberalization of assignment) as well as on technology and 
service neutrality in licence conditions (i.e. liberalization of allocation). 
 
4.4.1.- Europe 
Flexibility of spectrum management to enhance efficient use of frequency 
bands has been a crucial theme in European policy for many years. In 
December 2004, the Council argued that one relevant ICT policy issue was 
“to continue assessing different spectrum management models with a view 
to more flexible and efficient use of spectrum at European and global level, 
taking into account the development of new and innovative technologies as 
well as the methodologies which make use of market mechanisms”.58
                                                 
58 Council Resolution 10 December 2004, see 15472/04 (press release 345: 14). 
 EU 
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policy has been liberalising spectrum assignment and allocation in a number 
of ways, which are summarised below.59
 In Europe, spectrum trading is not mandatory but allowable. Article 
9(3) of the Framework Directive 2002/21/EC permits member states to allow for 
the transfer of rights to use radio frequencies between undertakings. In 2003, 
the RSPG (Radio Spectrum Policy Group) received a request from the EC for 
an opinion on secondary trading; in November 2004, the RSPG published 
 
Liberalization of assignment 
European countries have used competitive biddings to assign spectrum 
licences. The most relevant experience with auctions in Europe is the 
European UMTS/ IMT-2000 licence assignment, which took place in many 
European member states in 2000-2001. Many studies analysed the European 
3G auctions and tried to identify the determinants of its results (e.g. Jehiel 
and Moldovanu 2001; McKinsey & Co. 2002; Illing and Klüh 2003; Cave et Al. 
2007a). However, member states took different paths to assign spectrum for 
3G licences: only some of them auctioned licences, while others used 
comparative biddings (beauty contexts) or mixed approaches; spectrum 
users paid widely different amounts of money for 3G licences (see, e.g., 
Aegis and Connogue 2001, 37-9).  
                                                 
59 For a recent discussion of EU spectrum policy see Cave and Minervini (2009). 
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their Opinion (RSPG 2004). They adopted a cautious stance with regard to 
spectrum trading:60
 Most EU member states have implemented spectrum trading in a 
number of bands used for commercial services. In February 2009 the RSPG 
published their Opinion on best practices regarding the use of spectrum by 
some public sectors in Europe (RSPG 2009) and, with regard to trading, the 
RSPG considered that spectrum trading is not necessarily applicable in all 
frequency bands used by the public sector. However, trading offers public 
bodies the flexibility to enter into leasing arrangements for a limited time (if 
 they favoured a phased approach to secondary trading of 
rights of use to the spectrum, leaving to individual countries the decision 
whether to introduce secondary trading and the timing of it. This took into 
account that some EU countries were introducing secondary trading (e.g. the 
UK), while other countries were more hesitant. The difference in experience 
with trading also led the RSPG to consider that European harmonisation of 
spectrum trading rules should not be pursued at that stage. Last, but not 
least, the RSPG was sceptical about the application of trading in bands 
catering for government services (e.g. defence) and safety of life services 
(e.g., civil aviation), terrestrial broadcasting services and broadcasting-
satellite services, and scientific services (e.g. radio astronomy). 
                                                 
60 The RSPG considered trading to be beneficial in certain parts of the spectrum, subject to 
the implementation of sufficient safeguards to ensure that potential benefits are not offset by 
adverse consequences; moreover, the RSPG stated that “European administrations should 
introduce secondary trading with due care” (RSPG 2004: 4). 
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they do not wish to dispose of the spectrum permanently) and this could be 
especially useful for the public sector because of their long time horizons for 
planning. 
Liberalization of allocation 
Work aimed at introducing a more flexible spectrum management regime in 
Europe has gone further than fostering spectrum trading. In May 2004 the EC 
invited the RSPG to prepare an Opinion on a co-ordinated EU spectrum 
policy approach for wireless communication radio access platforms, under 
the acronym WAPECS (Wireless Access Platforms, later changed to ‘Policies’ 
for Electronic Communications Services). In its Opinion of November 2005, 
the RSPG defined WAPECS as “a framework for the provision of electronic 
communications services within a set of frequency bands to be identified and 
agreed between European Union Member States in which a range of 
electronic communications networks and electronic communications services 
may be offered on a technology and service neutral basis, provided that 
certain technical requirements to avoid interference are met, to ensure the 
effective and efficient use of the spectrum, and the authorization conditions 
do not distort competition” (RSPG 2005: 2-3). Table 1 shows the frequency 
bands originally identified for WAPECS. 
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Table 1 - Frequency bands identified for WAPECS 
Broadcasting bands 174–230 MHz 
470–862 MHz 
1452–1479.5 MHz 
Fixed links/point to point 
(P2P) 
5925–6425 MHz, 3600–4200 MHz, 1375–
1400 MHz, 1492–1517 MHz, 1427–
1452 MHz and  
1350–1375 MHz 
Point to multipoint (P2MP) (without MWS) 3400–3800 MHz, 24.5–
26.5 GHz 
(with MWS) 24.5 GHz–26.5 GHz 
Mobile services 380–400 MHz 
410–430 MHz 
450–470 MHz 
870–876 MHz 
880–921 MHz 
925–960 MHz 
1710–1785 MHz 
1805–1880 MHz 
1900–1980 MHz 
2010–2025 MHz 
2110–2170 MHz 
Unlicensed bands 1880–1900 MHz (DECT) 
2400–2483.5 MHz (RLANs) 
5150-5350 MHz (RLANs) 
5470-5725 MHz (RLANs) 
Source: RSPG (2005). 
 
The objective is to ensure that spectrum is available for a wide variety of 
services and applications to comply with the overall policy goal of 
developing the EU internal market and European competitiveness. WAPECS 
aims to introduce more flexibility in the use of radio frequency spectrum, 
taking into account that a number of platforms and technologies may 
provide mobile, portable and fixed access for a wide range of ECS and 
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converging applications (e.g., IP access, multimedia, multicasting, interactive 
broadcasting, datacasting), under one or more frequency allocations (mobile, 
broadcasting, fixed) deployed via terrestrial and/or satellite platforms. In 
practice it was suggested that substantial amounts of spectrum, including 
roughly one third of the spectrum below 3 GHz (the spectrum best suited for 
terrestrial communications), could possibly be made subject to tradable and 
flexible use by 2010.  
While the RSPG was working on the WAPECS concept, the EC 
published a communication on market-based approaches to spectrum 
management (EC 2005a). It proposed a coordinated introduction of spectrum 
markets across the EU. However, the traditional model was expected to 
continue to play a relevant role where public interests are at stake (e.g. 
defence, aviation, scientific research, etc). The EC also contended that lack of 
flexibility in spectrum management has led to a spectrum bottleneck61
                                                 
61 In 2006, a study by the ERG (European Regulators Group) highlighted a few 
bottleneck/competition problems in the mobile communications sector (see ERG 2006). 
 for 
new radio technologies; moreover detailed ex ante administrative decisions 
and a requirement for prior regulatory approval have often delayed or even 
prevented the introduction of new products (EC 2005b). Consequently, the 
Commission’s communication on the Review of the EU regulatory Framework 
for ECS proposed (at 5.1) that “based on common EU rules, greater flexibility 
in spectrum management could be introduced by strengthening the use of 
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general authorizations whenever possible. When not possible, owners of 
spectrum usage rights should not be unduly constrained but, subject to 
certain safeguards, have the freedom to provide any type of electronic 
communications service (‘service neutrality’) using any technology or 
standard under common conditions (‘technological neutrality’)" (EC 2006). 
 Moreover, in 2007 the EC stated that the deployment of innovative 
wireless services and technologies is increasingly hampered by the 
reservation of certain spectrum bands for narrowly-defined services (EC 
2007), thus embracing the principle of technological neutrality and service 
neutrality for spectrum policy.  
 In 2008 some member states took actions aimed at introducing market-
based approaches into their spectrum management practices: a draft 
Frequency Act allowing secondary trading and technologically neutral use of 
spectrum was presented to the Danish Parliament; a similar legislative 
instrument was being discussed in the Netherlands; the Greek Ministry of 
transport and communications adopted a regulation allowing partial 
spectrum trading (EC 2009b). 
 The Commission’s proposals have brought to the fore fundamental 
issues with regard to spectrum management and the design of property 
rights. In response to this, the European Parliament (EP) published a 
statement on radio spectrum policy where the principles of technological and 
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service neutrality where reaffirmed. In its statement the EP “rejects a one-
sided market model of spectrum management and urges the Commission to 
reform the system of spectrum management in such a way as to facilitate the 
coexistence of different types of licensing models”.62
4.4.2.- The United Kingdom 
  
 
Until the late 1990s, the UK applied command-and-control methods to most 
spectrum used commercially and by public agencies. In its Spectrum 
Framework Review (SFR) of November 2004, Ofcom set out a new 
deregulatory approach under which the market, not the regulator, would 
determine the most appropriate use of spectrum (Ofcom 2004).63
                                                 
62 The EP also “considers that the administrative method of allocating spectrum rights could 
be supplemented by Member States opening up more frequencies to unlicensed, and 
therefore possibly shared use, and by allowing spectrum trading on condition that this 
opening up does not harm the continuity and quality of services concerned with public 
information and safety”. Excerpts from texts adopted by the European Parliament at the 
sitting of Wednesday 14 February 2007, P6_TA(2007)0041, European Parliament resolution 
towards a European policy on the radio spectrum (2006/2212(INI)). Recently, the ECC has 
reviewed the various terminologies that are commonly used to qualify the type of licensing 
regime applied in the regulation of spectrum use in Europe (ECC 2009). 
63 The SFR followed Professor Cave’s review of spectrum management (see Cave 2002).  
 Ofcom 
adopts a light-touch approach to regulation and believes it is important to 
reduce restrictions on spectrum usage as far as possible. The liberalisation 
process was launched in 2005 in three license sectors: business radio, fixed 
wireless access and fixed links. As a rule, Ofcom is proceeding cautiously, by 
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initially only considering individual areas, and then dealing with changes to 
licence conditions in those sectors only. The extent and date of liberalisation 
will thus vary from licence class to licence class, depending, for example, on 
the practical viewpoint, the complexity of the coordination required and the 
ability of users to solve interference issues. 
Liberalization of assignment 
In its SFR, Ofcom indicated that their preferred method of spectrum 
assignment to operators - particularly where demand is likely to exceed 
supply - is by way of auction. A caveat was included that, where there are 
strong policy reasons for an auction not to be used, then alternative 
allocation methods would be considered. The UK has carried out a few 
spectrum auctions using the simultaneous ascending auction method (as in 
the auction for 3.4 GHz FWA spectrum). In 2008 Ofcom released spectrum in 
the so-called L-band at 1452-1492 MHz and this was Ofcom’s second 
combinatorial clock auction.64 In June 2009, the government’s action plan for 
the information society, known as Digital Britain,65
                                                 
64 Its result is in sharp contrast to the first combinatorial clock auction (the 10-40 GHz 
auction); several of the bidders failed to bid on the largest profitable package in the clock 
stage (see Cramton 2008). 
 announced that the 
government may implement a proposal from an independent spectrum 
65 See http://www.berr.gov.uk/whatwedo/sectors/digitalbritain/index.html . 
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broker to hold part of the 2.6 GHz auction together with the award of the 800 
MHz digital dividend band.  
 Spectrum trading was introduced in the UK at the end of 2004 as a key 
element in Ofcom’s programme of market-based reform. Since then, trading 
has been progressively extended to a broad range of licences. The holders of 
certain wireless telegraphy licences, granted by Ofcom under section 8 of the 
Wireless Telegraphy Act 2006, are allowed to transfer all or part of their rights 
and obligations to another party. Under the Trading Regulations,66
 Trading volumes in the UK have been low since trading was first 
permitted, particularly at the beginning. By August 1, 2007, only five extra-
group trades had been accomplished (and this has been a source of concern 
 Ofcom has 
introduced trading options which offer flexibility to parties interested in 
trading rights: in addition to an outright total transfer (where all the rights 
and obligations of a licence transfer from one party to another), the 
regulations permit concurrent or partial transfers – in concurrent transfers, 
rights and obligations under the licence become rights and obligations of the 
transferee, while continuing to be rights and obligations of the person 
making the transfer; in partial transfers, only some rights and obligations 
under the licence are transferred (partial transfers may be outright or 
concurrent). 
                                                 
66 See http://www.ofcom.org.uk/radiocomms/ifi/trading/tradingguide/tradingguide.pdf . The 
Trading Regulations give effect to Article 9 of the Framework Directive 2002/21/EC. 
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to the regulator). In April 2008, Ofcom’s information note on key spectrum 
initiatives reported the following number of trades (Ofcom 2008a), as of 
November 2007 (Table 2). 
Table 2 -  UK trades as of November 2007 
Licence class 
Licences on 
issue, March 
2007 
Licences 
traded 
Percentage of 
licences 
traded in 
licence class 
since trading 
began 
Fixed links 365 7 2% 
Business Radio CBS 563 3 1% 
Broadband Fixed Wireless 
Access 
14 6 43% 
Business Radio Public Mobile 
Data 
4 1 25% 
Concurrent spectrum access 12 1 8% 
Source: Ofcom (2008a: 13). 
 
Ofcom noted that, although some of these trades were “administrative” (e.g. 
transferring licence holdings within a group of companies or occurring as a 
result of corporate takeovers), “there is value even in these forms of trades” 
(Ofcom 2008a: 13).  
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 The Transfer Notification Register (TNR), which provides information 
on licences traded or in the process of being traded, shows information on 
hundreds of licences traded after November 2007.67 In addition, Ofcom has 
recently conducted work on simplifying spectrum trading in the UK, as 
features of its trading regime may be imposing unnecessary regulatory 
burdens.68
A distinctive feature of UK spectrum management is the use of 
administrative incentive pricing (AIP) for public sector spectrum holdings. 
The underlying principle of AIP is that, where spectrum is in excess demand 
in its current use or could feasibly be used to address excess demand from 
some alternative use, spectrum is assigned to those who value it most highly. 
Where spectrum is not priced in a market, as in the case of public sector 
holdings, AIP takes into account the opportunity cost of spectrum and 
introduces payments for spectrum usage; this brings about better incentives 
compared to traditional administrative fees (Cave et Al. 2007a, esp. ch. 12). 
Recently Ofcom has published a statement on applying spectrum pricing to 
the maritime sector (Ofcom 2010c) and has proposed to extend AIP to more 
 
Administrative incentive pricing 
                                                 
67 Access to the UK TNR is available at http://spectruminfo.ofcom.org.uk/spectrumInfo . 
Most trades involved business and radio licences. 
68 The Trading Regulations specify a six-stage process for executing trades; see Ofcom (2009, 
2010a). 
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licence classes, in addition to cases of public services where AIP is already in 
use (e.g. defence).69
Ofcom, as noted above, is shifting UK spectrum policy towards a flexible 
system of spectrum management. Therefore, the regulator has been 
developing spectrum usage rights (Ofcom 2006a). In 2006 Ofcom introduced 
two different ways to liberalise specific groups of licences. Firstly, by means 
of changing existing individual licences. In this case, licence holders can 
apply for a change to the usage conditions or requirements with regard to the 
technical parameters for their license(s). This gives Ofcom greater control of 
the interference potential, but creates insecurity for the applicant for the 
outcome is uncertain, and it also involves high administrative costs. The 
second course of action is to change generically the license conditions. This 
type of approach is aimed at making license conditions as flexible and 
technology-neutral as possible. It creates greater investment security and is 
associated with lower transaction costs for those concerned (ibidem). For 
instance, 205 MHz of spectrum in the 2010-2025 MHz and 2500-2690 MHz 
bands (known as 2.6 GHz) were released on a technology and service neutral 
basis. However, the definition of technology-neutral and use-neutral 
 
Liberalization of allocation 
                                                 
69 See Ofcom (2010d); see also the results of the 2005 independent audit of spectrum holding 
and further initiatives at www.spectrumaudit.org.uk . 
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emission rights brings up complex issues.70
4.4.3.- The United States 
In the US, liberalised spectrum management primarily relates to non-
government spectrum, whereas the framework for government spectrum, 
especially for military use, continues to be ‘command and control’. 
Liberalisation of non-government spectrum is being carried out gradually.  
Liberalization of assignment 
 Periodical revisions of spectrum 
usage rights were planned and carried out since 2006. In particular, Ofcom is 
liberalising 900 MHz and 1800 MHz spectrum for UMTS (Ofcom 2010e); the 
regulator is also liberalising licence-exempt spectrum access (cf., for instance, 
Ofcom 2006b and, recently, Ofcom 2010f, 2010g). 
 
The US were initially reluctant to use market mechanisms to assign spectrum 
to operators, preferring to use comparative hearings or even a lottery system. 
Comparative hearings (or beauty contests) have been conducted for many 
decades, whereas lotteries were experimented only briefly in the early 1980s 
to assign cellular telephone licences, in an attempt to avoid issues attached to 
                                                 
70 For instance, there are a number of potential uses of the 2.6 GHz spectrum including 
mobile broadband wireless services; each licence is tradable and various types of trade are 
permitted; see Ofcom (2008b) and Ofcom’s consultation about liberalisation in the 900 MHz, 
1800 MHz and 2.1 GHz spectrum bands (Ofcom 2009b). 
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comparative hearings.71 In 1985, when the FCC first asked permission from 
the US Congress to auction spectrum licences, the Congress denied that 
request. In 1993, having seen the success of other countries (notably New 
Zealand and India72) in raising government funds, and with a pressing need 
to reduce the budget deficit, the US government espoused market-based 
mechanisms to assign spectrum (Kwerel and Rosston 2000): the Omnibus 
Reconciliation Act provided the FCC with the statutory authority to conduct 
spectrum auctions and, since 1994, the FCC has been running auctions.73
 With regard to secondary assignments (i.e. spectrum trading) and 
further liberalization measures of spectrum management, the US 
government has long recognised that secondary markets can potentially 
serve as at least a partial correction to misallocation of spectrum in the hands 
of operators who do not use it to deliver the most valuable services. The 
SPTF Report (FCC 2002b) expressed its support for a clear definition of 
tradable property-like rights for spectrum (ibidem, esp. 55-8) and two 
alternative models of spectrum reuse were promoted: on the one hand, a 
 
                                                 
71 Hearing processes to uncover the value structure of firms over the available licences are 
very complex and may take a long time to allocate licences. With lotteries, hundreds of 
thousands of applications were submitted; it took many years for operators to obtain enough 
contiguous cellular licences to form businesses. 
72 India is not included in this survey. A discussion on spectrum auctions and policy in India 
can be found in Prasad and Sridhar (2009).  
73 As of July 1, 2009, the U.S. Government had realized $52.6 billion in license revenues (FCC 
2009). 
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secondary markets model; on the other hand, an easements74 or underlay 
model. In the former model, the licensee would determine what rights it is 
willing to sub-license, if any, and to whom; in the latter, the regulator would 
determine what rights if any must be provided to third parties. The SPTF 
also recommended the use of secondary market mechanisms, perhaps 
complemented by limited use of easements imposed by the regulator,75 “to 
facilitate access to licensed spectrum for opportunistic, non-interfering 
devices that operate above the temperature threshold” (i.e. the energy limit 
that can exist in a band).76
 Further measures to promote spectrum leasing have been discussed in 
the US. The SPTF advocated improvements in the FCC’s regulations for 
spectrum leasing to facilitate spectrum trades;
  
77
                                                 
74 Under U.S. law, an easement is a limited right to use the property belonging to another, 
especially to gain access. Here, an easement would confer limited rights to use spectrum 
licensed to another user. 
75 In the literature, see for example Faulhaber (2005), who argues in favour of easements to 
enhance spectrum access, and Baumol and Robyn (2006), who raise concerns on the 
effectiveness of arrangements which are not based on market mechanisms. See also the 
discussion in Cave (2006: 228-31). 
76 The FCC proposed the model “interference temperature” for quantifying and managing 
interference in a specific band, by providing a cap on the total radiofrequency energy that 
could exist in the band. This model would focus on the actual radio frequency interference 
environment confronted by receivers, rather than on transmitter operations (FCC 2002a). The 
model might promote more liberal spectrum allocations. 
77 Webbink, then the Deputy Chief of the FCC’s Office of Plans and Policy, argued that 
spectrum trading should be subject to few if any restrictions; that prior notification of the 
FCC should not be required; and that the FCC should eliminate most technical restrictions 
on usage except to the extent necessary to address interference (Webbink 1980). 
 they also considered that it 
might in some cases be appropriate to enable some private entity (a band 
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manager or frequency coordinator) to manage opportunistic secondary users 
on the primary licensee’s behalf.78
                                                 
78 There has been no wide-scale implementation of the easements (or underlay) approach. 
Existing licensees are understandably uncomfortable with the risk of interference, and also 
with the risk that easements would lead to a “squatter’s rights” problem—that once 
someone began to take advantage of an easement, it would be difficult or impossible to evict 
them later (Kwerel and Williams 2002). There are, however, instances where the FCC 
permits unlicensed devices to operate in licensed spectrum without first obtaining the 
permission of the licensee - UWB is a conspicuous example. 
 FCC procedures for spectrum leasing were 
substantially liberalised by the First Report and Order in October 2003 (FCC 
2003). That ruling enabled “most wireless radio licensees with ‘exclusive’ 
rights to their assigned spectrum to enter into spectrum leasing 
arrangements”. The policies affected both mobile and fixed services (FCC 
2004a). The First Report and Order provided two modes of liberalised 
arrangements. The first mode is spectrum manager licensing, where the 
licensee retains both de jure control (i.e. legal control) and effective de facto 
control (i.e. working control) over the leased spectrum. The ruling enabled 
leases without prior FCC approval within the perimeter drawn by a licence: 
in this mode, it is the licensee that is primarily accountable to the FCC for 
compliance with spectrum-relevant legal and regulatory obligations. The 
second mode is the de facto transfer mode, where the licensee retains de jure 
control, but transfers de facto control to the lessee; although this is a fast track 
approval process, prior FCC approval is still required. 
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 The Second Report and Order further liberalised the process (FCC 
2004b). Most notably, it made overnight processing of lease applications 
available to a wide variety of lease arrangements where the parties certify 
that the arrangement does not raise any of a specified list of potential 
concerns (such as foreign ownership, license eligibility, or competition 
issues). The Second Report and Order (Section 88) also attempts to clear the 
way for cognitive radio and similar forms of opportunistic use of spectrum. 
Liberalization of allocation 
By and large, the US spectrum access regulation has focused on power limits 
to constrain spectrum use and ‘harmful interference’ among users; with 
regard to the issue of licence technology and service neutrality, the US 
approach has been to have only a minimum of constraints on spectrum 
access and licences:79 unless precluded by international agreements, licensees 
are free, for the most part, to provide any service (e.g. fixed, mobile, private, 
common carrier) and free to deploy any technology they may see fit. For 
many services, including Personal Communication Services (PCS), 
constraints usually regard only power limits.80
                                                 
79 Technical constraints deal largely with mitigating the effects of harmful interference.  
80 The FCC limits essentially power radiated into adjacent frequency bands in the same 
geographic area, power radiated into adjacent geographic areas in the same frequency band 
and power radiated inside the assigned band for each class of station; see, e.g., Sutherland 
(2007). 
 However, those limits may 
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greatly (or even excessively) restrict the range of services permitted in a radio 
frequency band (see criticisms in Hazlett 2001, 2008a). 
 
4.4.4.- Australia 
Australia began a series of major policy reforms in the early 1990s, when the 
government published the results of a spectrum policy review (BTCE 1990), 
which advocated, firstly, a greater emphasis on a market-based system of 
spectrum management to replace the previous complex and inflexible web of 
inter-layered regulation, and, secondly, a gradual introduction of a mixed 
market/ administrative system, with tradability of spectrum restricted to 
commercial applications. Afterwards, Australia has carried on its liberalizing 
efforts in a number of directions. In its Five-year Spectrum Outlook 2009-2013 
(Outlook), ACMA (Australian Communications and Media Authority) has 
recently analysed spectrum demand and set work programmes for the next 
five years. The Outlook states that ACMA will seek to set conditions of use 
that will allow and encourage spectrum licensees to move spectrum to its 
highest value use(s) with a minimum of regulatory intervention (ACMA 
2009a). ACMA’s Outlook considers that the highest value use of spectrum 
will change over time and “[t]his requires a regulatory system that has the 
flexibility to enable licensees to adapt spectrum access and usage to both 
market requirements and technological advances” (ACMA 2009a: 11).  
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Liberalization of assignment 
Considerable amounts of spectrum have been made available to the market 
over the last 15 years in Australia, starting with the auction of MDS spectrum 
(2.3 GHz) in 1994. A number of broadcasting and open narrowcasting81 
licences were auctioned by the then Australian Broadcasting Authority 
(ABA) between 1996 and 2005. Revenue from auction of broadcasting 
licences amounted to about $693 million, with another $4 million realised 
from sale of open narrowcasting licences by the ABA. However, auction 
activity has slowed drastically since 2001 with the collapse of the dotcom 
boom.82
With regard to secondary markets for spectrum, Australia was one of 
the very earliest countries to allow spectrum trading. Apparatus licences
  
83
                                                 
81 
 
became tradable in 1995. Trading of spectrum licences was a fundamental 
element of the Radiocommunications Act 1992; however, the first spectrum 
licences were not issued until 1997. Spectrum blocks owned by licensees are 
Open narrowcasting services are broadcasting services whose reception is limited in at 
least one of a number of ways specified in section 18 of the Broadcasting Services Act 1992; 
see http://www.acma.gov.au/WEB/STANDARD/pc=PC_90044 . 
82 See www.acma.gov.au . 
83 The Radiocommunications Act 1992 provided for a new, comprehensive system of licensing. 
A spectrum licence represents the more market-oriented form of licensing; it authorises the 
operation of (non-specified) devices within a defined spectrum space and licence conditions, 
is fully tradable, can be divided and aggregated, is issued for periods of up to 15 years. An 
apparatus licence (the traditional command-and-control type licence) generally authorises the 
operation of a transmitter or receiver at a particular location. A class licence provides open 
access to spectrum on a shared basis: anyone can use equipment in class licensed bands, as 
long as they comply with the conditions.  
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represented in standard trading units (STUs), which are the smallest 
spectrum units recognised by the regulator and cover a predetermined 
geographic area and frequency band. STUs can be combined vertically, to 
provide increased bandwidth, or horizontally, to cover a larger area. In some 
cases the bandwidth is as small as 0.0125 MHz (cell size varies by location 
according to the population density).84
In November 2008, ACMA published data on secondary market 
activity for spectrum licences (Table 3) and apparatus licences (Table 4).
 Notwithstanding the introduction of 
STUs, the rate of trading has been quite slow. The Productivity Commission 
produced figures in its 2002 Radiocommunications report (PC 2002) 
purporting to show that the rate of trading in spectrum and apparatus 
licences was similar to annual turnover rates in the residential property 
market (PC 2002: 150).  
85
                                                 
84 See 
 
 
 
 
 
http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/27256/sub028.pdf; see also ITU 
(2004). 
85 Both spectrum and apparatus licence trade/ transfer data is likely to greatly over-estimate 
the level of trading taking place. The Productivity Commission (PC) itself noted that many 
transfers were among related parties. The PC also identified a number of possible reasons 
for the slow supply of spectrum traded in secondary markets. See ACMA (2008, 2009b). 
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Table 3 - Trading in spectrum licences 1998 to financial year 2007-2008 
Year MHz Traded Total Licences 
Traded 
Percentage 
Turnover Rate* 
1998-1999 136 50 13.8 
1999-2000 85 22 5.4 
2000-2001 879 47 7.7 
2001-2002 598 51 8.4 
2002-2003 24 54 8.8 
2003-2004 1315 24 3.6 
2004-2005 50 6 1.0 
2005-2006 5534 119 18.7 
2006-2007 120 24 3.5 
2007-2008 130 28 4.1 
Total 
Trades 
 425  
 
Source: ACMA (2008: 11).  
*Note: Turnover rate is the number of licences traded each year compared to the total number of 
spectrum licences on issue. 
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Table 4 - Trading in apparatus licences since 2004 
Licence 
Standard transfers (percentage  turnover) 
01/01/04 
to 
30/06/04 
2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 
Point to point 171 (0.9) 296 (0.8) 207 (0.6) 377 (1.0) 149 (0.4) 
Point to 
multipoint 69 (2.3) 61 (1.0) 37 (0.6) 92 (1.5) 55 (0.9) 
Land mobile 
system 615 (2.7) 497 (1.1) 731 (1.6) 649 (1.4) 694 (1.5) 
Ambulatory 57 (1.1) 192 (1.8) 132 (1.2) 73 (0.7) 228 (2.1) 
Paging system 8 (0.5) 32 (1.0) 29 (0.9) 27 (0.8) 19 (0.6) 
Broadcasting 
service 6 (0.2) 152 (2.0) 302 (4.0) 17 (0.2) 143 (1.9) 
Narrowband 
Area Service 10 (5.9) 15 (4.4) 49 (14.5) 64 (18.9) 7 (2.1) 
Narrowcasting 
Service 79 (7.6) 127 (6.1) 54 (2.6) 80 (3.8) 114 (5.5) 
Total licences 
transferred* 
1284 
(1.5) 
1794 
(1.1) 1948 (1.2) 
1628 
(1.0) 1685 (1.1) 
 
Source: ACMA (2008: 12).  
*Note: Total licences include non-assigned licences such as amateur, where a transfer is essentially the 
transfer of a call sign issue. 
 
Liberalization of allocation  
Spectrum licensing has created additional flexibility.86
                                                 
86 Some examples are the introduction of the wireless broadband service (in part of the 
spectrum licensed band used elsewhere for 3G mobile telephony) and the introduction of a 
land mobile network for the Western Australia police force using the spectrum licensed 500 
MHz band; Telstra was able to introduce a new W-CDMA 3G network into the 850 MHz 
 Nevertheless, 
spectrum licences fall short of an ideal of technology or use neutrality - in 
(Continued on next page) 
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practice, technical frameworks for spectrum licences are designed with an 
intended use in mind.87
                                                                                                                                          
band, previously used for CDMA and CDMA2000 services, without the need for band re-
planning or spectrum rule changes. 
 Outside of the spectrum licensed system, apparatus 
licences remain very service- and technology-specific. Indeed, the degree of 
neutrality has receded in later spectrum licence band releases compared with 
the earlier ones. The Productivity Commission reported in 2002 that the 
deployment of spectrum licences has proceeded more slowly and has been 
applied in far fewer bands than was envisaged. It noted that spectrum 
licensing had been applied in only 13 of the 84 bands initially assessed by the 
regulator as being suitable for this licensing approach, around 30 percent of 
the spectrum covered by these bands (PC 2002). There has been relatively 
little progress since. ACMA’s Outlook has recently stated, inter alia, that the 
creation of a new licence framework, which combines the characteristics of 
each of the existing licences types, may provide the necessary flexibilities to 
accommodate wireless access services into the future (ACMA 2009a). ACMA 
has investigated such a concept - called the ‘private park’ (this would be 
similar to class licensing arrangements for the 2.4 and 5.8 GHz bands, where 
87 See PC (2002). In 1996, the 1.9 GHz Band Plan stated that its primary purpose was “to 
facilitate the introduction in Australia of new systems known generally as cordless 
telecommunications services (CTS). By not specifying particular CTS systems, the Band Plan 
supports the competitive philosophy of technology neutrality”; see 
http://www.acma.gov.au/web/standard/pc=PC_285 
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each licensee could use the entire spectrum band and interference would be 
controlled by specifying conditions of use). 
 
4.4.5.- New Zealand 
New Zealand has been reducing command-and-control regulation for many 
years and its spectrum policy counts various market-based mechanisms 
introduced to improve spectrum management. The Radiocommunications Act 
1989 established a licensing regime which shares similarities to that in 
Australia. There are three licensing systems that apply to spectrum in New 
Zealand: i) the management rights regime (MRR), which is applicable to 
spectrum used primarily for commercial purposes; ii) the radio license 
regime (RLR), earlier known as apparatus licensing (an administrative 
assignment process which applies to spectrum used for applications in the 
public interest); and iii) general user licenses (GULs), for low powered 
devices such as garage door openers and WiFi. 
Liberalization of assignment 
Under the Radiocommunications Act 1989, the Ministry of commerce is 
provided with the authority to transfer portions of the spectrum to private 
management. Thus auctions have been used to sell spectrum since 1989, 
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when the first sealed-bid, second price tender system was used (the so-called 
Vickrey auction, with the bidder who submitted the highest bid winning the 
auction and paying the second highest offer price).88
 The Ministry of economic development (MED) published a review of 
radio spectrum policy in 2005 (MED 2005b). This provided an assessment of 
the spectrum strategy implemented by means of the Radiocommunications Act 
in 1989 and identified areas for prioritisation in the coming years. In 
particular, this review noted that the level of trading had been low and 
mainly confined to FM and AM radio broadcasting licences (where a great 
deal of consolidation happened through takeover). In addition, trades had 
not involved a change in use. The small size of the market in New Zealand, 
entry barriers to sectors using radio spectrum (notably in mobile 
telecommunications) and availability of alternative spectrum in the RLR 
licensing framework were identified as factors limiting secondary spectrum 
trading. The MED has recently completed a major technology platform 
upgrade to the online public register of radio frequencies in order to ease 
 The Radiocommunications 
Act also allowed spectrum transfers in some cases. 
                                                 
88 In New Zealand spectrum auction design and methods have changed over the years. 
Drawing from experiences in other countries (especially in the US), New Zealand adopted 
the simultaneous ascending auction in 1996 and has used it for a number of auctions. In 2004 
outcry auctions were used for the allocation of three spectrum licences that had been unsold 
in a previous simultaneous ascending auction (MED 2005a). In September 2009, MED 
(2009a) reported a reduction in government revenues from auction and spectrum sales 
activity ($0.249 million). 
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doing business (MED 2009a): this may facilitate transparent access to 
information on spectrum holdings and spectrum trading. The MED also 
proposed the development of a process for facilitating requests by 
prospective radio users to free up unused spectrum by cancelling or 
transferring radio licences.89
Technological and economic developments in the ICT area since the MRR 
was first introduced in 1989 have recently led the MED to review the way 
spectrum is managed under the longstanding administrative RLR. A 
discussion document was published in March 2009 (MED 2009b); as a result 
of the inquiry, no major changes were proposed by the MED. The Ministry 
for communications has agreed that the MED continue the RLR in its current 
form and consider congestion problems on a case-by-case basis. The Ministry 
also intends to explore options for minor improvements to the regime, 
including ongoing reviews of demand trends, coupled with a more 
systematic and forward-looking approach to enabling new technologies as 
they emerge.
 
Liberalization of allocation 
90
                                                 
89 See 
 
 
http://www.rsm.govt.nz/cms/policy-and-planning/current-
projects/radiocommunications/spectrum-management-in-the-radio-licensing-regime . 
90 Ibidem. 
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4.4.6.- Guatemala and El Salvador 
Guatemala and El Salvador are two small Central American countries (with 
populations of 12,728,111 and 6,948,073 respectively) which decided in 1996-
97 to adopt a simple but effective form of spectrum market which, in the case 
of non-public sector spectrum, gave private parties exclusive control over use 
of bandwidth and confined the regulator to defining, issuing and protecting 
spectrum rights (Ibarguen 2005; Hazlett et Al. 2006). 
 In Guatemala, before the enactment of the 1996 Ley General de 
Telecomunicaciones (General Telecommunications Law), spectrum was 
licensed by the state. The 1996 Law introduced the so-called titulos de 
usofructos de frecuencias (TUFs, also known as usufructs), which are the most 
salient feature of spectrum reform in Guatemala, as they established 
property rights over spectrum. TUFs can be leased, sold, subdivided or 
aggregated at will, and last for 15 years (renewable on request). A physical 
TUF is a paper certificate listing the frequency band, hours of operation, 
maximum transmitted power, maximum power emitted at the border, 
geographic territory and duration of right. The Superintendencia de 
Telecomunicaciones (SIT), an independent regulatory body established in 1995, 
is responsible for the registry of TUFs and is conceived as an administrator to 
enforce specified rules. “Essentially, the SIT is empowered to respond to 
private claims for spectrum access (TUFs) and to adjudicate disputes over 
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airwave rights” (Hazlett et Al. 2006: 7). The system is designed to have 
interference problems solved first by private negotiation and then private 
arbitration, if necessary (Ibarguen 2005). Regulation is thus restricted to 
setting aside bands for use by the state and adjudicating interference 
disputes which are not resolved by mediation. According to Ibarguen, one of 
the prime movers behind the reform, “one of the reasons for the vitality of 
the TUF market may be that interference problems have been negligible. 
Telgu (the largest private spectrum owner) has reported just one interference 
problem since 1996” (ibidem: 548). 
 In 1997 El Salvador adopted the Ley de Telecomunicaciones 
(Telecommunications Law) which brought about a reform similar to the one 
introduced by the Ley General de Telecomunicaciones in Guatemala. As a result, 
in Guatemala and El Salvador the management process was switched from a 
top down to a bottom up one. Any person or firm could request title to 
frequency bands not assigned to other users, and those and existing 
assignments became usufruct titles, offering the right to use and enjoyment 
by the right holder and not subject to being reclaimed by the government.  
 Following the enactment of the law, 3,985 TUFs have been auctioned 
between 1996 and 2004 with more than 75% of them auctioned between 1997 
and 1999.91
                                                 
91 Superintendencia de Telecomunicaciones de Guatemala, 2006.  
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 Spectrum trading is allowed in Guatemala and El Salvador. The sale of 
a TUF is accomplished by its endorsement by the seller, the buyer registering 
its new rights with the independent spectrum body. However, in Guatemala, 
change of use is permitted on transfer, whereas in El Salvador change of use 
is not allowed. In a recent study the authors note that “in Guatemala the 
regulatory authority has had difficulty buying back spectrum rights bands 
now needed for unlicensed use in keeping with new international 
recommendations to enable development of wireless broadband service 
using WiFi and WiMax technologies” (Wellenius and Neto 2007: 23).  
 
4.5.- Discussion 
In the previous section, liberalizing strategies and tactics adopted in a few 
countries were succinctly surveyed and individually discussed. The focus 
was on two major areas of spectrum management reform towards market-
based methods of spectrum use:  
(i) changes in the mechanisms to assign spectrum to users, either at the 
primary assignment stage (notably by means of auctions) or at the 
secondary assignment stage (i.e. trading); and 
(ii) changes in the framework governing the allocation of spectrum to 
services, by means of reductions, as far as possible, of administrative 
constraints on spectrum use (especially in the form of a complex web 
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of technical restrictions set by regulatory fiat) and decentralization to 
(licensed) spectrum users of decisions regarding more or less ample 
bundles of spectrum rights.  
This section discusses evidence from case studies using propositions about 
transition economics as theoretical lenses (cf. Section 3 above); those 
propositions about transition from administrative methods to market-
inspired ones are thus contrasted with data on spectrum policies in the 
countries surveyed above. Table 5 below provides a synthetic overview. 
Table 5 - Liberalization measures and timing in the areas surveyed  
 
 
          Part 1 
 
Major liberalization measures and timing 
 
Liberalization of assignment 
 
Liberalization of 
allocation Spectrum 
auctions 
Spectrum 
secondary trading 
 
Europe 
 
2000-2001, 3G 
spectrum 
auctions 
 
2002, Framework 
Directive 
 
2005, 
communication on 
a market-based 
approach to 
spectrum 
management; 
2006, Review of 
EU regulatory 
framework for 
ECS; 
2007, European 
Parliament’s 
resolution on 
spectrum 
management 
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          Part 2 
 
Major liberalization measures and timing 
 
Liberalization of assignment 
 
Liberalization of 
assignment 
Spectrum 
auctions 
Spectrum 
secondary trading 
 
UK 
 
2000, first auction 
 
2004, Spectrum 
Framework 
Review 
 
2004, Spectrum 
Framework 
Review; 
2006, spectrum 
usage rights; 
2010, licence-
exempt spectrum 
 
USA 
 
1994, first auction 
 
2002, SPTF report; 
2003, First Report 
and Order; 
2004, Second 
Report and Order 
 
In principle 
technology and 
service neutral 
spectrum 
 
Australia 
 
1994, first auction 
 
1995, apparatus 
licences; 
1997, spectrum 
licences 
 
1997, spectrum 
licences 
 
New Zealand 
 
 
1989, Radiocommunications Act 
 
Guatemala 
 
 
1996, Ley General de Telecomunicaciones 
 
El Salvador 
 
 
1997, Ley de Telecomunicaciones 
 
  
 Strategies which guide spectrum management reform in those 
countries differ substantially. On the one hand, most countries appear to be 
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moving gradually, from ‘command and control’ to more decentralized 
decisions of spectrum management. Reforms usually started from changes in 
the mechanisms to assign spectrum to users, rather than expansions of 
private property-like methods to manage spectrum rights. This has 
happened in European countries (including the UK), Australia92
Theoretical analyses show that gradualism has advantages and 
disadvantages compared to a big-bang strategy (cf. Section 3 above). Using 
the results from the theory of transition economics for an assessment, it can 
be argued that, by and large, countries which have been following a gradual 
approach to spectrum management reform may have chosen an appropriate 
 and the US - 
although traditionally, in the US, the approach with regard to licensees’ 
rights has been more liberal than elsewhere. New Zealand can be included in 
this group of countries: the Radiocommunications Act 1989 modernized 
spectrum management with regard to assignment and allocation, but use of 
auctions was the first major market-based measure implemented. On the 
other hand, a few countries have pursued liberalization of spectrum 
management by simultaneously acting on aspects of spectrum assignment as 
well as allocation (e.g. Guatemala). 
                                                 
92 Australia did introduce spectrum licences (which are more flexible compared to apparatus 
licences) and made them tradable in 1997, but their use has not met regulators’ expectations. 
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strategy.93 However, a few aspects deserve further discussion. Those 
countries represent a fairly good number of the most developed economies, 
with a long history in wireless electronic communications using radio 
spectrum. Therefore, spectrum use legacy is likely to pose many constraints – 
including the presence of vested interests94
                                                 
93 Success of a policy is often difficult to define and measure, because various parties have 
different goals and perspectives (cf. Patton and Sawicki 1993: 364 ff.). 
94 The literature on transition economics considers issues of political economy, which are not 
investigated here. In the case of spectrum liberalization, mobile operators and broadcasters 
may have strong interests and incentives in keeping close to traditional spectrum 
management; their customers’ welfare needs consideration too.  
 - on the implementation of 
reforms, which may show greater degrees of complexity, compared to 
countries with less developed economies and different (shorter) histories in 
electronic communications. The considerable amounts of consultation and 
analyses carried out by regulators, who have adopted a gradual reform 
strategy, seem to support this point. Thus the theoretical relationship 
between the speed of transition and `informativeness` appears relevant: in 
areas such as the UK and the US, the implementation of a gradual spectrum 
management reform has favoured collection of information about the effects 
of various reform actions on current circumstances. This might also provide, 
normatively speaking, useful inputs for future tactics. Indeed, the case of 
Australia offers evidence which supports the view that gradualism may be 
better than big-bang strategies in the management of transitions from 
‘command and control’ towards market methods: liberalization of spectrum 
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rights has proved more complex than initially envisaged; therefore 
Australian regulators have in some circumstances slowed down the 
liberalization process, or even reverted back to more centralised management 
of spectrum rights, at least in some frequency bands. 
 Nevertheless, theoretical propositions about the role of 
`informativeness` in carrying out reforms cannot be used, given available 
data, for precise positive assessments, because data on advantages and 
disadvantages (benefits and costs) is lacking.95
                                                 
95 A review of studies which have provided estimates of costs and benefits of more liberal 
spectrum regulation can be found in London Economics (2008). In Europe, an influential 
report was prepared for the EC by Analysys et Al. (2004).  
 Existing analyses of costs and 
benefits of spectrum policy reforms do not examine reversal costs, which are 
relevant in the formal analysis suggested in the literature on transition 
economics. Moreover, it is not possible to collect empirical data about the 
counterfactual case, because the choice for gradualism excludes big-bang 
strategies in any given country. Thus, it is difficult to assess what would 
have happened in the case of more rapid reforms (or vice versa) looking at 
the data collected. Recently, European regulators have analysed a few 
spectrum policy options and stated that “there would seem to be a need for 
further economic analyses of the costs and benefits of the various options 
available, e.g. measuring the value of windfall gains and the costs of any 
decrease in competition” (ERG and RSPG 2009: 24).  
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A few studies provide, however, ex ante valuations of net benefits 
(expected outcomes) from lifting constraints attached to licences, and show 
substantially high figures. This might imply that gradual or incremental 
moves towards liberalized spectrum management are not the best choice, if 
change is proceeding too slowly and considerable benefits are not enjoyed 
for some time,96 especially because of partial reforms which have changed 
only assignment methods quickly.  The cases of Guatemala and El Salvador 
seem to provide evidence that fast moves towards markets for spectrum 
rights can be successful liberalisation strategies (cf. Ibarguen 2005; Hazlett et 
Al. 2006). However, the apparently good outcomes of spectrum policy reform 
in those two small countries, which are close to each other,97
 In those countries where spectrum management reform has embraced 
a (cautious) gradual approach, liberalization moves have proceeded 
incrementally. In general - once decisions to use market mechanisms to 
assign spectrum were made - the introduction and implementation of 
auctions and secondary trading happened at relatively early stages (although 
 do not allow 
generalizations to countries that do not share similar features and contexts 
(Yin 2009: 43-4; Gerring 2007: 43-50, 76-80).  
                                                 
96 See London Economics (2008); see also Hazlett (2008c) for an analysis of cellular licences 
and Wellenius and Neto (2007) for the case of spectrum policy reform in developing 
countries. 
97 Dewatripont and Roland (1995) also consider that countries look at what others do in 
deciding their reform strategies. It can be argued that El Salvador has followed the strategy 
adopted in Guatemala. 
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spectrum trades have been fewer than usually expected); liberalization of 
licence conditions towards technology and service neutrality has proved 
complex and slow. By and large, this might be explained taking into account 
that liberalization of assignment is a relatively easier action, compared to 
liberalization of spectrum use with regard to services and technologies 
(which requires thorough analyses of possible harmful interference).98
 Theoretical propositions also point out that, if gradualism is optimal 
and reforms included in a package differ only in their riskiness, it is optimal 
to start with the riskier reform. The data seem to support the view that,  
coeteris paribus, liberalizing licence conditions and establishing property-like 
private rights over spectrum is riskier than changing mere assignment 
procedures (either primary or secondary ones). Accordingly, from a 
 In 
addition, it can be argued that governments have relatively strong incentives 
to introduce auctions soon, as auctions provide funds to cover public 
expenditure. However, the theoretical analysis suggests that, in those 
circumstances, gradualism may not be preferred to big-bang strategies, 
because delays in the implementation of the various components of a 
comprehensive spectrum management reform package may be too costly, 
especially in the case of significant benefits associated to liberal licence 
conditions. 
                                                 
98 On a continuum of liberalization measures, ordered in increasing degree of complexity, 
one might locate auctions, secondary trading and service/ technology neutrality. 
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normative perspective, spectrum policy should start from the former rather 
than the latter (when gradualism is chosen). Furthermore, the theory shows 
that, if the only difference is in the expected outcome and reforms do not 
proceed quickly, it is better to start with the reform with the higher expected 
outcome. Thus, there is an additional reason suggesting that starting from 
liberalizing licence conditions might be a better way to manage the transition 
from ‘command and control’ towards market methods: available research 
shows much greater benefits from spectrum liberalization of licence 
conditions rather than trading of spectrum licences (London Economics 
2008).   
 In conclusion, the countries surveyed in this study have gone through 
different experiences of spectrum management and their approach to reform 
varies. They have proceeded at different speeds, using different strategies 
and tactics. There is no unique recipe of spectrum policy reform, as shown by 
the cases analyzed above.99
                                                 
99 As noted by two authors in a recent paper, “[t]hese idiosyncratic spectrum policies 
illuminate possible paths to liberalization, an important normative exercise left for later 
research” (Hazlett and Muñoz 2009: 276). 
 By and large, it seems plausible that radical 
solutions may be easiest to implement when spectrum management is least 
developed (Wellenius and Neto 2007). The cases of small countries like 
Guatemala and El Salvador may be regarded as evidence supporting this 
claim.  
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The theoretical propositions elaborated in the area of transition 
economics might add a few more specific insights to the debate and analysis 
of spectrum policy reforms, especially with regard to comparative 
advantages and disadvantages of big-bang or gradual reform strategies as 
well as issues of sequencing (for gradual reforms). In particular, the 
theoretical framework proposed for the analysis might enable elaborations of 
spectrum management reform based on more clear-cut elements, such as 
expected outcomes, riskiness, reversal costs and `informativeness` of gradual 
versus fast liberalization measures. Thus it can be argued that future 
spectrum liberalization moves might benefit from this analysis – for instance, 
the issue of reversal costs, currently neglected, might be a relevant issue to be 
taken into account for decisions about how to best manage spectrum policy 
reform. One might also imagine that, in the future, a country could use 
Dewatripont and Roland’s work as a normative guide for spectrum strategy 
and policy. 
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Chapter 5. Competing to purchase spectrum commons 
 
5.1.- Introduction: the problem of using the market to allocate spectrum 
commons 
The crucial point of spectrum management reform is to change the 
regulation of radio frequencies to direct spectrum to the most valuable uses. 
One way of looking at this is to see it as a process of normalising the 
treatment of spectrum as an input into a variety of production processes. 
This can be done by applying a market-based approach to radio frequency 
access wherever possible.100
The introduction of spectrum auctions to assign frequency bands for 
3G mobile communications brought market forces and prices into the area of 
spectrum management, as many countries worldwide have recently used 
market mechanisms to assign rights over radio frequencies. However, the 
process of spectrum allocation was not delegated to the market and auction 
winners could secure spectrum for exclusive access to their licensed bands. 
In particular, the problem of efficient allocation of spectrum for unlicensed 
  
                                                 
100 Cf. the discussion in the previous chapters, esp. Sections 1.1 and 2.1. 
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operations has not received much attention so far. Actually, a major difficulty 
with market-based allocation of “unlicensed” spectrum (i.e. radio frequencies 
that can be used on a non-exclusive basis) is to aggregate individual 
demands for it in the same way as licensed service providers, such as mobile 
operators, can express their (derived) demand for radio frequencies (Cave 
2006; Mott MacDonald et Al. 2006).  
 The aim of this work is to suggest a mechanism – alternative to 
administrative fiat - to allocate and assign spectrum commons for unlicensed 
operations, notwithstanding the practical difficulties involved in the use of 
markets for their provision. Therefore, the rest of this chapter is organized as 
follows. Section 2 provides a review of solutions proposed in the literature 
from two perspectives: on the one hand, it discusses briefly mechanisms 
suggested to allocate spectrum for unlicensed operations; on the other hand, 
it looks at the literature on the efficient provision of public goods and 
considers models of “matching behaviour”. Section 3 introduces our basic 
model, which is a translation of Cave and Salant’s model on cartel quotas 
under majority rule to our problem (Cave and Salant 1995), assuming crucial 
knowledge about participants. Section 4 explores that translation by 
verifying, firstly, that an analogous set of properties is satisfied and that the 
median-index theorem (ibidem) applies – mutatis mutandis - to our setting. 
This might contribute to overcome some of the difficulties involved in the 
 116 
implementation of matching behaviour, as – by using a majority vote - firms 
bidding to acquire a spectrum commons must contribute a minimum amount 
of their wealth; the sum of contributions offered for a spectrum commons is 
then compared to bids for spectrum for exclusive access. Hence spectrum 
flows to the most valuable use. Section 5 closes this chapter. 
 
5.2.- The problem of collecting funds for spectrum commons: a review of 
previous proposals 
The traditional allocation of unlicensed bands by administrative fiat is 
“arbitrary and unsatisfactory” (Cave 2006: 224). An alternative approach was 
used by Indepen, Aegis and Ovum (2006) in their report for the UK 
regulator, under its licence-exemption framework review (Ofcom 2007b): the 
consultants attempted to attribute a value to licence-exempt spectrum by a 
cost-benefit analysis of services that might develop in unlicensed access 
bands.  
 In February 2008, a completely different approach, built around 
spectrum auctions, was proposed by the FCC (Federal Communications 
Commission, i.e. the US spectrum regulator); the FCC published two 
working papers by Bykowsky, Olson and Sharkey (2008a, 2008b), which 
contribute to the design of market mechanisms to allocate unlicensed 
spectrum. Bykowsky et Al. suggest a clock auction to efficiently allocate 
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available radio frequency bands between licensed services and unlicensed 
operations; in particular, taking into account public goods characteristics of 
spectrum bands allocated to unlicensed uses, the authors suggest a model 
where participants’ bids are summed up, if those bids are submitted for the 
unlicensed spectrum rule (thus creating an open platform101
                                                 
101 Under an unlicensed access rule, wireless network operators are not allowed to restrict 
access by radio devices or block software applications; therefore, this rule creates an open 
platform (whereas a licensed access rule creates a closed platform). This seems to reflect the 
network-centric service-provision approach (Lehr 2005).  
 for devices and 
applications); therefore each spectrum block up for auction will be governed 
by the licensing rule that gets the highest (aggregated) bid. The authors 
assume that bidders submit offers for the provision of spectrum under Nash-
Cournot behaviour and then compare the outcomes of their simulations with 
the Pareto efficient equilibrium. However, the solution to the incentive 
problem – that is to induce bidders to get as close as possible to the efficient 
outcome - is outside the scope of their work. Economic theory has suggested 
sophisticated mechanisms to implement an efficient allocation of public 
goods (for surveys, see: Green and Laffont 1977; Groves and Ledyard 1987; 
Laffont 1987). The general results are technically impressive, but the 
proposed solutions are frequently rather complicated and, hence, impractical 
for producing plausible mechanisms which induce efficient contributions to 
public goods (see criticisms in Walker 1981: 71; Laffont 1987: 567; Jackson 
and Moulin 1992: 2; Falkinger et Al. 2000: 247). Therefore, several authors 
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have suggested incentive mechanisms which seem to meet the requirements 
of simplicity (Falkinger et Al. 2000).102
 Among those incentive mechanisms, some useful ideas for the 
efficient allocation of unlicensed spectrum may be found in the literature on 
voluntary collective action (see, e.g., Olson 1965 and the references in Stigler 
1974), which is not concerned with the problem of demand revelation 
directly and does not involve coercion solutions. In particular, a voluntary 
collective action approach to the optimal provision of public goods is based 
on mutual subsidization by agents of their contributions to the public good. 
This approach, which is aimed at increasing voluntary contributions to the 
provision of a public good by “matching behaviour”, was originally 
suggested by Joel Guttman in 1978 (Guttman 1978).
  
103 Matching behaviour is 
“a strategy that makes an agent’s contribution to the provision of a public 
good conditional on the contributions of his counterparts in order to induce 
them to contribute as well. Unconditional contribution induces free-riding 
and thus is suboptimal” (Guttman 1986: 172). Guttman’s setting is a two-
stage non-cooperative game: the first stage of the game is played to choose 
simultaneously the matching rates (mi
                                                 
102 For some of those mechanisms, for example the compensation mechanism (Varian 1994a) 
and the Falkinger mechanism (Falkinger 1996), their effectiveness has been tested in 
experiments (Bracht et Al. 2008).  
103 See Guttman (1987) for a list of references to his works on matching behaviour. See also 
Danzinger and Schnytzer (1991). A related mechanism is the compensation mechanism 
(Varian 1994a, 1994b). 
) – i.e. the rate at which each firm i will 
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subsidize the sum of the flat contributions offered by the other firms, which 
are as yet undetermined; given the matching rates chosen in the first stage, 
the second stage of the game is played to determine, again simultaneously, 
the autonomous flat contributions (ai) – i.e. the amount of money which each 
firm will provide to acquire bandwidth, in addition to the money contributed 
by the matching mechanism. Therefore, firm i’s final contribution xi is given 
by: 
xi =  ai + mi ∑
≠ij
ja   
where: 
ai
∑
≠ij
ja
 =  firm  i's flat contribution; 
 = sum of the flat contributions offered by firm j, j i≠ ; 
mi
∑n ix1
 =  firm  i's matching rate. 
The total contribution X to the provision of spectrum for unlicensed 
operations would be the sum of individual contributions by the n firms:  
X =  = 





+∑∑
≠ ji
ji
i
ma 1 . 
Any of the firms solves a maximization problem, that can be stated as 
follows: 
max  πi ( )X =  ƒ  - xi , 
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where f is an appropriate twice continuously differentiable function, which 
captures the benefits to firm i associated to total contribution X; xi  can be 
regarded as i’s cost to participate in the provision of the good. 
 The model predicts Pareto optimal provision of a non-excludable 
public good by identical actors with perfect information, regardless of the 
number of actors and by two non-identical actors. Moreover, the author finds 
that “[w]ith more than two non-identical actors, some indeterminacy 
emerges in the equilibrium, and inefficient equilibria become possible” 
(Guttman 1978: 254). Hence, Guttman’s model offers interesting 
theoretical results. However, implementation is difficult, because the model 
is based on a two-stage game that is hard to play effectively, especially when 
the number of firms grows above a few units (Guttman 1986). 
 Recently, Gerber and Wichardt (2009) proposed a two-stage 
mechanism to establish positive contributions to public goods in the absence 
of strong institutions to sanction free-riders, as in the case of international 
agreements. The idea of their mechanism is to allow players to take an action, 
prior to the contribution stage, which renders it a dominant strategy to 
comply with the agreement (ibidem, esp. 430). Players commit to the public 
good by paying a deposit prior to the contribution stage; if there is universal 
commitment, deposits are immediately refunded whenever players 
contribute their specified shares to the public good.  
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In the following sections, we will assume that some spectrum may be 
used as commons for collective use with appropriate standards and suggest 
an approach which – in the spirit of the one proposed by Bykowsky et Al. 
(2008a,b) - is based on an auction mechanism to allocate spectrum efficiently 
between licensed and unlicensed uses. At the same time - and in the spirit of 
Guttman’s matching behaviour – our approach requires participants who bid 
for spectrum commons to contribute at least a minimum fraction of their 
wealth; this fraction is set by majority vote (each firm bidding for a spectrum 
commons has one vote) and we will show that a translation of the median-
index theorem applies to our circumstances. Thus, our envisaged mechanism 
is such that: (i) in the first stage, potential users of unlicensed spectrum vote 
on a common minimum percentage of wealth to pay; (ii) in the second stage, 
unlicensed users bid at least the common minimum percentage for 
unlicensed use, the auctioneer compares the total of these bids with the 
highest bid (if any) for licensed use, and provisionally assigns the lot to 
licensed or unlicensed use accordingly. This continues till there is no excess 
demand. If the lot goes to licensed use, the winner pays the larger of the 
next-highest licensed-use bid or the total of the unlicensed-use bids; if the lot 
goes to unlicensed use, each bidder 'pays' the smallest amount they could 
have bid without changing the use class. 
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5.3.- Basic (translated) model 
Our basic model is a tentative translation of an earlier model developed by 
Cave and Salant (1995) on cartel quotas under majority rule; we propose a 
translation of that earlier model to the circumstances that we are 
investigating and we will use the following notation: 
N number of unlicensed bidders; 
w  i bidder i’s (non-negative) exogenous wealth, which is assumed to be 
common knowledge104 and immediately convertible in assets accepted 
by the seller – i.e. the auctioneer - at no cost (wi is a firm-specific 
scalar);105 
c  i constant cost of capital (opportunity cost of funds) for firm i; 
b  i ‘individual’ bid for unlicensed access, i.e. the amount of assets offered 
as individual contribution to the purchase of spectrum for unlicensed 
 operations; 
B - i  sum of individual contributions offered by the n firms, excluding firm 
i,  i.e. B - i ∑
≠ij
jb = ; 
                                                 
104 For instance, firms` balance sheets are audited by an independent auditor and published; 
this would provide reliable information about firm i`s wealth, as represented in its accounts. 
105 Furthermore each bidder`s wealth is larger than his valuation for the spectrum; a similar 
simplifying assumption is used, e.g., in Moulin (1992). 
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F minimum fraction (or percentage) of wealth to pay, chosen by the N 
bidders by (unweighted) majority-rule voting; hence F will be the 
same for every player. F is a committee’s prior choice and if the 
committee chooses the fraction F, then firm i’s contribution must be no 
lower than F w  i . 
 It is assumed that it is possible to identify the firms which will 
definitively participate in the mechanism. Firms are then indexed in order of 
ascending cost of capital; if two firms have the same cost of capital, firms are 
indexed in order of increasing wealth: 
if c  i > cj  or 
if c  i = cj and w  i > wj 
then i > j 
(if c  i = cj and w  i = wj then assign indexes arbitrarily). 
 Firms bidding for unlicensed spectrum are assumed to spend their 
wealth on contributions to the purchase of a public good input. To avoid 
free-riding, those firms must join a committee, whose fundamental task is to 
vote by majority on the minimum fraction F of individual wealth that must 
be contributed.  
 124 
Let B = ∑N ib1 = B - i + b  i denote the aggregate bid for unlicensed 
spectrum; then B ≥  ∑N iFw1  = F ∑
N
iw
1
. Also, let f(B) denote average benefits 
(e.g. revenues) attainable by winning aggregate bids B. 
 Firm i is assumed to maximize a profits function, as specified below. 
For this purpose, i has to choose its preferred contribution (bi
∈
) to the 
collective project, given the contributions offered by other firms and the 
previously selected fraction F (where F  [0, 1]): 
max b  i [f(B) – c  i] = b  i [f(B - i + b  i) – c  i] 
s.t. 
b  i ≥  F w  i . 
 Each bidder’s equilibrium profit πi depend, inter alia, on the prior 
choice of F; hence they are regarded as induced profits πi(F). Also, 
equilibrium profits will be zero for every unlicensed bidder if B is less than 
max { Lk }, where Lk is the amount of money offered by firm k who is bidding 
against everyone else to get spectrum for exclusive licensed access (k is not in 
the group of n firms bidding for unlicensed spectrum and therefore is not in 
the voting committee): 
πi = 0   if  B < L  k. 
 Assume total benefits TB depend on the amount of capital collected in 
the following way:  
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TB = b  i . [f(B - i + b  i
∂
)]. 
Then marginal benefits MB are: 
MB =  TB / ∂ b  i = f(B - i + b  i) + b  i ∂ [ f(B - i + b  i ∂) / b  i]; 
in addition assume MB is strictly decreasing.  
With MB strictly decreasing, f(B - i + b  i) decreases. If at least one firm is 
constrained to bid the minimum (i.e. b  i= Fwi) then, as F increases, Fwi 
increases too and f(B - i + b  i) decreases. However, πi (F) will be positive as 
long as f(B - i+ bi) exceeds c  i
5.4.- Analysis of the basic model 
 
 . 
 
5.4.1.- Economic equilibrium which would result if the committee had voted for any 
arbitrary fraction of wealth 
Translating Cave and Salant’s assumption to our setting, it is assumed that: 
- the average revenue function f(B) is strictly decreasing and twice 
continuously differentiable; 
- the total benefit function [i.e., b i
- if b
 * f(B)] is strictly concave; 
 i → ∞ then lim f(B) = 0;  
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- there would be positive profits if the lowest-cost firm contributed 
funds whose cost of capital is c  1  [i.e., f(B) - c  1
Given those benefit assumptions, then a unique Cournot equilibrium - 
induced by any given fraction F of wealth - exists in pure strategies. 
Proofs. 
Existence and uniqueness are proved in Appendix (part A). 
 
The equilibrium is characterized by an aggregate bid (B) divided into a 
vector of individual bids (b
 > 0].  
1, b2, .., bN
a) unconstrained bidder:  f(B) + b
) satisfying one of the following 
conditions for i = 1, 2, .., N: 
 i f’(B) – c  i= 0  and 0 < Fwi< b  i 
b) constrained bidder:  b
; 
i = Fwi and f(B) + Fwi f’(B) – c  i ≤  0   
(firm i would like to contribute less than bi = Fwi 
c) outsider:     E[f(B)] – c
, but – since i joined 
the procedure – it must contribute at least a minimum amount of 
funds, according to F); 
o
≤  0  
(this firm is not one of the N bidders for unlicensed spectrum: it is 
better  off if it does not participate in the procedure, because expected 
average benefit is already so low that the firm would not be able to 
make a positive profit if it  participated; of course, bo = 0 ).  
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5.4.2.- Fraction which a regulated committee would select under (unweighted) 
majority rule 
Assume voters (i.e. firms) are foresighted and self-interested. We want to 
prove that the median-index theorem (Cave and Salant 1995) applies to our 
setting. The median-index theorem states that – assuming an odd number of 
voters (N) are to select an alternative from a compact one-dimensional set of 
alternatives by simple majority rule – every ideal point of the firm with the 
median index on the committee will be weakly preferred to any other point 
by a majority of the voters, if the following preference assumptions are met: 
1.- continuity, i.e. each voter’s preferences can be represented by a 
continuous real-valued function on the set of alternatives; 
2.- unconstrained monotonicity, i.e. each voter’s preference function is 
monotonically decreasing above its cutoff;106
3.- nesting of cutoffs and partial agreement, i.e. if voters are indexed so that 
someone with a higher cutoff has a lower index, then the preferences of any 
two voters display partial agreement
 
107
                                                 
106 In our setting, a “cutoff” is the wealth fraction which exactly induces firm i to contribute 
the amount of funds that firm i would freely choose to maximize its profits (i.e. the 
constraint is just binding). A unique cutoff is associated with each firm. 
 below their cutoff points. 
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 Therefore we have to prove – preliminary - that an analogous set of 
preference assumptions is satisfied in our setting. Given the benefit 
assumptions above, we will introduce a ‘translation’ of the regularity 
condition to our setting. Then, following Cave and Salant (1995), we will 
show that our benefit assumptions and regularity condition are sufficient for 
a set of preferences108
a) nested cutoffs; 
 to display the following properties: 
b) partial agreement; 
c) unconstrained monotonicity; 
d) continuity. 
 This will allow us to prove the existence of a Condorcet winner, that is 
a fraction of wealth to pay which will be selected by some majority of the 
firms. We will then consider uniqueness of a Condorcet winner. 
 Let B(F) denote the aggregate equilibrium bid induced by a majority 
decision to contribute fraction F of wealth. Also, let F j denote the fraction that 
would just bind on firm j, i.e. j’s marginal cost and benefit are equal for F = F j. 
Thus, given B– j(F j), F j
                                                                                                                                          
107 The agreement in preference is said to be partial when no restrictions are placed on the 
preference if the firm with the smaller index prefers the larger fraction (or vice versa). In 
contrast, the agreement is said to be complete when firms have the same marginal cost and 
must therefore rank the two fractions identically (Cave and Salant 1987).  
108 Cave and Salant (1995) start showing properties for the induced preferences and then 
examine the majority-rule voting behaviour of any set of agents whose preferences satisfy a 
generalization of those properties. Profit functions describe our (induced) preferences.  
 is implicitly defined as 
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f (B(F j)) + F j w j  f’ (B(F j)) – cj = 0 . 
F j is regarded as j’s “cutoff”, because it is the fraction which exactly 
corresponds to the amount of j’s wealth that j would bid to maximize its 
profits – whereas, above that fraction, j has to contribute more than the 
amount where its marginal benefit equals marginal cost (j’s profit 
maximization is constrained). 
 
Regularity condition 
In Cave and Salant’s model, the regularity condition is a crucial one: “[it] is 
necessary and sufficient for the cutoffs to be nested and […] is sufficient for 
the existence of a Condorcet quota. When cutoffs are nested, the induced 
preferences display a property we refer to as ‘partial agreement’” (Cave and 
Salant 1995: 87); in addition to nesting and partial agreement, the preferences 
display “continuity” and “unconstrained monotonicity” (Cave and Salant 
1995: 88). 
 We will therefore elaborate an analogous regularity condition, for the 
circumstances that we are investigating. Assume that the following 
regularity condition holds for each pair of firms i and j such that i > j: 
f’ (B(F j)) F j (w  i – wj) ≤  c  i – cj
f (B(F
 . 
This is a reduced form of  
j)) + f’ (B(F j)) F j w  i – f (B(F j)) – f’ (B(F j)) F j wj ≤  c  i – cj  
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where – given the selected fraction F = F j - the first part of the left-hand side 
is the marginal benefit for firm i when firm i bids the minimum amount 
required by the committee (bi = F j w  i); while the second part of the left-hand 
side is the marginal benefit for firm j (j would bid exactly that fraction of its 
wealth which is required by the committee). The right-hand side is the 
difference in the costs of capital for firms i and j. 
 Then any fraction binding on one firm must also bind on firms with 
greater indexes: for instance, if F j is a fraction binding on firm j and i > j, then 
F j must also be binding on firm i. In fact, if F j is binding on j, when F = F j 
marginal benefit and marginal cost are equal for firm j, but firm i would be 
better off with a fraction F lower than F j (i.e. F < F j), because when F = F j firm 
i’s marginal benefit are lower than its cost of capital. Nevertheless it must 
contribute at least F j w  i. This can be shown by re-writing the regularity 
condition in the following way: 
f (B(F j)) + f’ (B(F j)) F j w  i  – c  i ≤  f (B(F j)) + f’ (B(F j)) F j w  j  – c  j 
and, given that Fj is just binding on j, f(B(F j)) + f’ (B(F j)) F j w  j  – c  j = 0; 
therefore 
f(B(F j)) + f’ (B(F j)) F j w  i  – c  i ≤  0 
which shows that, when F = F j , for firm i marginal benefits are lower than its 
cost of capital (or, if equality holds, F j is just binding on i as well as on j). 
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 If firms face the same cost of capital, but firm i has greater wealth than 
firm j, c i=cj and wi > wj ; the regularity condition therefore becomes: 
f’ (B(F j)) F j (wi – wj) ≤
This can be manipulated
 0 . 
109 to get  
f (B(F j)) + f’ (B(F j)) F jwi ≤  f (B(F j)) + f’ (B(F j)) F jwj = cj = c i 
which, again, shows that for F = F j and ci = cj marginal benefits are lower 
than firm i’s cost of capital (or, if equality holds, F j is just binding on i as well 
as on j). 
 It can be noted that, if firm i and firm j have the same wealth, w i = wj 
(and c ≥i cj); then in the regularity condition  
f’ (B(F j)) F j (wi - w j ) ≤  ci - cj  
the left-hand side is equal to zero; therefore the regularity condition holds 
(by assumption, ci- c ≥j   
 The regularity condition also holds in applications where fractions are 
set equal to the Cournot-equilibrium individual contributions prior to the 
formation of a (voting) committee: this is the case where no minimum bid is 
0). 
                                                 
109 Recall: F = Fj which is the fraction just binding on firm j; hence marginal benefit and cost 
of capital are the same for firm j. Moreover, in this case it is assumed that the difference in 
the costs of capital is zero – i.e. firms face the same cost. Thus, for F = Fj marginal benefit for 
firm j is also equal to firm i’s cost of capital. 
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required from each player, who can bid as little as he likes (the Cournot 
contribution). 
 Is the regularity condition sufficient for the existence of a Condorcet 
fraction? Cave and Salant (1995: 89) show that “any set of preferences 
displaying nested cutoffs, unconstrained monotonicity, partial agreement, 
and continuity must have a Condorcet winner”. Therefore, to go on with the 
‘translation’ of Cave and Salant’s model, the average benefit assumptions, 
together with the regularity condition, should be sufficient for the set of 
induced preferences arising from the Cournot equilibrium to display the 
following properties: 
1) nested cutoffs; 
2) partial agreement; 
3) unconstrained monotonicity; 
4) continuity. 
Those properties are translated below to our circumstances.110  
 
1) Nested cutoffs. 
If i > j , then F i ≤  F j for any couple of firms; hence cutoffs are nested:  
FN ≤  FN-1 ≤  … ≤  F2 ≤  F
                                                 
110 Proofs similar to those elaborated by Cave and Salant will be presented (some of those 
proofs are relegated to the appendix).   
1 
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 (that is, if firms face different marginal costs of capital, when i > j firm i has 
greater marginal cost than firm j - hence firm i prefers a fraction F lower than 
F j; if marginal cost is the same for both firms, and firm i’s wealth is greater 
than firm j’s wealth, then again firm i prefers a fraction F lower than F j) 
 The ‘translated’ regularity condition is necessary and sufficient for the 
cutoffs to be nested: 
f’ (B(F j)) F j (wi – wj) ≤  ci – cj  iff  FN ≤  F ≤N-1  … ≤ F ≤2  F1 . 
 Note that, by adding the implicit definition of F j and the regularity 
condition, we obtain that also firm i is constrained at fraction F j : 
   f (B(F j)) + F j w j  f’ (B(F j)) - cj   (implicit definition of j’s cutoff) 
+ f’ (B(F j)) F j (w  i – wj) - c  i + cj
=  f (B(F
    (regularity condition) 
j)) + F j w  i  f’ (B(F j))  - c  i ≤  0 (i is constrained by fraction 
F j).111
If two fractions of wealth bind on each of two firms and one firm strictly 
prefers a particular fraction (case 2.a below) – or is indifferent between the 
two fractions (case 2.b below) - it is possible, in some circumstances, to 
 
 
2) Partial agreement. 
                                                 
111 The implicit definition of  j’s cutoff is f (B(Fj)) + Fj wj  f’ (B(Fj))- cj = 0; the regularity 
condition is f’ (B(Fj)) Fj (w i – wj) ≤  c i – cj and it is a non-positive number; f (B(Fj)) + Fj w i  f’ 
(B(Fj)) ≤  ci shows that i is constrained at Fj. 
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deduce that the other firm likewise – and respectively - strictly prefers the 
same fraction, or weakly prefers one of the two fractions. “The agreement in 
preference is said to be ‘partial’ rather than ‘complete’ since no restrictions 
are placed on the preference if the firm with the smaller index prefers the 
larger [fraction] or, alternatively, if the firm with the larger index prefers the 
smaller [fraction]. In contrast, firms with identical marginal costs must rank 
the two [fractions] identically even in these cases. Agreement is then said to 
be ‘complete’” (Cave and Salant 1995: 87). 
 
2.a) Strict preference: 
for any two firms i and j such that i < j and any pair of fractions φ and F such 
that φ < F ≤  F j ≤  F i

: 
if φ  i  F then φ  j

 F 
or 
if F  j  φ  then F  i
 “That is, if the firm with the smaller index strictly prefers the smaller 
[fraction], then so must the firm with the larger index; reciprocally, if the firm 
 φ . 
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with the larger index strictly prefers the larger [fraction], then so must the 
firm with the smaller index” (ibidem).112

 
Proof. 
Since φ  i F 
φ wi {f (B(φ)) – ci } > F wi {f (B(F)) – ci };  
also, since c i ≤  cj and φ < F 
- φ (cj – ci) ≥ - F (cj – ci). 
Dividing the first inequality by wi, adding the second weak inequality and 
multiplying by wj, we obtain 
φ w j {f (B(φ))– cj } > F w j {f (B(F)) – cj

 } 
which confirms that φ  i
for any two firms i and j such that i < j and any pair of fractions φ and F such 
that φ < F 
 F . 
 
The reciprocal statement can be verified mutatis mutandis. 
 
2.b) Indifference: 
≤  F j ≤  F i
                                                 
112 If firm i strictly prefers F to φ and both fractions bind on i, then F wi {f (B(F)) – c } > φ wi . 
.{f(B(φ)) – c }. We obtain F wj {f (B(F)) – c } > φ wj {f (B(φ)) – c } by multiplying by the positive 
number wj/wi,. Therefore, if both fractions also bind on firm j, firm j strictly prefers F too. 
: 
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if φ ~ i  F then φ weakly  j F 
or 
if F ~ j  φ  then F weakly  i φ . 
 “That is, if the firm with the smaller index is indifferent between the 
two [fractions] then the firm with the larger index must weakly prefer the 
smaller [fraction]; reciprocally, if the firm with the larger index is indifferent 
between the two [fractions], then the firm with the smaller index must 
weakly prefer the larger [fraction]” (Cave and Salant 1995: 88).  
Proof. 
Both statements can be verified mutatis mutandis. 
 
3) Unconstrained monotonicity. 
If firm i is unconstrained and at least one firm is constrained, 
FN ≤ F ≤  F i 
then i’s induced profits πi(F) is increasing in F. 
 
4) Continuity . 
πi (F) is a continuous function. 
Proofs. 
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Unconstrained monotonicity and continuity are proved in Appendix (part B). 
 
5.4.3.- Validity of the median-index theorem in our setting 
We have shown a translation of the (generalized) preference assumptions 
required by Cave and Salant’s median-index theorem. This theorem has a 
crucial element in firms’ “ideal points”. Therefore, we assume that the set of 
feasible fractions (of wealth to pay) is a compact collection of non-negative 
elements. Since πi (F) is continuous and F lies in a compact interval, each firm 
i has an ideal point, denoted I i, such that πi (I i) ≥ πi (F) for all F. Moreover, by 
unconstrained monotonicity, I i ≤   F i (cf. Cave and Salant 1995: 89). Hence 
Cave and Salant’s median-index theorem translates to our setting. 
Proof. 
Suppose there are N voters (i.e. firms), where N is an odd integer. Denote the 
median index by m = (N+1)/2. Let Im be an ideal point of firm m and let F 
denote any other quota. 
 If F < Im, voters 1, 2, .., m-1, m (a majority) would at least weakly prefer 
Im. This follows since F < Im ≤ Fm ≤ min (Fm-1 , Fm-2, …, F2, F1 ) and these voters 
partially agree with m. 
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 If instead F > Im, voters m, m+1,…, N-1, N (a majority) would at least 
weakly prefer Im.  
 Recall that the cutoffs of these firms are no larger than Fm and that Im ≤ 
Fm. Any i such that F i ≤ Im must weakly prefer Im to F > Im (unconstrained 
monotonicity). As for any i such that Im < F i ≤ Fm , such a firm at least weakly 
prefers Im ∈ to any F  (Im, F i] (since preferences partially agree) and at least 
weakly prefers F i to any F > F i (unconstrained monotonicity). Hence it 
weakly prefers Im to any F > Im (continuity). 
 We have thus established the existence of at least one Condorcet 
winner, namely any ideal point (i.e. fraction) of the voter with the median 
index. That fraction is unique if two additional mild conditions hold (Cave 
and Salant 1995: 90): 
- the firm with the median index has a single ideal point; 
- at this ideal point, the preference of every firm unconstrained at Im
5.5.- Summary and concluding remarks 
 is strictly 
decreasing. 
 
Technological change over the past decade has focused attention on 
spectrum as a valuable economic resource in increasingly short supply and 
triggered reviews of spectrum policy. Market-based mechanisms have been 
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introduced to assign spectrum for exclusive usage by individual network 
service providers. More recently, commercial success of services provided in 
licence-exempt spectrum bands has stimulated research on the efficient 
allocation of spectrum for collective use. This chapter contributes to the 
discussion on the efficient allocation of spectrum resources. It investigates 
the problem of efficient provision of a spectrum commons and suggests that 
spectrum can be allocated effectively with a mechanism which builds 
matching behaviour and the median-index theorem (under majority rule) 
into an auction where bidders compete simultaneously to acquire spectrum 
either for (exclusive) sole or collective use.  
Our approach requires participants who bid for spectrum commons to 
contribute at least a minimum fraction of their wealth; this fraction is set by 
majority vote. Hence our approach is based on crucial assumptions which 
have a great impact on its implementation, as this implies, in particular, the 
identification of bidders who will definitively participate in the auction for 
unlicensed spectrum and truthful reports of their wealth (for instance, the 
availability of accurate financial audit and other company reports). Under 
those assumptions, we show that a translation of the median-index theorem 
applies to our circumstances. Thus, our envisaged mechanism is such that in 
the first stage, potential users of collective spectrum vote on a common 
minimum percentage of wealth to pay; in the second stage, those users bid at 
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least the common minimum percentage for collective use. Then the 
auctioneer compares the total of these bids with the highest bid (if any) for 
licensed use, and provisionally assigns the lot to sole or collective use 
accordingly. This continues till there is no excess demand. If the lot goes to 
sole licensed use, the winner pays the larger of the next-highest licensed-use 
bid or the total of the collective-use bids; if the lot goes to collective use, each 
bidder 'pays' the smallest amount they could have bid without changing the 
use class.  
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Chapter 6. Spectrum sharing in composite and opportunistic 
networks: towards new approaches to future spectrum 
management? 
 
6.1.- Introduction 
Spectrum is a shared resource: it is used for a very wide range of coexisting 
services and applications, from satellite communications across the world to 
home WiFi connections, from TV broadcasting to cellular mobile phone 
services. Traditionally, administrative decisions have divided spectrum into 
a number of frequency bands.113
                                                 
113 Cf. Chapters 1 and 2 above; in the literature, see, e.g., Chaduc and Pogorel (2008). 
 Access to those bands has been governed, to 
a great extent, by a licensing system, which has coupled bands to services 
and has offered a means of spectrum sharing as well as protection against 
(harmful) interference; in addition, individual licence holders have used 
various methods to further divide their licensed spectrum. Allocation of 
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unlicensed bands for shared access by many independent users/ uses has 
been somewhat cautious and parsimonious by regulators.114
                                                 
114 Softening of regulation for licence exempt devices has been cautious as well (cf., e.g., 
McLean Foster & Co. 2007, and, recently, Ofcom 2010f). 
 
 The open access, unlicensed or spectrum commons approaches to 
managing shared access to spectrum offer many attractive benefits, but pose 
difficult challenges, one being the design or implementation of mechanisms 
for handling congestion and allocating resources among users/ uses in times 
of congestion (Lehr and Crowcroft 2005; Mott MaDonald et Al. 2006; 
Quotient Associates 2007). Congestion handling should avoid, ultimately, a 
tragedy of the commons in the use of radio frequencies – the argument is that 
unregulated access to shared spectrum would make it prone, in the absence 
of exclusive property rights, to too high a level of interference and inefficient 
use, because too many users and devices would attempt to access it 
avariciously (Hazlett 2005).  
 So far spectrum sharing has relied widely on the traditional approach, 
both in the private sector, where firms have rarely started businesses 
(individually or with partners) around access to shared spectrum bands, and 
in the public sector, where incentives to share historically generous spectrum 
assignments to governments’ agencies have been weak (Wik-Consult 2008; 
EC 2009). 
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 More recently, technological developments - especially so called 
“disruptive” ones such as dynamic spectrum access technology (which 
includes cognitive radios) – enable, or promise to enable, more flexible 
frequency usage and promote both the vertical disintegration and horizontal 
integration of the existing wireless market silos (Chapin and Lehr 2007; cf. 
also Olafsson et Al. 2007; Casey 2009; Peha 2009).115 Those developments have 
stimulated research in many directions to explore possible ways to increase 
(re-)use of spectrum, for instance by deploying opportunistic cognitive 
networks (Bellanger 2010) as well as reconfigurable radio systems in 
composite wireless networks and cognitive mesh networks in the long term 
(ETSI  2009, 2010). Various scenarios - with access to dedicated bands for 
those new technologies and architectures, or with shared access to spectrum 
used by primary users (as in the case of white spaces116
                                                 
115 Some technologies have not reached the mass market yet; regulatory changes to 
accommodate them have been under discussion for a few years. In Europe, cf., for instance, 
Commission Decision of 30 June 2010 amending Decision 2006/771/EC on harmonisation of 
the radio spectrum for use by short-range devices (the “SRD Decision”), available at 
), or hybrid solutions - 
are being investigated, especially to solve engineering issues and figure out 
new business models. 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:166:0033:0041:EN:PDF . 
The forthcoming World Radiocommunications Conference in 2012 (WRC-12) has cognitive 
radio regulatory policy on its agenda. 
116 White spaces are unoccupied radio frequencies (in TV bands); see, e.g. Marcus et Al. 2006 
and Ofcom (2009c). Spectrum usage measurements, in the frequency bands between 30 MHz 
and 3 GHz, show relatively low utilization of licensed spectrum (FCC 2002b; Ghasemi and 
Sousa 2008). 
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 This chapter aims to contribute to the current discussion on novel 
spectrum sharing methods. In particular, it takes a closer look at the issue of 
having mechanisms (access protocols) for allocating shared spectral 
resources among users/ uses and handling congestion (if it emerges). It tries 
to establish, among available arrangements designed to share scarce 
resources, those which can be useful if pieces of spectrum (e.g. spectrum 
commons) are used to deliver a number of services to many users. In 
addition, it figures out some conceptual circumstances marked by access to 
shared spectrum and qualitatively discusses possible management models 
and allocation mechanisms.  
There are at least three research themes which seem of some relevance 
for analyses of shared spectrum management and allocation: (i) the recent 
literature on the so called price of anarchy, mostly developed using a game 
theoretical approach;117
                                                 
117 For a recent application of game theory to spectrum sharing see Berlemann and Mangold 
(2009: 87-144). 
 (ii) some work on the features of a few protocols 
(online and offline), usually studied in the area of operations research, but 
with an emphasis on worst case equilibrium similar to the price of anarchy 
literature; (iii) last, but not least, the more traditional literature on (economic) 
public goods, which has investigated the commons under different 
hypotheses about their costs. Even when they do not offer a ready-made 
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solution for spectrum sharing problems, they still may present useful results 
and insights for (future) spectrum specific refinements and quantitative 
analyses.  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. After a sketch of 
various circumstances characterized by spectrum sharing (with traditional as 
well as new technologies), spectrum sharing in the presence of a spectrum 
manager/ allocation mechanism is analyzed. The analysis is carried out for 
the case where devices and users have equal access rights to spectrum (with 
a focus on spectrum commons costs and losses), and for the case where 
access rights are different (with a focus on management schemes involving 
cash transfers). Then consideration is given to circumstances where a 
spectrum manager is absent. The last section closes this chapter with a 
summary and some concluding remarks. 
 
6.2.- Allocation of shared spectrum without tragedies 
When a public or private spectrum commons can be used by devices in the 
hands of users who have property (or at least access) rights to it, and 
everyone enjoys the same rights, two circumstances seem of particular 
interest. The first one is the fully decentralized environment, with no band 
managing system (BMS, i.e. spectrum manager/ allocation mechanism) 
regulating access to shared spectrum, hence end users are entirely 
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responsible for all decisions on spectrum access - crucially, with regard to 
access timing and spectrum use duration, as well as amount of information 
transmitted. The other environment is the one where, although access 
decisions are still taken in a decentralized manner, a BMS system disciplines 
access to shared spectrum – e.g. by means of an operator spectrum manager 
(OSM) and a joint radio resource manager (JRRM), possibly deploying 
cognitive pilot channels or cognitive control channels (ETSI 2010; ITU-R 
2010); a multi-radio controller (which arranges scheduling of spectrum access 
requests issued by concurrent applications, cf. ETSI 2010); or, at minimum, a 
common protocol imposing a discipline on access (Akyildiz et Al. 2008). In 
the latter environment, should congestion arise, part of the data, which a user 
would like to transmit, might be diverted to another (opportunistic) network 
or even blocked by the BMS. In addition, the BMS might implement 
compensation schemes (possibly aiming at fair and efficient use of shared 
spectrum). This section deals with this kind of circumstances.  
 
6.2.1.- Management of shared spectrum where devices and users have equal rights of 
access 
In a device centric environment, where spectrum is shared by several devices 
and users, but regulated by a BMS, mechanisms for handling congestion and 
allocating resources among users/ uses in times of congestion are crucial. For 
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instance, this may be the case of a (cognitive) opportunistic system that 
proactively carries out continuous spectrum sensing (Ghasemi and Sousa 
2008, esp. 38).118
Two papers on scheduling present significant analogies to spectrum 
commons issues in this kind of environment, although the case of spectrum 
access may be more complex due to difficulties related to the awareness of 
other devices and of their operations.
 In those circumstances, the most relevant analyses for shared 
spectrum management are, to the best of our knowledge, those looking at the 
design and implementation of appropriate protocols (service disciplines) to 
manage continuously arriving requests for services from a shared scarce 
resource. This reflects dynamic interaction in the use of the shared resource. 
119
                                                 
118 Intuitively, delay sensitive applications favour proactive sensing (rather than reactive 
sensing), but this comes at the cost of increased sensing overhead (Ghasemi and Sousa 2008: 
38) 
119 In the literature on queuing systems, a line is drawn between observable and 
unobservable queues; it is shown that agent`s equilibrium behaviour differs (Hassin and 
Haviv 2003). 
 The first one is a recent paper by 
Hervé Moulin (2007), who investigates scheduling problems, including those 
with arbitrary job size and release time. Compared to the case of identical 
release time (similar to a static environment), that piece of research may be 
particularly appropriate for those instances where several devices and users, 
sharing a spectrum commons, seek access at arbitrarily chosen points in time 
to communicate their data. A crucial analogy, which is drawn here, is 
between the scheduling (queuing) problem investigated by Moulin and a 
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shared spectrum management model. Moulin (2007: 877) considers that “in 
many real life queues involving heterogeneous users, such as the Internet, 
ignorance of other users’ characteristics is the norm rather than the 
exception. In particular, the arrival of new jobs is subject to unpredictable 
bursts and lapses, and the service time may differ widely across users”. The 
analysis there is concerned with circumstances where a single server or a 
finite number of identical servers are shared resources among jobs to be 
processed. Nevertheless, access to a spectrum commons (or parts of it – for 
instance, bandwidth channels, each being a shared resource itself) shows, 
arguably, the same logic of access to a server and thus could be managed 
similarly: the operations carried out by the server may be carried out, in the 
case of spectrum, by the BMS, which could be a base station or even a 
(cognitive) device in the hands of an end user with ad hoc networking 
capabilities.  
Various service disciplines are compared by the `guarantees` they 
offer to users. A guarantee is the smallest welfare/ utility an agent will reach 
under the worst possible configuration of other users characteristics (Moulin 
2007: 876). In our setting, the guarantee of a particular user of a device can be 
interpreted as the smallest welfare/ utility120
                                                 
120 This depends only upon the user’s own characteristics, the resources to be shared (the 
commons), and the number of other users. 
 under the worst possible 
 149 
configuration of spectrum access timing and data transferred by other users. 
The focus is on the worst slowdown - i.e. sojourn time (from the beginning of 
a wireless electronic communication to its completion) divided by service 
time - which any user may experience, where the maximum is taken over all 
conceivable characteristics of other users. It is shown that, using a weighted 
version of the fair sojourn protocol (FSP),121 the worst slowdown can be 
capped as a function only of the number of users in the queue at release time 
(the bounds on slowdown are not improved with multiple servers). In the 
case of shared spectrum, this suggests that, by implementation of an 
appropriate protocol,122
Sanjeev Arora and Bo Brinkman (2004) study protocols for data 
transmission over an IP computer network with individual hosts responsible 
for setting their sending rate appropriately, in the absence of a central 
 communication delays experienced using devices 
such as cognitive radios and software defined radios (e.g. in the transfer of 
data between two devices or in the download of software to change 
operating parameters) can be capped too. Thus possible reluctance to share a 
spectrum commons could be reduced. 
                                                 
121 FSP is an efficient protocol Pareto superior to the processor-sharing protocol (PS); it 
achieves a nearly optimal total sojourn time, while offering to every user a smaller 
slowdown than PS (see Moulin 2007 and the references there). 
122 One might think of a protocol which is able to count the number of users of the commons 
at the time when transmission is considered by the device, which might also be projected 
and programmed in order to store data and refrain from transmissions until a favourable 
spectrum environment is sensed. 
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authority which allots bandwidth to the hosts. An analogy between a 
decentralized IP network used by hosts, and a spectrum commons used by 
cognitive radios/ software defined radios might be drawn in appropriate 
settings: similarly to hosts, cognitive radio users would like to send (masses 
of) data or to download software as fast as possible. However, this would 
lead to a congestion collapse. Arora and Brinkman propose a model, 
previously introduced by Karp et Al. (2000), to understand the problem of 
regulating the rate of a unicast flow between two devices. Their analysis 
points to a crucial issue in a device-centric environment where spectrum is a 
shared resource: the need to study network algorithms from the hosts’ 
perspectives as well as to study and design protocols (or other arrangements) 
from the devices’ perspectives in a spectrum commons. In order to set 
appropriate data sending rates, the authors develop an efficient algorithm for 
bandwidth utilization. Their algorithm is essentially a randomized version of 
the multiplicative increase, multiplicative decrease (MIMD) strategy, 
whereby the hosts, so long as they do not experience dropped packets, raise 
their transmission rates by a multiplicative factor. This is considered an 
aggressive and non-altruistic strategy (in contrast with other existing 
protocols).123
                                                 
123 For instance, the additive increase, multiplicative decrease protocol increases the sending 
rate by 1 if the host’s packets are getting through the network, whereas it halves its sending 
rate if the host notices that its packets are being dropped. This protocol has proved 
 In the case of shared spectrum, one could also develop 
(Continued on next page) 
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reputation indexes associated to protocols and shared spectrum 
environments, in order to inform on “politeness” (cf. Bellanger 2010, where a 
“good neighbour” approach is considered).  
Spectrum commons management: congestion, costs and losses 
A few studies about the commons, from an economic perspective, offer 
additional insights about allocation of shared spectral resources and 
handling of congestion. They share a concern with the analysis in Arora and 
Brinkman (2004) and may be related to the growing research on the price of 
anarchy (discussed below), because they use a very similar approach.  
Hervé Crès and Hervé Moulin (2003) observe that, in the case of 
commons with decreasing returns (increasing marginal costs),124 the non 
cooperative equilibrium has too low a level of balking, hence there is 
overproduction. Thus the problem is the design of a queuing protocol to 
minimize such inefficiency. Crès and Moulin propose management by means 
of a congestion factor; they find that, the more crowded the commons, the 
more random priority outperforms average cost:125
                                                                                                                                          
successful in preventing congestion problems on the Internet (Arora and Brinkman 2004: 
187-8). 
124 See also Moulin (2003, ch. 6). 
 random priority never 
overproduces by more than 100%.  
125 With random priority, users are told their number in the queue, and then they decide 
whether they want to receive the service or not (and pay for it); with average cost, users 
(Continued on next page) 
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If communications in a spectrum commons are managed (by a band 
manager) as if they are jobs in a queue – which is the case in congested 
networks such as the internet –, then this is another indication that 
bandwidth could be shared by various devices performing a wide range of 
different functions and services with only limited risks of a `tragedy`. 
Moreover, in a recent paper (Juarez 2008) the line of research proposed 
by Crès and Moulin is developed to consider the case of non crowded 
commons (instead of crowded ones, as in Crès and Moulin). The author, who 
presents an analytical approach which moves closer to the price of anarchy 
literature (than did Crès and Moulin), introduces the concept of worst 
absolute loss and finds that - if commons are not crowded – random priority 
(again) performs better than average cost rules. 
A crucial aspect of those analyses lies in resource management: it is 
assumed that decisions are taken at the beginning of a unit of time (which 
may well be very short), and that no other requests are considered during the 
processing time. This holds if one can think of a BMS that arranges 
transmission across a spectrum commons in blocks: for instance, this could 
be the case of a (cognitive) opportunistic system that, in order to decide the 
allocation of available spectral resources to its users, carries out periodical 
spectrum sensing. Use of store and forward protocols, such as those 
                                                                                                                                          
decide whether to request the service or not, and if they do, they pay average cost; see, for 
instance, Juarez (2008: 70). 
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developed for disruption tolerant networks, could be particularly helpful, 
because they use bundles of information, i.e. aggregated packages of users 
information, which can be passed and repackaged until their destination is 
reached (cf. Cannon and Harding 2007: 103-4). 
 
6.2.2.- Management of shared spectrum where devices and users have different rights 
(priority) of access  
In plausible circumstances, a spectrum commons may be shared by devices 
(and users) that do not have equal rights of access: some of them may enjoy 
exogenous rights which entail priority over other users, at least in specified 
cases. For instance, a commons may be shared by devices in use for general 
applications and services, as well as by devices in the hands of public 
agencies which provide defence, national security, public safety or 
emergency services. When the latter group of devices seek spectrum access, it 
will normally happen under a priority rule; therefore, communications by 
other devices will have secondary spectrum access (Webb 2007). 
A number of situations may arise: on the one hand, use of spectrum by 
priority access devices may require use of the whole capacity - thus access by 
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other devices is, at least temporarily, suspended126 - an issue of congestion 
brought about by priority access devices may arise (which would be again 
the case of spectrum management when devices have equal rights of access); 
on the other hand, use of spectrum by those devices may leave spare capacity 
for secondary access devices. In the latter case, spectrum management can be 
arranged in at least two alternative ways: firstly, communications which 
cannot be completed during the congestion peak are dropped and it is the 
responsibility of the device to repeat its access request later (if this is still 
beneficial for the user); secondly, communications are arranged in a queue 
by a spectrum commons manager, that will serve the queue (at the end of the 
congestion peak) – in the meantime, users may decide to leave the queue, 
which brings about a case with similarities to the online protocols analyzed 
in Moulin (2007).127
If spare capacity is not enough to satisfy all communications demands, 
rationing may occur among communications which have different access 
 
                                                 
126 Queuing systems can be organised using a number of rules; some of those rules include 
pre-emption. For instance, an emergency service could be arranged using a last-come-first-
served rule with pre-emption; therefore, therefore spectrum would be immediately used for 
that service, and any other service would be interrupted (Hassin and Haviv 2003). 
127 See also Crès and Moulin (2001). In order to check whether priority access devices are 
using all the capacity, one may think that protocols such as AIMD or MIMD are in operation 
inside devices (such as CRs) without primary access rights (cf. the discussion above and 
references to the literature). 
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rights.128 In those cases, discrimination among users of shared spectrum is 
wanted, independently of the size of their demand. The axiomatic literature 
on distributive justice points out that rationing methods imposing the equal 
treatment of equals axiom are not appropriate, because a priori 
discrimination is allowed in our context (cf. Moulin 2000: 644-5). This kind of 
observation has stimulated research (Moulin 2000) in the area of asymmetric 
rationing methods, i.e. methods where equal treatment of equals is not 
compelling and priority rules following a fixed priority ordering are 
designed. Moreover this research has focused on the case of the discrete 
rationing model (instead of traditional continuous models), which can be 
used for general queuing problems, including management of access to a 
spectrum commons.129
In spectrum commons with a BMS, if congestion is experienced during a 
certain period of time, the band manager (on behalf of the wider community 
 
Spectrum commons management: the LEDPP rule and other compensation schemes 
                                                 
128 Rationing is used in a variety of contexts, e.g. the inheritance context and the bankruptcy 
contexts; the cost-sharing of a public good and taxation are two related interpretations; in the 
network literature, queuing is almost synonymous with rationing (Moulin 2000: 643-4). 
129 Moulin (2000) proposes models which analyze rationing problems involving a finite set of 
N agents. The author shows that, in the discrete model, the priority rules are the only 
rationing methods satisfying the three properties of consistency (i.e invariance of the 
rationing method to certain changes in the set of agents), upper composition and lower 
composition (i.e. invariance to changes in the amount of resources to be shared among the 
agents; upper composition pertains to an optimistic assessment of the available resources, 
whereas lower composition pertains to a pessimistic one).  
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of potential users who enjoy access rights to the commons) may aim to have 
a rule (a protocol) which offers spectrum assignments satisfying a given set 
of desirable properties (or axioms). Recent work by Çağaty Kayı and Eve 
Ramaekers (2010), in the research area of games and economic behaviour, 
offers a characterization of Pareto-efficient, fair and strategy-proof130
This approach may be useful to manage requests of spectrum access 
by a plurality of devices and users, whose demand for communications as 
well as waiting costs may differ from one another. In those circumstances, 
the authors suggest using the largest equally distributed pairwise pivotal 
(LEDPP) rule, which is identified as the only allocation rule satisfying the 
three axioms imposed. The LEDPP rule selects all efficient queues; sets each 
agent’s transfer considering each pair of agents in turn, making each agent in 
the pair pay the cost she imposes on the pair, and distributing the sum of 
these two payments equally (for equal treatment of equals in welfare) among 
the others (for strategy-proofness).
 
allocation rules in queuing games, with monetary transfers à la Groves (1973) 
set up to compensate agents having to wait.  
131
                                                 
130 Efficiency requires to maximize total welfare; fairness requires to treat equal agents 
equally; strategy-proofness requires that an agent should find revealing her unit waiting cost 
at least as desirable as misrepresenting it.  
131 The authors decompose Pareto-efficiency, on the domain of linear preferences in transfers, 
into two axioms: queue-efficiency, i.e. queues should minimize total waiting cost, and 
balancedness, i.e. transfers should sum up to zero; all axioms are satisfied by their LEDPP 
rule. 
 The results in Kayı and Ramaekers 
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(2010) include two relevant extensions (ibidem: 230-1): (i) if agents (users) 
differ in processing time (spectrum capacity per unit of time), the 
appropriate generalization of the LEDPP still satisfies the axioms imposed; 
(ii) agents (information transmitted) may be excluded (blocked), but not 
forced to participate in the rule - that is, voluntary participation is 
guaranteed.  
Nevertheless, in the case of spectrum commons, a few issues related to 
the implementation of the LEDPP rule seem worth discussing. First of all, the 
question arises, whether transfers à la Groves can be implemented with low 
transaction costs and, consequently, whether the LEDPP rule can be 
economically implemented (here, it is worth noting that some contributions 
in the literature on spectrum trading suggest spot markets for spectrum 
resources). Secondly, it seems interesting to extend the LEDPP rule to 
situations where the band manager of a congested commons is faced (almost) 
continuously with request of spectrum access by devices and users. Thirdly, 
the LEDPP rule might be useful when compensations (transfers) are 
arranged only if waiting time is in excess of some threshold. 
Moulin (2007) proposes a scheduling model relevant for a static 
environment (offline) where the band manager – as randomization is not 
feasible - can perform cash transfers balancing to zero among users (who, in 
this model, are characterized by their waiting cost as well as their job size). 
 158 
The results about the worst slowdown are still the same as those with 
randomization.132
 6.2.3.- Anarchy and spectrum commons  
 
 
In the fully decentralized environment, without a BMS, spectrum sharing (in 
a commons regime) may result in excessive access, given a priori technical 
limits, e.g. Shannon’s information transfer limit (cf. Webb 2007, ch. 6, esp. 60-
1). Recently, a few papers have contributed to the development of a new 
research line about the so called “price of anarchy”, i.e. the extent to which 
selfish behaviour affects (system) efficiency (Johari and Tsitsiklis 2004: 407-8). 
This is a performance index for resource allocation mechanisms introduced 
in the context of congestion games; it has been applied in various areas, 
including transportation problems, allocation of divisible goods, supply 
chain management and resource allocation of network bandwidths. Various 
ways to compute the price of anarchy are proposed in the literature (see the 
discussion in Moulin 2008: 379-82; Chen and Zhang 2010: 1-5); by and large, 
the price of anarchy can be computed as the ratio of total delay over efficient 
                                                 
132 This model, however, presents greater implementation difficulties: the server must elicit 
individual trade-offs between delay and cash compensation. The author makes the usual 
simplifying assumption that waiting costs are linear in time and known to the server 
(Moulin 2007: 877). For an analysis with non balanced transfers among users and a residual 
claimant, see Moulin (2006). 
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delay, or the ratio of equilibrium surplus over efficient surplus (the latter 
approach was used to evaluate output-sharing and cost-sharing methods).  
 Spectrum commons might experience congestion and delays too (if 
spectrum use gets too intense). Research on the price of anarchy suggests 
that, however, congestion will not lead to a collapse. In this growing 
literature, two contributions are of particular relevance for the case of 
spectrum sharing, as they offer insights about what one could expect when 
thresholds such as the Shannon limit or sub-channel capacity (cf., e.g., 
Bellanger 2010) are reached, following increasing demands of access to a 
spectrum commons.  
One very recent contribution is by Moulin (2008), who aims at finding, 
for a given cost function and number of users, the cost sharing method(s) 
with the highest guaranteed surplus. The author notes, firstly, that a more 
recent application of cost sharing methods is to queuing games, where 
individual demands are the size of a single job, or the rate of a random flow 
of small jobs, whereas the cost is the resulting delay before completion of 
these jobs (in those circumstances, the numeraire is time and a crucial 
assumption is that waiting costs are linear); secondly, that output sharing 
methods are not conceptually problematic, once cost sharing methods have 
been investigated – with congestion games on a network, where agents bid 
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for capacity, being an example (see Johari and Tsitsiklis 2004, and the other 
references in Moulin 2008).  
With regard to spectrum, this research may be useful for the case of 
mesh networks (using spectrum commons), where a set of users share a one-
input, one-output technology with increasing marginal costs. In addition, a 
variant of Moulin’s model, measuring the output commodity can be applied 
to the case of cognitive radios and software defined radios, if those radios 
share protocols which manage a kind of queuing game, where a user (or 
device) requests an amount of spectrum capacity to transfer some data and 
suffers a delay.  
Johari and Tsitsiklis (2004) offer additional insights into the case of 
spectrum, especially where networks are comprised of cognitive radios. They 
show that, when users are sharing a single resource or, in a network context, 
when users submit individual payments for each link they may wish to 
use,133 the aggregate utility received by them is at least ¾ of the maximum 
possible aggregate utility.134
These results suggest that spectrum can be shared with limited 
failures, if any. Selfish behaviour by users need not lead to arbitrarily 
inefficient outcomes. However, those models are static models of (network) 
  
                                                 
133 Users are required to know the prices of the links they wish to use. 
134 See also Roughgarden (2003), who shows that the price of anarchy is independent of the 
network topology. 
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behaviour. In practice, users will dynamically interact and use the shared 
resource. “In general, convergence of such dynamics is not very well 
understood” yet (Johari and Tsitsiklis 2004: 433). Further analyses along 
those lines would be beneficial for the case of shared spectrum.  
 
6.3.- Concluding remarks 
The qualitative analysis of possible circumstances (scenarios) of shared 
spectrum resources, combined with research contributions in areas other 
than spectrum management, suggests that spectrum sharing is a viable 
option in a number of settings. Different spectrum environments might be 
managed relying on various mechanisms (coupled with the appropriate 
engineering solutions) relatively soon. Moreover, if spectrum sharing and 
allocation is governed by a BMS, a few (additional) management methods 
can be relied upon, to avoid or reduce inefficiencies. The following table 
shows succinctly the various arrangements envisaged with respect to 
research themes which can enhance spectrum sharing or, at a minimum, 
provide elements for further investigation of spectrum sharing issues (Table 
6). 
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Table 6 - Managing shared spectrum beyond command and control 
 
Type of spectrum management arrangements 
 
Research theme 
 
 
 
 
 
(A): 
With a band 
manager (or 
mechanism 
performing a 
similar function) 
 
 
(A.1): 
Users with 
equal rights 
of access 
(A.1.a): 
Continuous 
spectrum 
access 
Scheduling problems 
with arbitrary job size 
and release time; 
MIMD strategies 
(A.1.b): 
Discontinuous 
spectrum 
access 
 
Random priority 
mechanisms 
 
 
(A.2): 
Users with 
different 
rights of 
access 
(A.2.a): 
Continuous 
spectrum 
access 
Possible elaborations 
building on the themes 
identified for equal 
rights 
(A.2.b): 
Discontinuous 
spectrum 
access 
Asymmetric rationing 
methods; 
Compensation schemes 
(B): 
Without a band manager (or mechanism 
performing a similar function) 
 
Price of anarchy 
 
Effective management of shared spectrum relies on the appropriate 
design of protocols, rules and, in general, mechanisms to cope with 
congestion, because, at least occasionally, spectrum sharing may involve 
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inefficiencies, as  too much capacity is demanded by too many users in a 
decentralized environment. Congestion management is crucial to avoid a 
collapse in shared spectrum. Moreover, radio networks - especially in 
decentralized environments – are much more complex than other networks, 
because the sensing of other transmissions (awareness of other devices) 
cannot be taken for granted. A number of technical engineering solutions 
need to be explored and tested before some of the qualitative scenarios 
envisaged can be implemented (e.g. in cognitive radio systems a 
fundamental element is the operation of a cross-technology layer which deals 
with access to a common spectrum band for different users/ uses). However, 
this need not be done by regulators. Arguably, a very promising line of 
research, which could promote efficient management of a spectrum 
commons, is the one that investigates, in scheduling problems, the worst 
possible configuration which might occur in particular circumstances. The 
worst slowdown concept used in cases of arbitrary job size and release time 
may be appropriate for shared spectrum problems. Therefore, solutions in 
line with fair sojourn protocols should be considered to improve spectrum 
management. 
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Chapter 7. Conclusion and further research 
Wireless communications are experiencing an unprecedented expansion. The 
increasing mobility of the communication society and the pace of 
technological change are growing pressure for more spectrum to support 
more users, more uses and more capacity. Thus, spectrum management has 
become an extremely important part of wireless communications. However, 
the traditional approach and its management tools are no longer adequate. 
Those developments have brought about several issues for spectrum 
managers and regulators. One crucial issue is artificial spectrum scarcity, 
which has emerged in decades of `command and control` spectrum 
management. This work argues that spectrum management reform has not 
yet significantly departed from the traditional approach, and spectrum is not 
treated like any other input.  Spectrum management can benefit from more 
liberal spectrum sharing.   
This work set out to answer three main research questions: firstly, 
whether there is a theoretical framework which can be used to analyze and 
guide spectrum policy reform, when moving spectrum management from a 
traditional ‘command and control’ regime to a market-inspired one; 
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secondly, whether it is possible to design a plausible mechanism which can 
promote efficient allocation and assignment of (shared) spectrum commons; 
and, thirdly, what methods can be used to share spectrum with no harmful 
interference by new spectrum-using technologies, which are challenging the 
‘command and control’ framework. 
The literature on transition economics was used to analyze spectrum 
management reforms which have been carried out in a few liberalizing 
countries. A number of propositions, suggested by Dewatripont and Roland 
(1995), with regard to the speed and sequencing of economic reforms were 
applied to the case of spectrum reforms. Thus, developments in reforming 
countries could be analyzed systematically, by focussing on two main areas 
of spectrum management reform, namely reform of assignment and 
allocation methods. This contributes to the discussion on modernizing 
spectrum management in a number of ways: firstly, it provides a unifying 
framework for the various ingredients (and tools) of spectrum reform 
towards market-inspired methods already analyzed in the literature; 
secondly, it offers a structure to carry on research about reforming countries 
as well as to collect and analyze data on their experiences; thirdly, it enables 
a more comprehensive discussion of the conditions which might help to 
successfully move away from `command and control`; finally, and more 
generally, it presents some empirical work informing the debate on the 
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sequencing of (telecommunications) reforms, which has been a subject of 
theoretical analyses, but little empirical work (Wallsten 2002).  
Work on the first research question thus benefitted from the use of 
that theoretical framework, which, however, was not conceived to analyze 
spectrum policy. Furthermore, spectrum management reform has not been 
brought forward by policymakers in accordance with theories of transition 
economics; thus, data to cover all elements considered in that framework was 
not available.135
Spectrum management reforms have focussed on liberalization of 
spectrum assignment and allocation. However, spectrum regulators have not 
changed substantially their approach to making spectrum for collective use 
available. Therefore, one of the aims of this work was to study a plausible 
mechanism which could be used in a market-inspired spectrum management 
context to assign and allocate the resource for collective use. The approach 
proposed here envisages auctions where bidders demanding spectrum for 
sole use (such as wireless network operators) compete simultaneously 
 Therefore, avenues for further research include at least two 
related topics: firstly, the development of a theoretical framework which is 
specifically conceived to analyze spectrum management reform; secondly, 
empirical research carried out using that specific theoretical framework. 
                                                 
135 The data does not show anywhere that a comprehensive framework for reform, similar to 
that proposed by Dewatripont and Roland (1995) for transition economics, was used to 
guide the transition from ‘command and control’ to more market-inspired mechanisms for 
spectrum management.  
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against groups of players who demand spectrum for collective use. These 
players agree to contribute at least a minimum fraction of their wealth and 
this fraction is set by majority vote. It is shown that a translation of the 
median-index theorem – originally proposed by Cave and Salant 1995 in the 
analysis of cartels to restrict output - applies to our circumstances. Thus, in 
the first stage, potential collective spectrum users vote on a common 
minimum percentage of wealth to pay during the auction; in the second 
stage, those users bid at least the common minimum percentage; then the 
auctioneer compares the total of these bids with the other bids (if any). 
Therefore, a market-based mechanism might be used to decide whether, and 
how much, spectrum should be allocated to collective use, thus taking 
decisions on allocation and assignment of spectrum for collective use away 
from regulatory fiat. 
 Research carried out in this part of the work focussed on the 
translation of Cave and Salant`s results to the problem of collective use of 
spectrum, which has (severe) specific difficulties compared to cartels. For 
instance, the incentives to actually reach an agreement to submit a collective 
bid were not investigated (cf. Gerber and Wichardt 2009, esp. 429-30). The 
procedure proposed here seems plausible in circumstances where only a few 
players agree to bid together to get spectrum for collective use. A line for 
future research might be a test of our envisaged mechanism by means of 
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simulations. In addition, the design of a plausible mechanism which can be 
used with a high number of players is an interesting issue which deserves 
further research (cf. Nitzan and Ueda 2009).   
 Finally, part of this work took a closer look at plausible arrangements 
for allocating shared spectral resources among users/ uses, and handling 
possible congestion or prioritizations of access. It considered, among 
available arrangements designed to share scarce resources, those rules which 
can be useful for the case of spectrum management if pieces of spectrum (e.g. 
spectrum commons) are used to deliver a number of services to many users, 
in particular deploying new spectrum-using technologies and networks. It 
also figured out, being as specific as possible at this stage, some conceptual 
circumstances marked by access to shared spectrum. Among the research 
themes which were considered for the case of shared spectrum, recent 
developments in the literature on scheduling problems were identified as the 
most relevant ones, especially with regard to analyses of the worst 
slowdown. 
The qualitative arguments presented have not considered the technical 
engineering requirements for effective spectrum sharing. Those requirements 
have been either taken for granted, by borrowing from areas other than 
spectrum management, or skipped (and left for engineering research). In 
addition, the elaboration of dynamic mechanisms, to deal with continuous 
 169 
demands for spectrum access by users, is of key importance for shared 
spectrum in a device centric environment with composite and opportunistic 
networks, but research on dynamic settings is at a relatively early stage 
(being more complex than static settings). Those complexities, however, do 
not seem insurmountable and spectrum sharing in flexible and dynamic 
environments does not seem to be condemned to failures. The qualitative 
analysis suggests some conceptual settings which might be taken as starting 
points for further investigation into more specific environments. Some of 
those settings may turn out to be technically or economically unviable. 
Further investigation of specific solutions, with quantitative analysis 
involving the technical elaboration of algorithms, formulas and calculations 
(linked to appropriate quantitative assumptions),136
                                                 
136 For example, what maximum delay would not be yet considered collapse. 
 are left for future 
research.  
Nevertheless, policy makers and businesses managing spectrum 
access may be less worried about spectrum tragedies and more prone to 
exploiting spectrum sharing opportunities in the near future.  
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Appendix 
 
Part A: Existence and uniqueness of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium 
Existence 
Let WN ∑
N
iw
1
 =   denote the sum of exogenous wealth of the N players, 
whose maximization problem is: 
max b  i [f(B) – c  i] 
s.t. 
b  i ≥  Fw  i  . 
If the constraint is not binding, the F.O.C. requires f(B) – ci + bi f’(B) = 0; 
therefore, we get  bi (B)' f
cf(B) i− = - . 
Since f’(B) < 0 , bi > 0 if f(B) – c i > 0 or, equivalently, f(B) > ci .  
If the constraint is binding, firm i contributes Fwi.  
Let βi(B) denote firm i’s best reply: 
βi






−
(B)' f 
c-f(B) ,Fw  i i(B) = max  
for B ∈[FWN , WN]. 
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Define β(B) = ∑N1 βi(B) .  Hence β(B) is the “aggregate best reply”. Since f(B) 
a nd f’(B) a re continuous a nd f’(B) <  0 ,  β(B) is a continuous function. 
Moreover, if the firm with the lowest cost of capital has positive average net 
benefit when firms contribute the minimum fraction of their wealth (i.e. 
f(FWN) > c i ), then the aggregate best-reply contribution is greater than FWN:  
β(FWN) > FWN as long as f(FWN) > ci . 
Finally β(WN) ≤ W N
∈
 (the maximum amount of funds that the N firms can 
contribute is their entire wealth).  
It follows that there exists at least one fixed point B*  [FWN , WN
∈
] such that 
β(B*) = B*. 
Assume that total benefit is strictly concave: 
2f’ (B) + B f’’(B) < 0 for all B  [FWN , WN]; then 2f’ (B) + β i
∈
(B) f’’(B) < 0 for all 
B  [FWN, WN] and each firm’s second-order condition will be satisfied 
whenever its first-order conditions hold. Hence, every fixed point of the 
mapping β(.) is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. 
 
Uniqueness 
We now verify that the left-hand derivative of β(.), evaluated at any fixed 
point B*, is strictly less than 1 – which implies that there exists a unique fixed 
point. 
 172 
If firm i is unconstrained, 
βi (B)' f
cf(B) i−(B) = - . 
Hence β’ i






+ (B)β
(B)' f
(B)'' f1 i(B) = - . 
Assume that, as B→  B* from the left, u firms are unconstrained; summing 
over the unconstrained firms we obtain: 
β'(B*)-






+ ]FW -(B*) [β
(B*)' f
(B*)'' f
cou = -  
where FWco is the aggregate contribution of the constrained firms (they must 
contribute the minimum fraction of their wealth according to F, i.e. Fwi, 
which is their best reply).  
Since f’(B*) < 0 and β(B) ≥ FWco , β'(B*)- ≤ 0 < 1 provided f’’(B) ≤ 0. 
It remains to show that β'(B*)- < 1 if f’’(B) > 0. 
At a ny fixed point,  2 f’(B*) +  βi(B*)f’’(B*) < 0 (since total revenue is strictly 
concave). Hence, summing over the u unconstrained firms  
2uf’(B*) + [β(B*) - FWco
Adding the negative quantity
] f’’(B*) < 0.  
137 2f’(B*) + β(B*)f’’(B*) to the previous 
inequality (which is negative), we obtain: 
2uf’(B*) + [β(B*) - FWco
                                                 
137 Recall total revenue is strictly concave and β(B*) = B*. 
] f’’(B*) + 2f’(B*) + β(B*)f’’(B*) < 0 
or, equivalently,  
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2f’(B*) [u + 1] + 2 ( )





 −
2
FW*Bβ co  f’’(B*) < 0 . 
Dividing by - 2f’(B*) > 0 we get 
- [u + 1] - 
(B*)' f
(B*)'' f  ( )





 −
2
FW*Bβ co < 0 
or, equivalently, 
- ( )






−+ ]
2
FW*B[β
(B*)' f
(B*)'' f  cou < 1. 
Since 
(B*)' f 2
(B*)'' f  FWco < 0 we obtain 
- ( )






−+ ]
2
FW*B[β
(B*)' f
(B*)'' f  cou + 
(B*)' f 2
(B*)'' f  FWco < 1 
or, equivalently, 
- 






+ ]FW -(B*) [β
(B*)' f
(B*)'' f
cou  < 1; hence β'(B*)-
Let B(F) denote the aggregate contribution offered by firms bidding for 
unlicensed spectrum in the unique Nash equilibrium induced by fraction F 
 < 1. 
 
 
Part B: Unconstrained monotonicity and convexity of the set of fractions binding on 
firm i 
 174 
(set by majority-rule vote)138 and let i be an unconstrained bidder at F. Firm 
i’s profits are: 
 πi = {f (B(F)) – c  i} . b  i
=
dF
dπi
 (B(F)). 
A change in F will affect i’s profits: 





 +− (B(F))' fb
dB
db]c[f(B(F))
dF
dB
i
i
i . 
For firm i, marginal benefit and cost are equal: 
f(B(F)) + bi f’ (B(F)) – ci = 0; 
hence f(B(F)) – ci = - bi
=
dF
dπi
 f’ (B(F)) and we obtain 
=





 + (B(F))' fb
dB
db(B(F)] ' fb [-
dF
dB
 i
i
i






dB
db - 1
dF
dB i (B(F))' fbi  
where (B(F))' f  is strictly negative. 
Since bi(B) implicitly solves f(B) + bi f’ (B) – ci
(B)' f
(B)'' fb(B)' f
dB
db ii +
−=
 = 0, we can use the implicit 
function theorem to get that 
 
and, since total benefit is strictly concave, we obtain 
1 - 
(B)' f
(B)'' fb(B)' 2f
dB
db ii +
=  > 0 . 
Hence 






dB
db - 1 i (B(F))' fbi  < 0 and 
                                                 
138 Henceforth, to simplify our notation, we will write B(F) without an asterisk. 
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sgn =
dF
dπi - sgn 
dF
dB . 
To show that 
dF
dπi  ≤ 0 as long as some firm is constrained (clearly 
dF
dπi = 0 if no 
firm is constrained), we verify that 
dF
dB > 0. 
Let Ω  be the set of unconstrained firms and u the number of elements in this 
set. For each unconstrained firm i ∈Ω  we have  f(B) + bi f’ (B) – ci
Χ
 = 0. Also, 
let  be the set of constrained firms and v be the number of its elements (v = 
N – u and FWco is their aggregate contribution, i.e. FWco ∑
v
j
1
Fw = , where j is a 
firm in Χ ). The aggregate contribution collected by the unconstrained 
bidders is ∑
u
i
1
b = B - FWco . 
Summing over the set of unconstrained firms, we obtain 
uf(B) + [B - FWco ∑
u
i
1
c] f ‘ (B) - = 0. 
Total differentiation gives: 
dF
dB = 
 (B) '' f )FW - (B  (B)' f 1)(
(B)' fW  
co
co
u ++
 
which is zero if no firm is constrained (Wco ∑
v
j
1
w = = 0). 
Suppose Wco ∑
v
j
1
w =  > 0 . Since f ‘(B) < 0 and 






+ ]FW -[B
(B)' f
(B)'' f
cou > - 1 , we 
get  
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(u + 1)f ‘(B) + [ coFW -B ] f ’’(B) < 0. Hence 
dF
dB  > 0. 
 
Following the reasoning in Cave and Salant (1995), we now use these results 
to verify that a firm unconstrained at F will remain unconstrained at any 
looser fraction F l (where  F l < F). For this it is sufficient that the optimal bid of 
any unconstrained firm i decrease no faster than the minimum contribution 
required by the voting committee Fwi, as F decreases: 
dbi ≥ dFwi  
dF
dbi
(note that there are both negative); hence  
=
dB
dbi






dF
dB  ≤ wi
(B)' f
(B)'' fb(B)' f
dB
db ii +
−=
 . 
Since  and 
dF
dB = 
 (B) '' f )FW - (B  (B)' f 1)(
(B)' fW
co
co
u ++
, we get 
that 
dF
dbi = - 
 (B) '' f )FW - (B  (B)' f 1)(
(B)]' f  (B)'' f[b W
co
ico
u ++
+
≤ w
coFW -B
i 
where u ≥ 1 and (u + 1)f ‘(B) + [ ] f ’’(B) < 0. 
If  f ’’(B) ≤ 0 then (B)]' f  (B)'' f[b W +ico < 0 and -
 (B) '' f )FW - (B  (B)' f 1)(
(B)]' f  (B)'' f[b W
co
ico
u ++
+
≤ 
wi clearly holds in this case (w i 
B f’’(B) + 2f’ (B) + 
≥ 0).  
Suppose instead that  f ’’(B) > 0. Since total benefit is concave, the following 
inequality holds: 
(B)' f )1(
w
W





 −+ u
i
co < 0. 
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This is equivalent to 
B f’’(B) + (B)' f )1(
w
W





 ++ u
i
co < 0 
which can be manipulated to get  
f’’(B) + { } (B)' f  )FWB(WFw  +−+ coicoi w { }ico u w)1(W ++  < 0 
(note that wiB = FwiWco + wi [B – FWco]). 
Re-arranging we obtain: 
f’’(B) FwiWco + f’’(B) wi [B – FWco] + f ‘(B) Wco + f ‘(B) (u + 1) w i < 0 
or, equivalently, 
Wco [f’’(B) Fwi + f ‘(B)] + w i {f’’(B) [B – FWco] + f ‘(B) (u + 1)} < 0. 
Therefore, - Wco [f’’(B) Fwi + f ‘(B)] > wi {f’’(B) [B – FWco] + f ‘(B) (u + 1)}.  
Since {f’’(B) [B – FWco
 (B) '' f )FW - (B  (B)' f 1)(
(B)]' f Fw (B)'' [f W
co
ico
u ++
+
] + f ‘(B) (u + 1)} < 0 we get  
-  < wi 
where Fwi ≤ bi
 (B) '' f )FW - (B  (B)' f 1)(
(B)]' f  (B)'' f[b W  
co
ico
u ++
+
. Hence the following inequality holds: 
- ≤ wi .  
This confirms that a firm unconstrained at F will remain unconstrained at 
any looser quota. 
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